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SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis provides a neo-Gramscian account of Cross-Strait economic integration (CSEI) between 
Taiwan and China and challenges the realist and liberal underpinnings which define the CSEI 
literature. I argue that rather than occurring between two separate state apparatuses which respond to 
an objective market-led integration process, that both the political and economic dimensions of CSEI 
should be understood as components of a single process. I theorize Taiwan’s policy parameter as 
confined by a Cross-Strait historical bloc in which Taiwan’s capitalist class and the Chinese 
Communist Party are hegemonic.  
 
I start by arguing that CSEI can only be understood in terms of social order and the social basis of 
Taiwan’s state and develop a regionally focused neo-Gramscian framework to account for it in terms 
of a Cross-Strait historical bloc. To better contextualize Taiwan’s contemporary social order 
parameters, I first examine the social basis which enabled and eventually diluted the bureaucratic 
autonomy on which the Kuomintang’s one-party rule was based between 1945 and 1988. Afterward, I 
examine the erosion of the KMT’s elite bureaucratic autonomy and the social order parameters set by 
Taiwan’s newly hegemonic Cross-Strait historical bloc between 1988 and 2000. I then examine the 
Democratic Progressive Party’s CSEI openings between 2001 and 2008 in the context of both its 
historical bloc confined policy parameter and an increasingly populist identity politics in Taiwan 
which diverted the citizenry’s attention from economic matters. I conclude by examining the 
unprecedented CSEI deepening which occurred since the KMT’s return to power in 2008 and argue 
that this is a culmination of the historical bloc’s long-term policy parameter. But, I also examine to 
what extent a capital-defined CSEI has spurred forth an increased contestation process and to what 
extent this may signal that a counter historical bloc is coming into shape in Taiwan. 
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Introduction 
On February 28, 2004, the Taiwan nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) organized an 
impressive mobilization in which one million of its supporters locked hands and formed a 
continuous human chain along Taiwan’s coast. Symbolically, this mobilization was framed by 
the DPP as signalling the party’s resolve to preserve Taiwan’s sovereignty from China's 
encroachment. But, despite the impressive political theatre, the human chain had little effect on 
the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) unification strategy which was based on the combination 
of a threat of war in the case of a formal declaration of Taiwanese independence and the 
intensification of Cross-Strait economic integration (CSEI), a process which intensified full1y 
from 1988 onward. A deepening CSEI is central to the CCP’s unification strategy because it 
facilitates Taiwan’s economic dependence on China and because it allows the CCP to constrain 
Taiwan’s long-term policy parameter toward a China-friendly pathway through its control over 
Taiwan’s capitalist class which has invested heavily in China. Even more importantly, however, 
despite publicly striking a principled Taiwan identity advancing and sovereignty preserving 
posture throughout its two terms in office between 2000 and 2008, the DPP actually lifted 
numerous existing restrictions on CSEI with China. That a self-professed Taiwan nationalist 
party pursued a unification advancing economic policy may appear to be a baffling phenomenon, 
but it indicates that regardless of sovereignty implications, that Taiwan’s two major political 
parties, the DPP and the more China-friendly Kuomintang (KMT), have pursued an equally 
CSEI enabling policy course from 2000 onward. The difference between the two party’s CSEI 
policies was only a matter of tempo and degree, not substance.  
 
Within much of the scholarly literature, the DPP’s CSEI enabling policy course is interpreted as 
an outcome of the party leadership’s awareness of the unavoidable and economically vital 
nature of CSEI for Taiwan. This understanding of CSEI is based on underlying and taken for 
granted liberal assumptions which are dominant in the CSEI literature and which propose that 
CSEI, in a typical free market fashion, leads to the upgrading of Taiwan’s economic 
composition along a comparative advantage and market-defined pathway (Dent, 2003; Sutter, 
2002). Such liberal assumptions have themselves become a tool of legitimation by which the 
"beneficial" nature of CSEI is presented as objectively valid and beyond reproach while 
Taiwan’s citizenry has also been encouraged to accept CSEI on the basis of an expert consensus 
on its desirability (Roy, 2004). A liberal interpretation of a CSEI-induced national prosperity 
(henceforth to be referred to as the economistic narrative) has been propagated so effectively 
throughout Taiwan’s financial, business and media institutions that a majority of its citizens 
associate CSEI with Taiwan’s collective interest. As such, despite a majority of Taiwan’s 
citizens indicating a status-quo friendly and unification-averse political stance, nearly 70 % 
simultaneously voice their support for CSEI (Ma, 2009, p. 18). 
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Based on the perceived economically beneficial nature of and strong degree of popular support 
for CSEI, the Cross-Strait dynamic tends to be tidily summed up in the literature in a binary-like 
economics vs. politics schematic. According to this view, Taiwan’s citizens are faced with a 
collective choice between either an economically vital but sovereignty-impeding CSEI, or an 
economically harmful but sovereignty preserving economic isolationism (Keng & Schubert, 
2010; Roy, 2004). Because of the strong degree of support for CSEI, the mainstream view posits 
that Taiwan’s citizenry soundly veer toward the former. As an outcome, a majority of the CSEI 
literature tends to be aimed at providing an account of the relative tilts in Taiwan toward either 
an economic or political direction. Needless to say, such a binary-like approach is not only over 
simplified and reductionist, but also fails to correspond to the reality of the CSEI dynamic.  
 
At a closer inspection, not only did CSEI not lead to an increased socio-economic prosperity in 
Taiwan, but it was rather accompanied by an ever-deepening socio-economic malaise which 
refers to a prolonged economic slowdown and a consistent deterioration of Taiwan’s 
socio-economic welfare. The roots of Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise were already observable 
in the 1990s when CSEI first visibly intensified (having been more incremental in nature during 
the 1980s) while manifesting fully after 2000. In welfare terms, Taiwan fared particularly poorly 
and a historically low unemployment rate grew from an already increased 3% in the 1990s to 
more than 5% after 2000 while real wages also declined annually and have continued to do so 
until this day (Driffield & Chiang, 2009; Kong, 2005; L. Wang, 2011). As an outcome, 
inequality in Taiwan has increased significantly and has manifested itself in the so-called M 
shaped society phenomena by which Taiwan’s middle class has grown slimmer while the 
discrepancy between the wealthy and the poor has grown at a pronounced rate. In terms of the 
labour process, CSEI also did not lead to a visible improvement of Taiwan’s labour norms 
which continue to be centred on intensive and long-hours based work practices. This has been 
so much the case that Taiwan has consistently ranked as having among the world’s longest 
working hours, securing a higher ranking even than Japan (Bulard, 2012; Fell, 2005).  
  
Correlation, of course does not equate to causation, but it is impossible to deny that the 
pronounced capital flight toward China which underpinned the CSEI process has been an 
important factor exacerbating Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise. Although challenging to liberal 
proponents of CSEI, such an outcome is not surprising, especially in the context of the two 
central aims which guided the investment decisions of Taiwan’s capitalist class in China. These 
were to make inroads into China’s large domestic market and to secure lower production costs 
by outsourcing production processes to China. In terms of the first aim, Taiwan’s capitalist class 
fared unevenly while successful inroads into China also did not necessarily correlate with 
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positive externalities in Taiwan. But, in terms of the second aim, although Taiwan’s capitalist 
class was enormously successful, the social cost of the capital flight and production outsourcing 
was an increased unemployment and a deteriorating labour and wage environment in Taiwan. 
Although liberals are willing to acknowledge that job losses have occurred, they argue that such 
job losses are confined to lower-end labour processes and that they are necessary for Taiwan’s 
economic upgrading which will create plenty of new jobs that are more in tune with its 
comparative advantage (Lui, F.T. and Qiu, L.D., 2001). But in Taiwan’s case, not only have 
limited new jobs been created, but outsourced jobs have also extended far beyond the scope 
permitted by liberals and have occurred all along Taiwan’s value chain (Driffield & Chiang, 
2009; Kobayashi, 2005).  
 
When Taiwan’s CSEI induced socio-economic malaise is acknowledged, it is most commonly 
shaped by an economic nationalist perspective which blames this malaise on a vertical 
hollowing-out of Taiwan’s value chain to China (Driffield & Chiang, 2009; Kobayashi, 2005). 
The economic nationalist position’s widening of the scholarly debate is to be welcomed, but its 
analysis also remains wanting because it fails to account for the CSEI’s class defined nature 
which has proceeded primarily to advance the interests of Taiwan’s dominant sub-contracting 
based capitalist class. Although Taiwanese firms are advanced in relative terms, a majority 
continue to engage primarily in either Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) or Original 
Design Manufacturing (ODM) production, the latter of which is slightly more advanced than 
OEM because it also includes some design functions. Excluding a very slim number of core 
technology or brand value possessing firms such as TSMC and Acer, a predominantly 
sub-contracting industrial composition has ensured that Taiwanese firms tend to only enjoy very 
low profit margins. Rather than pursuing innovative business strategies or investing more 
heavily in R&D, however, the majority of Taiwan’s firms have rather pursued a cost-down 
strategy by securing revenues primarily through reducing production costs (Breznitz, 2007). 
When perceived this way, it is clear that Taiwan’s capital flight to China was an unavoidable 
outcome of its industrial composition which, in turn, has further strengthened Taiwan’s 
sub-contracting industry features.  
 
It is true that many of Taiwan’s firms have not yet outsourced all of their production processes 
to China, especially in terms of more technologically or capital-intensive production processes. 
But at the same time, without viable economic upgrading and job creation, the overall outcome 
of CSEI has been negative for Taiwan’s social welfare. But, despite the collective costs of this 
capital flight, it remains the case that Taiwan’s capitalist class has advanced its interests and has 
profited enormously through the CSEI process. Because class is so central to CSEI, it is clearly 
not possible to examine CSEI without focusing on the class drivers and class contradictions 
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which underpin it. Taiwan’s deteriorating labour regime, for instance, is an outcome of both 
sub-contracting induced cost-down imperatives, but also more general contradictions in the 
resource allocation process between the capitalist and non-capitalist classes. As such, other than 
immediate challenges posed by capital flight, CSEI has also significantly increased the 
bargaining power of employers to set labour conditions and to constrain Taiwan’s government 
policy toward a capital advancing pathway. It is thus not difficult to discern that the welfare 
impeding outcomes of CSEI have been a direct result of Taiwan’s OEM/ODM capital defined 
social order features. Such an understanding directly challenges both liberal assumptions of a 
socially conducive CSEI process while also overcoming the reductionist hollowing-out schema 
by theorizing CSEI within its appropriate class context.  
 
The failure of the CSEI outcomes promised by liberals to materialize problematizes the 
previously mentioned politics vs. economics binary and suggests that CSEI poses challenges on 
both economic and political grounds for Taiwan. This being so, the Taiwanese state’s CSEI 
enabling policy becomes even more counter-intuitive because it challenges both Taiwan’s 
sovereignty while also exacerbating Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise. Despite this, a common 
realist assumption remains as prevalent within the CSEI literature as the liberal assumption and 
conceives of Taiwan’s CSEI enabling policies as an outcome of economic necessity and as 
being guided by the state’s aim of advancing Taiwan’s collective interest (Dent, 2005; Sutter, 
2002; Xin, 2010; W. Zhang, 2001). Such an interpretation is clearly erroneous, but because it is 
so dominant in the literature, it has been the central impediment which has limited the analytical 
rigour of CSEI theorizing to date. This being so, it should be clear that CSEI can only be 
explained accurately once the policy parameters which shape Taiwan’s state are theorized first. 
Given the fact that CSEI is so evidently class defined, it is imperative that Taiwan’s state policy 
be examined with specific reference to its social and class basis before which assumptions of its 
political autonomy must remain in question.  
 
Research Questions 
The main research question I examine is why has Taiwan’s state facilitated a prolonged CSEI 
process? To answer this, I explore two main sub-questions, namely how can CSEI be 
understood in terms of Taiwan’s social order and what was the CCP’s role in shaping it? and 
how can the limited contestation against CSEI be understood in terms of its successful 
legitimation? To address these questions, I also examine a number of more specific questions 
which focus on key junctures of Taiwan’s post-WWII social order and which combined will 
allow me to answer my main research question and sub-questions. Because the question of a 
separable political autonomy is crucial to theorizing the nature of Taiwan’s state, I first examine 
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what the social basis of Taiwan’s hard developmental-state was between 1949 and 1978 to 
address how the KMT’s elite bureaucracy’s secured its pronounced political autonomy during 
this time? I then examine how a prolonged changing social basis of Taiwan’s state led to a 
continued, but much weakened elite bureaucratic autonomy during Taiwan’s soft 
developmental-state era between 1978 and 1988? I then examine how Taiwan’s changing social 
basis of the state led to the dissolution of a separable political autonomy during Lee-Teng-hui’s 
presidency between 1988 and 2000 and what the social basis of Taiwan’s state was after this? 
Because CSEI only fully intensified during Lee’s presidency, I also examine why his 
administration allowed CSEI to proceed? I then examine why and how the DPP’s Taiwan 
nationalist Chen Shui-bian administration significantly liberalized existing CSEI restrictions, 
especially in the context of an intensified socio-economic malaise which became fully evident 
during his presidency? Finally, I explore how the KMT’s President Ma Ying-jeou was able to 
pursue an even more pronounced CSEI deepening after 2008 despite Taiwan’s continually 
worsening socio-economic malaise? But, I also ask to what extent a more visible social 
contestation against CSEI during Ma’s administration may be reflective of a weakened CSEI 
legitimation?  
 
Theoretical and Argument Overview  
As the above overview illustrates, I take issue especially with the realist and liberal predicates 
on which the mainstream CSEI analysis is based. Although the realist and liberal approaches are 
separate, both tend to inter-twine within the CSEI literature to shape the mainstream analysis. 
As such, I don’t engage with the realist and liberal approaches as separate, but rather as 
un-reflexive predicates on which a majority of the CSEI analysis is based. Before I proceed 
further, it will first be useful to outline the core assumptions that define both the realist and 
liberal predicates which I will return to again in the following chapter at mode depth.  
 
The liberal predicate is based on the assumption that CSEI is a rule-like and market-led process 
which advances Taiwan’s collective economic interests. Despite its claim to objectivity, the 
liberal predicate is influenced heavily by the normative assumption that a market-led CSEI is 
not only desirable, but that it is the single most conducive path possible toward advancing 
Taiwan’s collective social welfare. Because the engine for this “objective” CSEI induced 
welfare enhancement is the concept of a comparative advantage-led upgrading, a liberal 
perspective equates and collapses the economic interests of the capitalist class with the 
collective interest of the citizenry. As such, liberal proponents of CSEI oppose state interference 
in the CSEI process because it is argued to impede the market from functioning properly. But, 
based on the previous overview of the correlated social outcomes which accompanied Taiwan’s 
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prolonged CSEI, it is clear that such a CSEI induced welfare enhancement did not materialize, a 
fact which seriously challenges the liberal predicate’s claim to objectivity. This failure to 
correctly theorize the CSEI process is an outcome of the negation among liberals to account for 
the very real class contradictions which shape and define the CSEI process.  
  
Because I focus especially on the question of the state, the realist predicate tends to be the most 
visible focal point of my analysis. As noted, the realist predicate is based on the central 
assumption that Taiwan’s state is an autonomous and agency-bound actor which is guided by the 
modus operandi of advancing Taiwan’s national or collective interest. A realist analysis tends 
most often to be coupled with a liberal predicate so that Taiwan’s state is either conceived of as 
actively enabling CSEI or as forced to do so because of an economic necessity which trumps the 
state’s long-term sovereignty imperatives. But, as I argue, this understanding cannot be 
substantiated if the liberal predicate of a CSEI-induced economic prosperity is problematized. 
Regardless of the untenable nature of its analysis, I argue that the realist predicate of an 
autonomous state in Taiwan is so deeply engrained in the literature that a deeper exploration of 
Taiwan’s state policy in terms of its social basis remains seriously lacking to date. The 
prevalence of the realist predicate is especially problematic because it has also influenced the 
analysis of the more critical and class-focused literature. As such, although some scholars have 
argued that Taiwan’s state policy has advanced capitalist interests which do not coincide with 
Taiwan’s collective interest, they have not parted paths entirely from the concept of its 
continued political autonomy (Driffield & Chiang, 2009; Kobayashi, 2005). For these reasons, a 
clear theoretical precision to understand Taiwan’s state remains under-developed and I will 
address this lacuna especially by arguing that Taiwan’s state was inherently capital advancing 
because its social basis was one in which its capitalist class was dominant. 
  
I critique the realist and liberal predicates on the basis that the market is not an objectively 
welfare enhancing and rule abiding mechanism and that the assumption of a separable state 
autonomy can also not be substantiated in Taiwan’s case. Both dimensions, I argue, are 
composites of a unified social order which cannot be theorize independently of social relations 
and class. To overcome the limitations of a realist and liberal analysis and to theorize CSEI in 
terms of it social basis, I apply a neo-Gramscian framework to theorize Taiwan’s CSEI policy in 
terms of a Cross-Strait historical bloc. The historical bloc is a conceptual tool which refers to 
class alliances between hegemonic and allied classes that shape and define the policy 
parameters of the state. (Cox, 1983) I argue that from the 1990s onward, Taiwan’s Large 
Enterprise (LE) owning capitalist class became hegemonic and forged a Cross-Strait historical 
bloc with the CCP which thereby also secured a capacity to shape Taiwan’s social order. The LE 
capitalist class distinction from a much larger Small and Medium (SME) enterprise owning 
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capitalist class is crucial to my analysis because I identify the LE capitalist class specifically as 
hegemonic and as shaping the policy parameters of Taiwan’s state. The LE capitalist class can 
be understood as Taiwan’s equivalent of a transnationally oriented capitalist class which is 
economically most consolidated and politically most powerful. Although it is difficult to 
demarcate specifically where the category of the LE capitalist class begins, LEs are generally 
publicly traded in the stock or over the counter market and will have employees numbering in 
the thousands or tens of thousands while enjoying direct access to the highest echelons of the 
political establishment. As for the CCP, I theorize its political autonomy on the basis of a 
passive revolution-enabled contender state which operates in opposition to neoliberal 
encroachment and which has actively shaped the Cross-Strait historical bloc to advance its 
interests (van der Pijl, 2012).  
 
By applying a Gramscian framework, I demonstrate that the artificial separation between an 
objective market and an autonomous state is untenable and that both are separate facets of 
Taiwan’s social order which can only be theorized as a whole. Furthermore, a theorizing of 
CSEI on the basis of a Cross-Strait historical bloc also demonstrates that the Gramscian 
approach is well-suited to theorize non-Northern inter-state relations through the concept of 
regionally operating historical blocs more generally. As such, my analysis also implicitly 
critiques a more dominant global capitalist type application popular among Gramscians which 
focuses centrally on a binary-like neoliberal social order convergence process and an 
anti-capitalist resistance against it (Gill, 1995a; Rupert, 2000). Such a conception is challenged 
by Taiwan’s internationalization toward China which, I argue, can be understood in terms of the 
fractional composition of its OEM/ODM capitalist class due to which its immediate economic 
interests are centred primarily in China. I ground this understanding on the Gramscian 
framework’s conception of a national point of social order legitimation and foreground the 
possibility of a continued geographical variation between globally and national/regionally 
dominant capitalist classes (Cox, 1981, 1983). This, I argue, ensures that differing fractional 
compositions of capital influence the susceptibility of nationally hegemonic classes toward 
either a Northern-emanating historical bloc or regionally operating historical blocs as in the case 
of the Cross-Strait historical bloc.   
 
My analysis is based on the assumption that Taiwan’s Cross-Strait historical bloc only became 
hegemonic by the early 1990s and before which a state-controlling elite bureaucracy enjoyed a 
pronounced political autonomy on the basis of a prolonged passive revolution. Passive 
revolution refers to a strategy of rule by which a regime managing class secures a political 
autonomy through limiting and balancing the relative strength of major classes so that no single 
class becomes powerful enough to impinge on its political autonomy (Cox, 1983).  In chapters 
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3 and 4, I focus primarily on the social conditions which enabled this elite bureaucratic 
autonomy in order to examine how a changing social basis of Taiwan’s state led to its 
progressive diluting during this time. The originally Chinese KMT first set up in Taiwan a 
provincial government in 1945 and then set up its official Republic of China (ROC) government 
in 1949 after its retreat from China. With the arrival of the KMT’s transplanted elite bureaucracy 
and a two million strong Chinese diaspora, I argue that the autonomy of the state-managing elite 
bureaucracy is to be understood in terms of its disconnected regime features from Taiwan’s 
social base and its ethnically homogenous elite bureaucratic composition. In addition, I also 
explore other factors which enhanced the elite bureaucracy’s political autonomy such as a 
crucial US support, a highly developed colonial infrastructure of rule inherited from Japan, and 
Taiwan’s predominantly agrarian society in which both class consciousness and civil society 
were under-developed. On this basis, I then examine the advances made by the elite bureaucracy 
to secure a long-term passive revolution by systematically weakening Taiwan’s elite classes and 
securing the long-term foundations for Taiwan’s class equilibrium. 
 
On the foundation of its passive revolution, I agree that the elite bureaucracy adopted an 
archetypal developmental-state (statist) policy framework. As a developmental-state, the KMT’s 
elite bureaucracy empowered a specialist economic bureaucracy to plan and lead Taiwan’s 
successful economic development according to a national plan (Amsden, 1979; Wade, 1990). 
But, I argue that the statist literature remains limited because of its primary focus on the 
institutional and policy parameters of Taiwan’s developmental state while focusing 
insufficiently on the class basis on which the political autonomy for a prolonged statist social 
order was secured. As an outcome, statists have failed to provide a satisfactory account for the 
progressive weakening and eventual erosion of the elite bureaucracy’s autonomy. In addition, I 
also argue that statists have failed to understand the elite bureaucracy as a distinct class which 
has secured its economic and political privileges through an organic connection with the state. 
As such, I argue not only that the elite bureaucracy shared a common interest, but that it also 
shared a strong consensus toward preserving its political autonomy. This being so, I explain the 
elite bureaucracy’s pursuit of a consistent statist development in terms of its need to deliver 
welfare-enhancing development which secured it the regime legitimacy necessary for its 
prolonged one-party rule.  
 
After theorizing the class features of Taiwan’s statist social order, I proceed to account for the 
class formation trajectory induced by the KMT’s statist development and examine how this 
affected Taiwan’s social order between 1949 and 1988. The KMT’s statist economic 
development progressively brought into existence rapidly expanding and increasingly defined 
labouring, middle and capitalist classes. But, despite this being so, I argue in chapter 3 that 
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between 1949 and 1978, that Taiwan can be conceived of as a hard statist social order in which 
the elite bureaucracy secured an unchallenged autonomy, remained unresponsive to interest 
articulation among Taiwan’s social forces while also freely wielding the coercive apparatus of 
the state to discipline its opponents. Although this was secured on a purely disciplinary basis 
during the KMT’s early rule, the KMT’s long term passive revolution also required a prolonged 
transformismo by which the elite bureaucracy relied on the Taiwan’s Leninist party-state to 
absorb and co-opt key class actors within the state. In addition to formal co-optation into the 
state, trasformismo can also be understood as a process of extensive relation building between 
the elite bureaucracy and targeted classes by successfully wooing them to concede to a 
subservient position (Cox, 1983). During the hard statist social order, such a transformismo was 
controlled and confined to ancillary roles in which no significant power was at stake. Despite 
the elite bureaucracy’s continued autonomy, I argue that from the late 1960s onward, a historical 
bloc increasingly came into shape between the elite bureaucracy and Taiwan’s LE capitalist 
class. This was because LE capitalists, although facing constraints on capital consolidation and 
politically subservient to the elite bureaucracy, were, nonetheless, the prime beneficiary of the 
statist development model while also enjoying the closest relationship among all of Taiwan’s 
classes with the elite bureaucracy.  
 
Despite the elite bureaucracy’s success at maintaining a prolonged bureaucratic autonomy, it 
was also undeniable that its autonomy weakened progressively. This became especially evident 
during Chiang Ching-kuo’s presidency between 1978 and 1988 and was an outcome of the 
KMT’s successful capitalist development due to which a successful passive revolution could 
only be secured for a definite timeframe. The weakening of the elite bureaucracy’s political 
autonomy was a result of a changing social basis of the state by which ascendant classes 
advanced on previously off-bounds political spaces while eventually dissolving a remaining 
political autonomy altogether. In Taiwan’s case, this inter-twined with its political 
democratization trajectory and was an outcome of two fundamental processes. The first was the 
rise of a pronounced social contestation while the second was a diluted and increasingly 
fragmented elite bureaucratic consensus. Both were unavoidable because the KMT’s prolonged 
sojourn on Taiwan eventually led to the elite bureaucracy’s progressive integration with the 
social base from which it operated. On this basis, I argue in chapter 4 that Chiang’s presidency 
can be understood as a qualitatively separate soft statist social order in which the elite 
bureaucracy’s autonomy weakened while it also had to become significantly more responsive to 
Taiwan’s social forces. This was especially so in the case of the elite bureaucracy – LE capitalist 
class historical bloc which increasingly underpinned the stability of the statist social order. I 
argue that this led to an intensified interest harmonization between the elite bureaucracy and the 
LE capitalist class so that Taiwan’s economic policy was now oriented increasingly toward 
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satisfying the short-term interests of the LE capitalist class. Reflective of this was the fact that 
although long term strategic statist development policy was still in operation, that it was now 
only applied to absolute national priority initiatives.  
 
The elite bureaucracy’s policy responsiveness to the LE capitalist class was particularly crucial 
in the context of Taiwan’s increasingly unmanageable rise of social contestation. At a most 
visible level, Taiwan’s rising contestation was catalysed by the KMT’s waning regime 
legitimacy which resulted from its increased international de-recognition during and after the 
1970s. But, at a more fundamental level, Taiwan’s increased contestation was an outcome of the 
KMT’s successful economic development policies which resulted in a better educated populace 
and a much more clearly defined class composition. Paradoxically, however, I argue that the 
unmanageable nature of Taiwan’s contestation was an outcome of the KMT’s ethnic 
monopolization of power and its prolonged success at repressing a class based contestation. As 
such, Taiwan’s contestation process was ultimately channelled toward a specifically anti-KMT 
democratization movement which was composed of more issues-focused social movements as 
well as a nativist democratization movement. But, despite the increasingly difficult to manage 
nature of Taiwan’s social contestation, a weakened elite bureaucratic autonomy was secured 
until Chiang’s death in 1988. This was because the elite bureaucracy secured the continued 
acquiescence among the LE capitalist class toward its senior role while also securing a sufficient 
social assent among Taiwan’s citizenry to its continued one party rule. This assent, I argue, was 
secured on the basis of the continued disciplinary features of the KMT regime, the effectiveness 
of its propaganda apparatus and its regime-led political liberalization and islander promotion 
drive in which islanders were for the first time promoted into the elite bureaucracy.  
  
Because Taiwan’s statist social order came to an end after Lee Teng-hui’s presidency in 1988, I 
proceed in chapter 5 to examine how the elite bureaucracy’s autonomy eventually dissolved 
altogether. Although I account for this as a culmination of Taiwan’s development induced 
changing social basis of the state, I explore the immediate dissolution process in terms of a 
fractured elite bureaucratic consensus. I examine this fracturing as an outcome of an already 
diluted bureaucratic consensus due to the elite bureaucracy’s prolonged interest harmonization 
with the LE capitalist class, but also a visible ethnic split within the elite bureaucracy itself. This 
split took place between mainlander dominated elite bureaucrats who attempted to secure a 
continued monopoly on political power and a Lee Teng-hui led reformist alliance composed of 
islander and some allied mainlander elite bureaucrats. Scholars such as Wang Jenn-hwan (1996) 
have correctly pointed out that the LE capitalist class, although courted by both factions, 
eventually granted its support to the reformist alliance and due to which the anti-reformist 
bureaucratic faction was eventually dislodged. But, although correctly understanding the 
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process of the elite bureaucracy’s dislodging from power, I advance on Wang’s approach by 
theorizing this process in terms of a newly forged hegemonic historical bloc and based on which 
I propose that a separable political autonomy eroded throughout the 1990s. 
  
On the basis of the historical bloc, I proceed in chapters 5 through 7 to examine a rapidly 
intensifying CSEI trajectory. The CSEI process began very gradually in the 1980s during which 
time prohibited investment types in China were still punishable by law. Despite this, the elite 
bureaucracy did tolerate some very limited China-bound capital migration for small-scale sunset 
industry firms. Toward the latter half of the decade and the early 1990s, coinciding with 
Taiwan’s democratization, CSEI also quickly manifested itself with full intensity. Although it is 
true that President Lee did eventually attempt to constrain CSEI after 1996 due to his Taiwan 
nationalist proclivities, he was unsuccessful in doing so. I argue that this was because Lee’s 
administration actively courted and relied on the support of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class. The 
attempt by the Lee administration to constrain a hegemonic LE capitalist class from investing in 
China was most likely due to the erroneous assumption of a continued residual political 
autonomy. The untenable nature of this assumption was quickly demonstrated by the LE 
capitalist class’ intensified investments in China which rendered the policy meaningless. 
Although the LE capitalist class remained critical of Lee’s CSEI policies, it continued to support 
him due to the unenforceable nature of his attempted CSEI constraints and Lee’s otherwise 
overwhelmingly capital-friendly policy course. But, at the same time, the LE capitalist class 
also leveraged its influence to ensure that all major candidates for the 2000 presidency 
committed to a CSEI enabling policy course. Thus, following Chen Shui-bian’s victory in 2000, 
Taiwan’s politicians no longer just tolerated CSEI, but also proactively enabled and made way 
for it to occur at a much deeper and more intensified level which I examine in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Before concluding this overview, there is one final question that must be addressed, namely how 
it was that a socio-economic malaise exacerbating and capital advancing CSEI process secured 
such a strong degree of support in Taiwan. This, I argue, can only be understood in terms of 
Taiwan’s social order and the hegemony of Taiwan’s Cross-Strait historical bloc. In order to 
understand this, I examine ideational processes and the hegemonic narrative on which Taiwan’s 
historical bloc secured its hegemony. Paradoxically, I argue that it was the rise of a Taiwan 
nationalist and identity politics which enabled the Cross-Strait historical bloc’s hegemony by 
diverting the citizenry’s attention from material and economic issues from the 1990s onward. 
Rather than a unified Taiwan nationalism, I argue that Taiwan’s contested sovereignty and its 
fractured identity perceptions were unresolvable because a hard-line Taiwan independence and 
more China-friendly unification-favouring demographic possessed entirely different national 
imaginations. This binary defined the outermost parameters of Taiwan’s politics toward which a 
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majority status quo favouring demographic tilted in either direction. As such, rather than a 
left-right cleavage, the KMT and DPP’s electoral positioning was defined by a first instance 
identity cleavage. On this basis, I theorize, Taiwan’s national identity politics as a central 
element of its hegemonic narrative. This, I argue, was because of its attention diverting effects 
which allowed for a wide acceptance of an economistic narrative that linked Taiwan’s collective 
welfare with its market defined social order and CSEI trajectory.  
 
Due to the centrality of identity in defining party support, I argue that both the KMT and the 
DPP secured a carte blanche to pursue an equally capital friendly policy course without being 
held accountable by their electorates. It is also this dynamic which I argue in chapter 6 that has 
paradoxically enabled the DPP to pursue a CSEI-enabling policy framework. This, I argue, was 
because the DPP was successful at channelling Taiwan’s national identity discourses and debate 
toward a populist and emotive, but primarily state level focus in which specifically economic 
processes such as CSEI were written out of the narrative. As such, I argue that in economic 
terms, a common sense developed by which Taiwan’s citizens overwhelmingly accepted and 
celebrated a capital flight driven CSEI process as being in tune with their economic interests. As 
I will argue in chapter 7, it was only after a relative nuancing of Taiwan’s identity politics that 
more tangible non-identity issues have once again factored more centrally within its political 
discourse. But, I will proceed sceptically toward the possibility of a counter-historical bloc as 
coming into existence because Taiwan’s contestation continues to be defined by an inter-twined 
Taiwan identity and class agenda.  
 
Chapter Summaries  
In Chapter 1, I develop a set of conceptual insights in relation to the existing literature. By doing 
so, I first argue that the mainstream CSEI literature tends to an asocial and ahistorical direction 
due to the centrality of liberal and realist predicates in guiding its analysis. I argue instead that 
CSEI can only be theorized in terms of the social basis on which it is defined and which 
requires an account of the relative degree of political autonomy enjoyed by Taiwan’s state. 
Because I posit that Taiwan’s state policies are capital advancing and that CSEI should be 
understood on such terms, I argue that it is necessary to first explore how a previous statist elite 
bureaucratic autonomy eroded in Taiwan. In terms of established interpretations of Taiwan’s 
statist social order, I argue that they offer valuable insights on institutional, geopolitical and 
production related dimensions of Taiwan’s social order, but that it is important to integrate such 
insights within a macro-level account which can then examine how such variables affected 
Taiwan’s class composition and social order. Although I explore a number of macro-level 
accounts that advance with considerable degrees of success to historicize Taiwan’s social order 
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features, I argue that none have correctly accounted for the erosion of Taiwan’s political 
autonomy and its now LE capital defined policy parameter. On this basis, I posit that the CCP 
has secured a considerable degree of influence over Taiwan’s policy parameter through an 
alliance with its dominant LE capitalist class and that I intend to examine CSEI on such terms.  
 
I proceed in chapter 2 to develop my intended application of the neo-Gramscian framework 
to theorize Taiwan’s CSEI policy in terms of the social basis of its state. In doing so, I 
argue that a neo-Gramscian framework is strongly suited to a regional analysis which veers 
from a more common global capitalist tendency within the literature. To substantiate this 
understanding, I argue that a Gramscian approach tends toward a plural social orders 
conception of global order because of its national point of departure which understands 
transnational social orders as having to be legitimated at the national level and on which a 
plethora of regional historical blocs can impinge upon. In the case of intra-capitalist social 
order variation and internationalization pressures, I argue that a national point of 
legitimation couples with a pronounced interest variation among regionally uneven capital 
fractions to shape the social order parameters of states on the basis of given historical blocs. 
To theorize CSEI, I identify a distinct Cross-Strait historical bloc forged between the CCP 
and Taiwan’s LE capitalist class as having shaped Taiwan’s social order and state policy 
parameters. In order to theorize both the CCP’s role in the Cross-Strait historical bloc and 
the process by which a previous elite bureaucratic autonomy eroded in Taiwan, I also 
identify the concept of passive revolution to theorize both dimensions. Finally, to theorize 
Taiwan’s transition from a statist to capital advancing social order, I also identify the statist 
historical bloc, transformismo and the hegemonic narrative as central to my analysis. .  
 
In chapter 3, I examine how the KMT’s elite bureaucracy secured a necessary autonomy for 
Taiwan’s prolonged hard statist social order between 1945 and 1978 during which it ruled in a 
highly disciplinary and unresponsive fashion toward Taiwan’s social forces. Through the 
concept of passive revolution, I examine how the KMT’s ethnically homogenous and 
transplanted elite bureaucracy advanced to shape Taiwan’s class composition to attain a 
long-term class equilibrium. Because the elite bureaucracy secured its economic and political 
interest from the state, I explain its prolonged commitment to a statist development path as 
guided by legitimacy gaining imperatives to secure a necessary acquiescence among the 
citizenry to its disciplinary rule. As such, I argue that the prolonged durability of the hard statist 
order can only be explained with a specific focus on the social basis of Taiwan’s state. I focus 
especially on a consensual dimension to the KMT’s rule by examining how the elite 
bureaucracy secured a necessary acquiescence among all of Taiwan’s major classes to enable the 
effectiveness of its disciplinary rule. I examine this acquiescence in terms of the elite 
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bureaucracy’s transformismo by which it relied on ideational, disciplinary and absorptive 
apparatuses of the KMT’s Leninist party state. At a most causal level, I argue that the 
effectiveness of the elite bureaucracy’s transformismo relied particularly on Taiwan’s 
under-developed class consciousness and I explore how direct processes of rule and more 
diffuse production and social order features combined to impede such a class consciousness 
from developing. An increasingly economically influential LE capitalist class, I argue, was the 
exception to the rule and was thus targeted for the most intensive transformismo which led to 
the gradual formation of an elite bureaucracy-led statist historical bloc which did not yet, 
however, alter the hard statist features of Taiwan’s social order during this time.  
 
In chapter 4, I examine Taiwan’s soft statist order between 1978 and 1988 during which time a 
weakening passive revolution led to a significant erosion of the elite bureaucracy’s political 
autonomy, the securing of which also required it to become more responsive to Taiwan’s social 
forces. I argue that this was an unavoidable outcome of a prolonged social transformation in 
Taiwan by which its transforming class composition impinged on and confined the elite 
bureaucracy’s political autonomy. I identify the elite bureaucracy’s weakened autonomy as an 
outcome of both a rising social contestation and a prolonged historical bloc induced interest 
harmonization between it and the LE capitalist class. In terms of Taiwan’s social contestation, 
although I account for the KMT’s international de-recognition as a catalyst, I theorize its 
increase as an outcome of long-term class formation induced social change which led to the 
eroding acquiescence, especially among the labouring and middle class, to the elite 
bureaucracy’s continued rule. I will argue, however, that Taiwan’s increasingly active social 
movements did not develop into a viable counter-historical bloc due to the failure of a central 
class agenda to develop therein. Although social movements developed instead into a nativist 
democratization movement, I argue that the elite bureaucracy, nonetheless, had to become more 
responsive by elevating political transformismo to the elite bureaucratic level and also by 
deepening its historical bloc with Taiwan’s LE capitalist class. It is on this basis that I account 
for the elite bureaucracy’s increased responsiveness to short term capital interests in its policy 
formation. But, I argue that a soft statist order did continued to hold because the elite 
bureaucracy secured a continued dirigisme which was now, however, only wielded to absolute 
national priority development initiatives.  
 
In chapter 5, I examine how a prolonged changing social basis of Taiwan’s state led to the 
dissolution of its developmental state and Taiwan’s transition toward its currently LE capital 
advancing social order. I examine the dissolution of the statist order in the context of a fractured 
elite bureaucratic consensus and the newly hegemonic stature of an LE capital-led historical 
bloc. I argue that this historical bloc served as the social basis for a Lee Teng-hui centred 
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reformist alliance within the KMT to dislodge the elite bureaucracy from its continued control 
over Taiwan’s state. To account for the historical bloc’s hegemonic stature, I argue that the rise 
of a Taiwan identity politics was crucial because it fractured Taiwan’s social movements while 
also diverting the citizenry’s attention from a more specifically class focused political discourse 
to an identity focused discourse. As such, I argue that a rising Taiwan identity politics became a 
crucial tool of policy legitimation for Lee’s capital advancing administration because it 
de-politicized economic policy while allowing politicians to secure a captive support base on 
the basis of identity affinities. Therefore, I argue that a class politics did not develop among 
Taiwan’s social movements and due to which they failed to develop into a counter historical 
bloc. Finally, in relation to a rapidly intensifying CSEI trajectory, I also expand my analysis to 
theorize it as proceeding on the basis of a Cross-Strait historical bloc. Composed of Taiwan’s 
hegemonic LE capitalist class and a contender state-managing CCP, I argue that the Cross-Strait 
historical bloc began to impose a unified logic on Lee’s administration toward intensifying 
CSEI and which it was powerless to resist.  
 
In chapter 6, I examine how the Cross-Strait historical bloc advanced to secure substantive 
CSEI openings from the DPP administration. By doing so, I explore especially how a commonly 
perceived labour friendly and Taiwan nationalist DPP was able to legitimate its 
capital-advancing and CSEI deepening policy. I will explore this question especially in the 
context of Taiwan’s visibly worsening socio-economic malaise which I argue to be an outcome 
of its OEM/ODM capital advancing social order and CSEI trajectory. I argue that the DPP’s 
pursuit of such a CSEI enabling policy course was due both to the hegemonic stature of the 
Cross-Strait historical bloc and the party’s proactive reorientation toward securing the support 
of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class. Although initially legitimating its policy on centrist grounds, I 
argue that the continually worsening nature of Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise instead led the 
DPP to legitimate its policy through its self-repositioning as a hard-line Taiwan nationalist party. 
This, I argue, was such a successful strategy that Taiwan’s political discourse quickly came to be 
defined almost entirely by the Taiwan identity debate which almost entirely overshadowed class 
and economic issues. Coupled with its successful co-optation of its previous social movement 
allies, I argue that Taiwan’s divisive identity politics led to the de-politicization of economic 
policy while also enabling the DPP to secure a captive Taiwan nationalist support base. This 
support base, I argue, did not challenge the DPP’s CSEI liberalization due to the party’s 
legitimation of it as a purely economic matter. But regardless of the DPP’s reorientation, I 
finally argue that the CCP, nonetheless, wielded the Cross-Strait historical bloc to secure the 
DPP’s eventual electoral defeat in 2008.  
 
In chapter 7, I examine how the KMT’s return to power and its subsequent CSEI deepening 
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policies can be conceived of as a logical culmination of the Cross-Strait historical bloc’s policy 
parameter. But, at the same time, I also argue that the Cross-Strait historical bloc faced 
significant challenges to its continued hegemony. This, I argue, is especially evident in the 
intensification of Taiwan’s social contestation which was spurred forth by the combination of an 
increased socio-economic malaise and a receding intensity of the Taiwan identity debate. After 
exploring the factors that led to the receding intensity of the Taiwan identity debate, I argue that 
Taiwan’s discursive climate became much more receptive again to non-identity issues and I 
examine how Taiwan’s social movements resurfaced in this context. To date, I argue that 
Taiwan’s social movements have not yet developed into a viable counter-historical bloc due to 
the failure of a central class agenda to develop within them. As such, aside from a number of 
highly specific victories, I argue that it has only been in the case of CSEI that Taiwan’s social 
movements have mobilized most successfully and that this is because social movements have 
been defined by an underlying Taiwan nationalist current which enabled them also to draw in 
the support from Taiwan nationalists more generally. For the time being, I argue that social 
movements have succeeded at moderating CSEI somewhat by making the elite-led nature of the 
process more difficult to justify. Still, I argue that the hegemony of the Cross-Strait historical 
bloc remains intact. But, at the same time, I also explore underlying tensions between the CCP 
and the LE capitalist class which is especially cogent in the pressures faced by the CCP to 
address Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise or risk losing long-term support for a CSEI 
deepening.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
In this chapter, I engage with the existing literature and develop a set of conceptual parameters 
by which I intend to examine CSEI on the basis of Taiwan’s social order. To do so, I first 
examine the specifically CSEI focused literature and argue, by and large, that it fails to theorize 
CSEI due to the centrality of liberal and realist predicates in guiding its analysis. The centrality 
of the predicates, I argue, has led to an asocial and ahistorical CSEI theorizing which is based 
on an un-reflexive and untenable separation between delineated economic and political spheres 
which are devoid of social relations. In reality, I argue, that the spheres are two facets of 
Taiwan’s social order which can only be theorized as a totality. To proceed, I first problematize 
the liberal predicate on the basis that a capital-led CSEI has failed to deliver on promised 
economic and welfare gains and I argue that this is because it neglects to account for the class 
contradictions which underline CSEI. I then problematize the realist predicate of Taiwan’s state 
autonomy as similarly untenable because it cannot account for why Taiwan’s state has allowed 
for CSEI to proceed despite the challenges it poses both to Taiwan’s sovereignty and collective 
socio-economic welfare. Because class contradictions have so evidently defined the CSEI 
trajectory, I argue that CSEI can only be theorized through an explicit focus on the class and 
social basis of Taiwan’s state. To do so, I develop insights from the economic nationalist, 
sociological and policy studies literature to posit that the outcome of a capital-defined CSEI 
process has been a deepening of Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise. But, I argue, that this 
socio-economic malaise can only be understood when it is theorized within the context of 
Taiwan’s social order which advances the interests of a predominantly sub-contracting LE 
capitalist class and which, in turn, has also shaped the course of CSEI.  
  
In order to theorize Taiwan’s policy parameter as being capital defined, I argue that it is first 
necessary to historicize its post-WWII social order to account for how a previous elite 
bureaucratic political autonomy eroded. To do so, I engage with the developmental state 
literature and argue that although Taiwan was a developmental state until 1988, that statists fail 
to account sufficiently for the social basis which enabled a necessary elite bureaucratic 
autonomy. Although I also examine a number of illuminating geopolitical and 
production-centred accounts, I argue that Taiwan’s statist order can only be theorized by 
integrating the respective processes focused on by each approach in a combined fashion. On this 
basis, I examine a number of macro-level accounts which more correctly identify the social 
basis that enabled a previous elite bureaucratic autonomy and how its transformation led to a 
progressive dilution and eventual dissolution of this autonomy. I argue that it is particularly 
important to account for the elite bureaucracy’s political autonomy on a consensual basis and for 
which Taiwan’s under-developed class consciousness was crucial. Although Taiwan’s statist 
development was an important factor which facilitated the citizenry’s acquiescence to the elite 
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bureaucracy’s disciplinary rule, I argue that it also led to social transformations which 
eventually eroded the elite bureaucracy’s political autonomy. To theorize this process, I argue 
that a historicist framework is crucial which must be able to account for how institutional, 
production and ideational processes defined the social basis of Taiwan’s state throughout its 
development history. By proceeding in this way, I argue that it is possible to discern how 
Taiwan’s elite bureaucratic autonomy quickly eroded after the dissolution of Taiwan’s statist 
order. This, I argue, is because Taiwan’s state became capital defined and after which the CCP 
secured a capacity to shape Taiwan’s policy parameter through its control over Taiwan’s 
dominant LE capitalist class and that CSEI should be understood on such terms.   
  
Section 1.1: Cross-Strait Economic Integration and Taiwan’s State  
A process of CSEI between Taiwan and China began from the 1980s onward and progressively 
intensified thereafter. By the 1990s, CSEI became so pronounced that a majority of Taiwanese 
firms already had investments and business interests in China while Taiwan also became 
progressively more economically dependent on China thereafter. Due to Taiwan’s contested 
statehood, however, a pronounced CSEI process has posed challenges toward its long term 
sovereignty. Many scholars have attempted to provide an account of CSEI which can grapple 
with the paradoxical relationship between its economic and territorial features. To date, however, 
serious conceptual muddles continue to define the literature because most CSEI scholars base 
their analysis either on untenable liberal or realist predicates or, as is most often the case, a 
combination of both.  
 
At the most general level, the primary research motif which defines the CSEI literature is how 
to account for Taiwan’s state policy toward a sovereignty encroaching CSEI process. Most CSEI 
scholars approach this question from a quasi-dialectic schema which conceives of CSEI as 
being unquestionably beneficial for Taiwan’s economic development and social well-being, but 
which then is contrasted with the sovereignty impeding effects that it poses for Taiwan (Chao, 
2004; Y.-H. Chu 1999; Dent, 2001; Kastner, 2005). Some scholars are genuinely alarmed over 
CSEI-induced sovereignty repercussions and argue that Taiwan’s state apparatus has correctly 
attempted, but generally failed to constrain a deepened CSEI due to the propensity of Taiwan’s 
capitalist class to circumvent attempted policy constraints (Deng, 2000). But, because of the 
perceived importance of CSEI for Taiwan’s economic prosperity, a majority of CSEI scholars 
tend to support the intensification of CSEI. The mainstream interpretation of CSEI is best 
encapsulated in terms of Taiwan’s citizens as having to choose between ‘bread and love,’ or in 
other words, between economic prosperity and political affinity (Keng, Chen, & Huang, 2006). 
The prevalence of such a ‘bread vs. love’ type conception within the mainstream CSEI literature 
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has led to an analysis which attempts to provide an account of CSEI as occurring on two 
separate economic and political spheres. The dominance of a ‘bread vs. love’ type interpretation 
of CSEI within the literature is largely due to the centrality of liberal and realist predicates in 
guiding its analysis and due to which CSEI is rarely examined at a deeper and more critical 
level.  
 
Due to the prevalence of the ‘bread vs. love’ position, in economic terms, most scholars hold the 
liberal assumption that CSEI is unquestionably beneficial for Taiwan’s collective economic 
interest. Although CSEI scholars do not always focus specifically on the question of state-level 
relations between Taiwan and China, adherents to a ‘bread vs. love’ perspective tend to hold 
either explicit or implicit realist assumptions of an independent state autonomy and agency in 
Taiwan. But, due to their prioritizing the economic in the first instance, they propose 
normatively that Taiwan’s state should disband any attempts at impeding CSEI. This is based on 
neo-classical understandings of transnational trade and economic relations as following 
objective and law-like rules which are disconnected from social relations and which are held to 
lead to the most socially conducive economic outcomes possible. As such, the CSEI trajectory 
is said to occur within a typical comparative advantage and market-led schema which leads to 
economic growth and which consequently also advances the collective welfare and prosperity of 
Taiwan’s citizens (Dent, 2005; Sutter, 2002; Xin, 2010; W. Zhang, 2001). For this reason, a 
majority of CSEI scholars tend to argue that the economic decisions of private economic actors 
are concomitant with the citizenry’s collective interests because they allow for the most rational 
and market optimizing outcomes possible. As such, Taiwan’s China-bound investment is argued 
not only to result in a more efficient allocation of economic resources, but also a consequent 
economic upgrading in Taiwan which, in turn, is predicted to further enhance Taiwan’s 
collective economic welfare (Roy, 2004).  
  
In economic terms, although both China and Taiwan are said to benefit from CSEI, the 
mainstream interpretation of CSEI posits that Taiwan stands to benefit in particular due to its 
more advanced economic composition. This assumption is often substantiated with reference to 
Taiwan’s IT sector and its prominent role in global IT production chains (Sturgeon & Lee, 
2004). At a most general level, it is proposed that China’s value for Taiwanese firms lies 
primarily in its provision of a low-cost, but efficient production environment and a large 
domestic market which can be captured by Taiwanese firms (Chase, Pollpeter, & Mulvenon, 
2004; Fuller, 2005). Due to the perceived technological and economic gap between Taiwan and 
China, liberals also commonly propose that Taiwanese capital is crucial toward China’s 
economic development and upgrading (Chao, 2003, p. 287; Chase et al., 2004). Generally, 
liberals not only postulate Taiwan’s economic superiority in the short-term, but also in the 
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longer-term because of institutional and economic factors such as Taiwan’s freer functioning 
market economy, simpler trade regulations and better infrastructure. Such factors, they argue, 
ensure that Taiwanese firms will only outsource labour-intensive production processes to China 
while continuing to upgrade their business operations in Taiwan (Cavey, 2003, p. 22). Finally, 
in terms of China’s specific importance for Taiwan, liberals are also prone to identify a cultural 
and linguistic proximity between the two which not only provides a unique advantage to 
Taiwanese capitalists investing in China, but also allows for the development of a synergetic 
and complementary CSEI process between the two (Steinfeld, 2005). 
  
Aside from postulating on the merits of outsourcing to China, ‘bread vs. love’ proponents of 
CSEI are also prone to highlight an inevitability factor at work which is argued to drive CSEI 
forward regardless of political or socially motivated attempts at altering its capital-defined 
parameters. It is not difficult to tell that this is a context specific variant of the oft-encountered 
There Is No Alternative (TINA) position which holds that due to a process of economic 
globalization and various accompanying institutional changes, that the pursuit of neoliberal 
economic policies is an irresistible and path dependent process (Chao, 2004; Dent, 2005; Leng, 
2002; Sutter, 2002; W. Zhang, 2001). Some TINA proponents of CSEI, however, propose more 
accurately that attempted CSEI limiting policy restrictions in Taiwan have been reversed largely 
due to the structural force imposed by the collective weight of its capitalist class (Y.-H. Chu, 
1999; Sutter, 2002). But, despite this being so, they tend to celebrate the CSEI process as crucial 
toward advancing Taiwan’s collective economic interest.  
  
Due to the liberal account’s optimistic analysis toward the desirability of an inevitable 
market-led CSEI integration process, a clear prescription emerges as to Taiwan’s most 
appropriate policy framework toward CSEI. This prescription allows for no legitimacy or space 
for the mediation of the CSEI process due to the demarcation of it as a purely ‘economic’ matter 
which leads to the greatest possible good in Taiwan and which is argued to be separate from 
non-economic social and political processes. As such, winners of CSEI are presented as being 
responsible for the bulk of Taiwan’s economy and as the key economic actors driving forward 
Taiwan’s economic upgrading which, in turn, advances the collective welfare of its citizenry 
(Y.-H. Chu, 2009, p. 58). Denny Roy, for instance, pursues such a line of reasoning and posits 
that due to the unambiguously economically beneficial outcomes of CSEI which are beyond 
reproach, that opposition to CSEI can only stem from an emotional reasoning based either on 
identity type calculations or political baggage (Roy, 2004). 
 
  
From the above overview, it is not difficult to tell that the mainstream CSEI analysis is itself 
political as it internalizes the interests of capital and collapses it with the citizenry’s collective 
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interest. As such, in order to correctly account for Taiwan’s state policy, it is crucial first to 
examine whether liberal predictions that a capital-led CSEI results in welfare enhancement and 
economic upgrading in Taiwan have materialized. Although it will be argued subsequently that 
Taiwan’s historical economic development trajectory was accompanied by consistent economic 
and social welfare enhancements, this trend no longer held from 1990 onward. Of course, this 
cannot be argued to be a sole outcome of CSEI and scholars such as Lin Thung-hong (2009) are 
correct to analyse such trends in terms of Taiwan’s wider capital friendly social order within the 
parameters of which both Taiwan’s domestic and CSEI policies are pursued. Engaging in a 
rigorous and meticulous class analysis, Lin demonstrates that it is only Taiwan’s capitalist and 
intelligentsia classes which have benefited economically from its post-1980s social order. Lin 
finds that Taiwan’s other major class demographics have fared poorly and that they have 
experienced marked welfare declines, a finding which mirrors my own analysis.  
  
Lin’s study points to the importance of analysing CSEI in terms of social order and class. But, in 
addition to doing so in a more abstract sense, it is also important to account for the specific 
features of Taiwan’s dominant capitalist class which has important implications both for its 
domestic social order and its CSEI trajectory. This is especially important in the context of the 
popular liberal assumption that CSEI occurs between a more backward China and a more 
economically advanced Taiwan. This assumption is correctly challenged, however, by other 
scholars who argue that Taiwan’s industrial composition is nowhere near as advanced as is 
commonly assumed. Huang Chenwei (2011), for instance, argues that Taiwan’s economic 
composition is semi-peripheral because its capitalist class primarily manages production 
processes in the periphery for the global core. Huang’s adherence to a world-system approach, 
however, results in a strong degree of structural determinism and other scholars such as Dan 
Breznitz (2005, 2007) identify similar economic features, but have done so in a less 
deterministic way. Breznitz theorizes Taiwan’s economic features in terms of its sub-contracting 
based industrial composition which he argues to be the outcome of a failure among Taiwan’s 
capitalist class to upgrade toward the global core. As such, Breznitz argues that Taiwanese firms 
are located primarily within a low-margin defined and economically stunting OEM/ODM 
production model. Breznitz’ argument is useful because it suggests that Taiwan’s predominantly 
sub-contracting industrial composition can be understood in terms of more contingent factors 
such as a no longer tenable state-led technology development model and a generally risk and 
innovation averse capitalist class in Taiwan.  
 
A most immediate implication of Taiwan’s sub-contracting economic position is that its capital 
migration to China is not due to the conscious upgrading strategy as proposed by liberals. 
Rather, it is a necessary outsourcing response to cost-down production pressures which arise 
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from the very slim margins that Taiwan’s OEM/ODM production model allows for. Such 
findings are mirrored particularly in the economic nationalist critique of CSEI which 
understands it as occurring in terms of a so-called industrial hollowing out process of Taiwan’s 
value-chain to China (T.-J. Chen, 2003; Kobayashi, 2005). Tain-Ju Chen, for instance, identifies 
CSEI as not only leading to an outsourcing in downstream production, but that upstream 
production processes also follow suit to compete with cheaper inputs produced in China and to 
maintain closer relationships with their down-stream clients. Under such conditions, economic 
nationalists argue that the interest of Taiwan’s labouring class is challenged due to Taiwan’s 
reduced production and economic activity which directly leads to a much increased 
unemployment and a generally deteriorating labour environment (Kobayashi, 2005). The 
economic nationalist position is also reductionist, however, because it does not develop an 
account of the class basis of the state and due to which it holds realist-influenced assumptions of 
Taiwan’s state as an autonomous actor which struggles, but fails to constrain Taiwan’s 
outsourcing to China. In economic terms, rather than a mechanistic vertical outsourcing process, 
economic nationalists also do not adequately identify the causal role of Taiwan’s OEM/ODM 
type economic composition in shaping its outward capital flight. Most problematic, however, is 
that economic nationalists are particularly alarmed toward China as the destination of Taiwan’s 
capital flight, but not so much the process of capital flight itself.  
  
Despite defining the parameters of analysis within the mainstream CSEI literature, it is clear 
that the centrality of liberal and realist predicates have led to a muddled analysis. Because the 
predicates are so central to my critique of the literature, it is prescient for the fundamental 
assumptions that underline both predicates to be outlined before proceeding further.  
 
The liberal predicate which has already been shown to be highly problematic, accepts the core 
tenant of liberal economic theory of an objective and rule abiding market mechanism which can 
only proceed according to comparative advantage defined market signals. Although liberal 
theorists often deny it, theirs is a deeply political stance which proposes a standardized policy 
course that must allow for an ever deepening laissez-fair policy. Because of the centrality of the 
liberal predicate, the mainstream CSEI literature has generally failed to disentangle the interests 
of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class from its non-capitalist classes. As such, the mainstream literature 
has similarly failed to correctly theorize the CSEI process in terms of Taiwan’s capital 
advancing social order more generally and the OEM/ODM features of Taiwan’s capitalist class 
more specifically.  
 
In addition to the liberal predicate, the mainstream account suffers similarly from an often 
overlapping realist predicate which has also limited the analytical rigour of more critical 
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accounts. At a most fundamental level, the realist predicate refers to an apriori assumption that 
states enjoy a genuine political autonomy. The realist predicate often takes the form of the 
classical realist state-as-actor conception in which states are conceived of as seeking to advance 
the national interest. But, the realist predicate can also take the form of the conception that 
politicians and policy makers possess a distinct autonomy and interest which operates 
independently to and which may, at times, clash with the interests of dominant classes or social 
forces.  
 
Because realist and liberal assumptions form un-reflexive and untenable apriori predicates 
which guide the analysis of the extant literature, rather than illuminating underlying dynamics 
of Taiwan’s social order or CSEI, they have instead had a distorting effect on it. With the capital 
advancing and socio-economically challenging nature of CSEI substantiated already, attention 
can now be turned to a more focused examination on Taiwan’s political process to address the 
question of its political autonomy. After doing so, it can then be explained why Taiwan’s state 
apparatus allowed for and enabled CSEI to progressively deepen from its onset onward.  
  
Section 1.2: The Social Basis of Taiwan’s State  
From the overview so far, it is already clear that CSEI has occurred in a largely capital-defined 
fashion in Taiwan. Although it is true that Taiwan is economically dependent on China, it is also 
difficult to deny that the scale and intensity of Taiwan’s capital flight has challenged the 
interests of its non-capitalist demographics. As such, a state complicity cannot be so easily 
accounted for in realist terms as a matter of necessity or as being guided by the aim of 
advancing the collective interest of Taiwan’s citizenry. Rather, to satisfactorily account for the 
capital advancing features of Taiwan’s state policy, it is necessary to first develop an 
understanding of Taiwan’s state in terms of its class basis and which can only be done by 
historicizing Taiwan’s post-WWII social order. This is because it is crucial to first account for 
the question of when and how a previous elite bureaucratic political autonomy eroded so that 
Taiwan’s post-1988 CSEI policy parameter can be understood as being capital-defined.  
 
1.2.1 The Developmental State  
Many scholars have focused on theorizing Taiwan’s post-WWII social order, but most have 
done so by focusing on the policy and institutional features of its state. This is because Taiwan 
belongs to a very small group of countries in the global South which successfully attained a 
developed country status after WWII. The liberal account of Taiwan’s economic development is 
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by far the most influential and theorizes Taiwan’s post-WWII development in neoclassical terms 
as occurring in a context of the state’s close adherence to free market policies. Just as is the case 
with CSEI, liberals also tend to accept realist predicates of a state autonomy in Taiwan during its 
development history. But, liberals argue that Taiwan’s state officials wisely pursued a generally 
hands-off and market-led development policy which relied on Taiwan’s comparative advantage 
to determine its developmental success. In terms of policy specifics, liberals understand 
economic policy as having been guided by aims such as the securing of a stable export incentive 
system, limited government intervention, well-functioning labour and capital markets and 
conservative budgeting (Balassa, 1988; S. P. S. Ho, 1978; Little, 1979). In addition, liberals also 
accept that the state intervened at times in the market to provide public goods such as 
infrastructure and education and to actualize free market conditions by correcting market 
distortions when necessary (McCord, 1989). In economic terms, liberals accredit Taiwan’s 
developmental success as resting on an export oriented industrialization (EOI) path by which 
limitations of a small domestic market were overcome through international trade. As for 
Taiwan’s industrial composition, liberals most often point to its economic success as relying on 
its dynamic web of SMEs which were connected into a responsive, cost effective and relatively 
technologically sophisticated one-stop subcontracting network (Lam & Clark, 1994).  
  
Although Liberals are correct to identify Taiwan’s state as autonomous throughout its 
development history, they are wrong to posit that Taiwan’s state-managing elite bureaucracy 
allowed for Taiwan’s economic development to occur in a market-led fashion. In terms of 
identifying Taiwan’s policy features, the statist position, which developed in criticism of the 
liberal literature, provides a much more illuminating account. Statists conceptualize a distinct 
non-liberal East Asian development path which is characterized by a largely uniform set of 
policies and development features (Amsden, 1979; W.-W. Chu, 2001; Wade, 1990). The statist 
model places primacy on a powerful state which is led by developmentally minded bureaucrats 
who foster and guide rapid national upgrading by intervening directly in the economy according 
to a national development plan. Taiwan’s state, under the aegis of such agencies and bureaucrats, 
is understood to have pursued a heterodox economic development policy which distorted 
market signals by guiding investment toward targeted sectors. As such, statists also argue that 
bureaucratic agencies correctly established direct ownership or control over strategic sectors to 
foster overall economic upgrading. In social terms, statist development is celebrated due to its 
leading to rapid economic growth and a general social welfare improvement which can be 
measured through indicators such as literacy, health, life expectancy and per capita income. 
  
Identifying individual developmental states is not difficult, but the identification of core features 
which are shared by and define all developmental states is. Despite this being so, there is still a 
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very common tendency within the statist literature to examine and identify all East Asian 
developmental states under a uniform heading (Amsden, 1994; Wade, 1992; Weiss, 2002). But, 
the difference between even the two most commonly cited and indisputable developmental 
states, Taiwan and South Korea, is vast enough to challenge such a lumping. South Korea’s 
economic development, for instance, relied much more heavily on highly leveraged large 
conglomerates and foreign lending while its development trajectory was also characterized by a 
more turbulent regime of social and political control and the development of a more militant 
labour movement (Cumings, 1984; Deyo, 1989; Park, 2000). Such variation suggests that it is 
counterproductive to theorize developmental states only in terms of all-encompassing economic 
and policy formulas in which they can be pinned down. Rather, due to the degree of variation 
between developmental states, it is important to develop a more fundamental understanding of 
developmental states so that qualitative variations such as those between Taiwan and South 
Korea can be accounted for in terms of differences between their social or class basis. 
  
Despite class foundations being crucial toward enabling and defining developmental states, it is 
still important to appropriately identify the binding features of developmental states. Due to the 
nature of plan-oriented economic development and the need for a state managing elite 
bureaucracy to stand above and discipline social forces, one stylized prerequisite on which 
statist social orders rest is that they must enjoy a sufficient autonomy from social forces 
(Grabowski, 1994, pp. 415–416). Although an elite bureaucratic autonomy can be explained in 
terms of the social basis of the state, the question first remains as to what explains the elite 
bureaucracy’s prolonged pursuit of a statist development path. In Taiwan’s case, some scholars 
have pointed to nationalism as the defining element and have developed personalized accounts 
which accredit successful statist development to the integrity and virtue of state officials (W.-W. 
Chu, 2001). But, at a closer inspection, the prime factor for the elite bureaucracy’s commitment 
to statist development was rather a perceived regime threat for which welfare enhancing 
development was crucial to secure it a necessary degree of regime legitimacy and social 
acquiescence toward its disciplinary rule (Zhu, 2002). Thus, in political terms, developmental 
states can be understood as having been established on the principle of legitimacy to ‘promote 
and sustain development’ which ‘aims at the fundamental transformation of the economic order’ 
(Castells, 1992). But, rather than arising in a vacuum, the source of the policy can be more 
correctly traced to development disciplining regime threats. It is worth clarifying that although 
such threats are often external regime threats, fears of a domestic regime destabilizing 
discontent can also be considered as a statist development disciplining threat perception.  
 
The development of such a more specific understanding is necessary to overcome the 
limitations that arise from common institutional or policy based accounts of development states 
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which lack specificity and theoretical precision. For instance, among the commonly identified 
core features of developmental-states such as capital controls, export oriented industrialization 
and bank-firm state collaboration (Shin, 1998; Wade & Veneroso, 1998, p. 11), all were 
institutional responses to the elite bureaucracy’s need to attain a welfare enhancing economic 
development necessary to secure its stable rule. It is only within the broader parameters of such 
a more fundamental understanding of the developmental state that the conceptual tool can gain 
the theoretical precision necessary for effective usage, especially because the conditions which 
enable developmental states are highly contingent. But once prospective developmental states 
are identified, the conceptual tool becomes enormously useful toward providing a necessary 
structure and conception by which to examine the effects of statist development on class 
formation and the social basis of Taiwan’s state.  
 
Before returning to the question of class, it is necessary also to examine a secondary debate 
which arose in relation to the developmental state literature regarding the international context 
within which Taiwan developed. The central question explored in this debate is whether or not 
East Asian developmental states should be understood as the exception or the norm within the 
global system. As such, there can also be identified a specific geopolitical perspective which 
argues that Taiwan’s developmental state was only viable because of a contingent and atypical 
geopolitical context. Bruce Cumings, for instance, has argued that Taiwan (and South Korea) 
should be understood as belonging within a wider regional system in which Taiwan served 
firstly as a receptacle for outdated Japanese industries while then coming under US protection 
after WWII within a global Cold War context in which it was essentially invited to develop 
toward the semi-periphery (Cumings, 1984). Despite identifying contingent geopolitical factors 
which enabled Taiwan’s atypical development trajectory, geopolitically concerned analysts 
acknowledge that Taiwan was a genuine developmental state. But, at the same time, they 
understand Taiwan’s statist social order to have been determined by and only to have lasted as 
long as the historically-specific Cold War juncture during which the US permitted and tolerated 
heterodox statist development in crucial frontline states such as Taiwan
 
(Tsai, 2002; Zhu, 2002).  
  
There is little doubt that international factors such as Taiwan’s colonial experience and the US’ 
proactive role were instrumental to its successful development. In terms of America’s role, for 
instance, it not only helped to influence Taiwan’s developmental policy consensus, but it also 
provided generous aid and preferential market access despite Taiwan’s protectionist economic 
development policies (Gills, 2000, pp. 389–390; Tsai, 2002, p. 149). As such, the geopolitical 
critique is important because of the tendency among many statists toward ever increasing 
generalizations of statist development who promote the view not only that a statist policy logic 
continues to define Taiwan’s social order, but that the statist development framework can be 
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emulated by countries throughout the world (Amsden & Chu, 2003; Amsden, 1994; Thurbon, 
2007; Weiss, 2003). This understanding of the developmental state is not only theoretically 
wanting, but it also fails to account for the effects that social transformation and a changing 
social basis of the state have on the durability of developmental states. Fortunately, such a 
looser understanding of the development state is not inherent to the statist approach and more 
critical statists such as Robert Wade acknowledge that the statist social formation rests on 
unique global circumstances and domestic conditions which make it ‘too stringent’ to be met by 
many other states (Wade, 1992, p. 316). 
 
Despite its merits, an overly geo-politically concerned analysis also risks developing a 
one-sided account of developmental-states as being over-determine by the international system. 
A much more fruitful approach rather is to account for statist social orders within their 
simultaneously international and domestically defined context and to identify a first-instance 
variable on which both dimensions impinge and on which they can be integrated, namely class 
and social order. By accounting for the developmental state in such a more integrated fashion, 
specificity is maintained by avoiding overgeneralizations toward the applicability of the concept 
while a temporally and geopolitically confined application can also be avoided. For one, the 
validity of a historically specific understanding of the developmental state has already been put 
into question with the development of China which shares many core features of typical 
developmental states and which will be explored at more depth subsequently (Deans, 2004).  
  
1.2.2 The Dissolution of Taiwan’s Developmental State   
Now that the importance of theorizing Taiwan’s developmental state within its social basis has 
been established, the question that naturally arises is how it was that Taiwan’s statist social order 
eventually dissolved. A number of scholars have focused on this question and they tend to 
understand this dissolution as a natural outcome of the always transitory nature of statist 
development which eventually is superseded by a more appropriate free market policy 
framework (Y.-Y. Chen, 2007; C.-H. Huang, 2002a). This understanding is not a peripheral take 
on the theory as even more critical statists such as Robert Wade also only champion statist 
development to overcome problems of late development and after which more market 
conforming policies can take their place (Wade, 1990, p. 368). It is true that such a transitional 
statist trajectory is corroborated in all acknowledged developmental states that have attained a 
successful developed country status thus far. This being so, there is little merit in defending the 
developmental state as a permanent fixture, but at the same time it is important not to 
uncritically accept a transitory nature as somehow inbuilt in the genetic code of the statist social 
formation without assessing how and why this is the case. To do so, however, it is necessary to 
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focus specifically on development induced class formation processes which fundamentally 
altered the class basis of Taiwan’s state and which consequently weakened the elite 
bureaucracy’s political autonomy.  
  
There have been some attempts by statists to make up for the lacuna on the social basis of the 
development state to provide a more sophisticated account of a necessary elite bureaucratic 
autonomy and the class basis on which it can be secured. Peter Evans, in particular, has focused 
on this question and has developed the useful concept of embedded autonomy to account for 
periods in which a prolonged, but weakened bureaucratic autonomy continues to hold during 
latter stage developmental transitions toward higher value added economic compositions. 
Because of the natural consolidation of powerful capitalist classes during such transitions, 
Evans argues that the elite bureaucracy can maintain its autonomy by deepening networked and 
collaborative relationships with various civil society interests. But in doing so, Evans argues 
also that the elite bureaucracy no longer only stands above, but is also itself dependent on an 
influential capitalist class with which it shares numerous mutual interests (Evans, 1995). 
Despite the usefulness of concepts such as embedded autonomy, there is a tendency among its 
proponents to extrapolate and extend periods of embedded autonomy significantly for what is 
really only a brief and transitional window in which limited autonomy is maintained before it 
erodes. This point is raised by Mark Beeson, for instance, who cautions that the challenge has 
always been in achieving the right degree [… of] “embedded autonomy”—in other words, 
bureaucratic agencies that were not only capable and coherent, but also were sufficiently close 
to society and economic actors to implement policy and “guide” development [with] the danger 
[having] always been that such agencies become too close, “captured,” and the servants of 
particularistic interests’ (Beeson, 2009, p. 10). 
 
In Taiwan’s case, challenges of embedded autonomy pointed to by Beeson were never overcome 
while an embedded autonomy also only defined Taiwan’s social order for a very brief window 
of time during the 1980s. Even during this brief window, however, due to prolonged processes 
of interest harmonization between the bureaucracy and the rapidly ascending LE capitalist class, 
only a very limited degree of an effective elite bureaucratic autonomy was maintained. As will 
be subsequently demonstrated, although useful toward explaining a brief transitory window 
during the 1980s, lingering assumptions of Taiwan’s continued embedded autonomy are not 
tenable. Despite this, embedded autonomy type conceptions are often relied on by statists, 
realists and liberals alike to argue for a continued political autonomy in Taiwan by which the 
state is said to continue advancing Taiwan’s collective interests. As noted, after Taiwan’s brief 
1980s window of an embedded autonomy, the statist social order quickly dissolved thereafter. 
The inability of statists to account for this process is because they underplay the centrality of the 
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social basis of the state in defining its policy parameter. As such, although Evans’ account is 
clearly a theoretical advance and a step in the right direction, it also unfortunately suffers 
because it underplays the contradiction of interests which defines the elite bureaucratic – LE 
capitalist relationship that is so crucial to the elite bureaucracy’s political autonomy. 
Furthermore, embedded autonomy type accounts also underplay the class tensions which 
undermine the stability of a continued elite bureaucratic autonomy outside of the elite 
bureaucratic – LE capitalist relationship.  
  
The main reason for the failure of the statist approach to account for Taiwan’s social order 
transition is a still insufficient focus on the social basis of its state. For one, it does not account 
for the importance of the acquiescence among major classes toward the elite bureaucracy’s rule 
to enable a prolonged political autonomy. To make up for this lacuna, the Marxist influenced 
production-centred literature is useful, but also provides only a partial account of the social 
basis of Taiwan’s state because of its more narrow focus on the production process. This is an 
outcome of its central focus on explaining Taiwan’s strong degree of labour passivity toward a 
capital advancing social order and labour process. As such, proponents such as Shieh 
Guo-Hsiung (1992) and Hill Gates (1979) have focused particularly on Taiwan’s SME scaled 
industrial composition and argue that it has diluted Taiwan’s class consciousness. This, they 
argue, was due to various ideational processes which, due to the relative ease and common 
aspiration among workers to set up SMEs, fostered a so-called part-time proletariat mentality 
and a tendency toward self-exploitation among the labouring class (Shieh, 1992). But, just as 
statists have reified the state, production-centred accounts have reified the production process 
instead as both defining class consciousness, but also as determining the parameters of Taiwan’s 
social order. Thus, although highly illuminating toward Taiwan’s class composition during the 
statist period, production-centred accounts have not been able to explain the dynamic changes 
which led to the dissolution of Taiwan’s developmental state after 1988. To explain this, it 
would have been necessary for the micro-level processes focused on by its proponents to be 
integrated within a macro-level framework that is able to account for the role that institutional, 
production and ideational processes have had on shaping Taiwan’s class composition.  
  
Thus far, it has been established that both statist and production-centred accounts of Taiwan’s 
social order have been unable to explain the process of historical change which led to the 
dissolution of its developmental state. Fortunately, some scholars have advanced beyond such a 
more reductionist line of analysis and have accounted for Taiwan’s social order within a wider 
scope of focus which encompasses numerous variables and social processes. Thomas Gold 
(1986), in particular, has consciously set out to provide a more dynamic and non-reductionist 
account of Taiwan’s statist order which specifically aims to incorporate inter-determining 
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economic, political and social spheres into its analysis. Thus, rather than an instrumentalist 
understanding of the state, Gold develops a more advanced conception of it by accounting for 
the various relations existing both within the state and between the state and society. As such, 
Gold holds that state - society relations can be understood according to two poles, one in which 
the state is little more than a puppet to powerful domestic or foreign interests and the other by 
which it enjoys complete autonomy from such interests (Gold, 1986, pp. 18–19). Based on this 
conception, Gold accounts for Taiwan’s statist social order in terms of state-society relations 
which veered toward the latter pole during the 1980s.  
 
Gold’s study is valuable as a signpost toward a more integrated analysis of Taiwan’s statist 
social order by examining it with a stronger emphasis on the social basis of the state. But, 
although Gold’s study is a crucial advance, it also at times loses specificity due to its failure to 
identify a central variable such as class on which identified spheres of focus impinge upon and 
on which Taiwan’s social order can be more concretely theorized. Engaging in a similar 
macro-level analysis, Hee-Yeon Cho and Eun-Mee Kim overcome such limitations by 
establishing a necessary specificity on which Taiwan’s late statist social order can be understood 
and do so in terms of the central variable of class. As such, they argue that the state cannot be 
understood without taking into account the specific class conditions which enable it. To do so, 
Cho and Kim develop the useful distinction of state autonomy veering between the ‘autonomy 
to coordinate class relations toward development’ and the ‘autonomy to coordinate policy 
instruments toward development.’ They stress that statists only understand autonomy in the 
latter sense and that they therefore only acknowledge the more directly visible behavioural 
aspects of the state while neglecting its social basis (Cho & Kim, 1998). As such, Cho and 
Kim’s argument suggests that although an elite bureaucracy may enjoy effective autonomy on 
which the statist social order can be understood, that such autonomy can also be theorized in 
class terms as resting on the formation of a developmental alliance in which development is 
carried out as a hegemonic project (Cho & Kim, 1998, p. 154). It is not difficult to tell that, over 
time, a developmental alliance between the elite bureaucracy and the LE capitalist class became 
ever more central toward enabling a prolonged elite bureaucratic autonomy in Taiwan.  
 
The application of a widened, but class focused macro-level approach not only allows for 
Taiwan’s state to be theorized in terms of its social basis, but also for processes of social 
transformation to be examined in terms of their effect on the elite bureaucracy’s autonomy. 
Furthermore, the elite bureaucracy can also be theorized in class terms as possessing a distinct 
economic and political interest which was maintained through its organic relationship with the 
state. Such a widened conception of the developmental state allows for a clearer account of the 
relative positions of the core class interests within the KMT’s developmental alliance at any 
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given time. By doing so, it is also much easier to examine the process by which capital interests 
eventually ascended to dissolve the elite bureaucracy’s autonomy altogether. This is theorized 
particularly well by Hsiao Hsin-Huang (1995) and Wang Jenn-hwan (1996) who argue that the 
LE capitalist class ascended so rapidly during the 1980s that it forged a viable alliance with an 
islander dominated reformist faction within the KMT. Wang’s account focuses particularly on 
the process of the capture by examining how this alliance of interests proceeded to dislodge the 
elite bureaucracy from its organic connection with Taiwan’s state. After the state’s capture, both 
Wang and Hsiao understand Taiwan’s state apparatus as being confined within an alliance of 
interests forged between the LE capitalist class and capitalist/special interest-like KMT 
affiliated political/factional politicians. Although accurately theorizing the process of Taiwan’s 
social order transition, Wang and Hsiao have not, however, identified the over-determining 
nature of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class toward which politicians were increasingly beholden to. 
But, this is largely because of the more dated nature of the studies as, during the time of writing, 
it was still very difficult to predict the full ascent of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class because this 
was still very much a process that was in motion.   
  
With the dissolution of the statist social order and the eroded autonomy of a 
bureaucratic/political class, Taiwan’s state policy from the 1990s onward can be theorized 
straightforwardly as being unambiguously capital advancing. This being so, the only question 
that remains is how Taiwan’s capital friendly and CSEI advancing social order was legitimated. 
This is a particularly prescient question because Taiwan’s social movements were very active 
during its democratization and among which was also an active labour movement. All social 
movements, however, became progressively more marginalized after Taiwan’s democratization 
and for this reason, many scholars have attempted to address why this was so. Among the most 
commonly identified causes are intra-social movement factionalism, a successful political 
co-optation as well as a general docility due to longer-term ideational legacies of the KMT’s 
propaganda and a production process induced labour passivity (Gates, 1979; G.-S. Hsieh, 1992; 
Minns & Tierney, 2003). Although all such factors had a role to play, other scholars more 
correctly identify a primarily ideational process which diluted the coherence of Taiwan’s social 
movements in the context of a democratization and Taiwan nationalist narrative which 
increasingly came to the fore within it (H.-H. Chen, 2009, 2012).
3
  Only some scholars 
correctly identify the centrality of a Taiwan identity politics not only toward diluting a social 
movement coherence, but also toward pacifying the citizenry more generally (Buchanan & 
                                                     
3
 
There also exists an extensive body of literature which examines the genesis and discursive currents of Taiwan’s cultural and political identity perceptions, 
much of which focuses on the development of a distinct Taiwan identity (i.e. C.-L. Lin, 2002; A. Hsiau, 2000; Hughes, C., 1997). This body of literature tends to 
focus either on understanding the discourses of Taiwan identity on its own terms or in relation to nation-building in Taiwan. But, because I approach identity 
discourses in the context of their emotive and de-politicizing effect on class and economic issues, I do not engage with it as a distinct body of literature in my 
analysis. This is because it speaks to a different research question and motif.
 
37 
 
Nicholls, 2003; Minns & Tierney, 2003; Wang, 1996). This, as I will also demonstrate, was 
because of the diverting effects of Taiwan’s divisive identity politics from non-identity political 
issues.  
 
By now, it is clear that following the dissolution of Taiwan’s development state, that its policies 
can be accounted for as being capital defined. But, before concluding, it is necessary to return 
briefly to the CSEI process to account for the role that an autonomous CCP has secured toward 
shaping Taiwan’s social order. Due to the economic dependence of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class 
on China, it is an unavoidable question as to what the relational dynamic was between it and the 
CCP. This is especially important because of the CCP’s strategy to secure its influence over 
Taiwan’s LE capitalist class to shape the parameters of Taiwan’s social order. Due to the 
economic relationship between Taiwan and China and the assumed more advanced nature of 
Taiwan’s capitalist class, many mainstream CSEI scholars have posited a perceived increase in 
the political influence that Taiwanese capital wields over the CCP’s policy making apparatus 
(Skanderup, 2004; Tung, 2005a). Tung Chen-Yuan, for instance, argues that taishang 
(Taiwanese capitalists in China) organizations such as the Taiwan Invested Enterprise 
Association (TIEA) have not only been successful in shaping China’s investment policies, but 
that they have even gained some degree of influence to moderate China’s Taiwan policies (Tung, 
2005a, pp. 164–168). 
 
Claims of Taiwanese capital’s political influence in China are entirely untenable. This is 
especially so in the context of China’s rapid economic development due to which the CCP has 
gained a defining degree of influence over Taiwan’s LE capitalist class. It is true that China 
depended on all variants of Taiwanese capital in economic terms during its earlier stages of 
economic development, particularly in the 1990s. This, however is much less the case now as 
China’s economic development has occurred so rapidly that it now possesses a similarly 
powerful base on which to foster economic upgrading. As such, other scholars have more 
correctly argued that Taiwan’s capitalist class is now valued by the CCP primarily in political 
terms due to the likely transformative political outcomes which continued CSEI has on Taiwan 
(Kahler & Kastner, 2006, pp. 534–535; Tanner, 2007). This assessment is very much correct 
and the CCP has clearly gained a strong capacity to shape Taiwan’s social order through its 
alliance with Taiwan’s LE capitalist class, a point which will be explored at much more depth 
subsequently.  
 
Due to the changing social basis of Taiwan’s state, it is clear that a statist enabling elite 
bureaucratic autonomy eroded throughout the 1990s and that Taiwan’s social order became 
capital defined thereafter. It is on this basis that Taiwan’s CSEI policies can be understood and 
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for which it is necessary to explore the social foundations of Taiwan’s social order in a 
historicist fashion.  
  
1.3 Conclusion    
In this chapter, I engaged with the existing literature to develop the conceptual insights on 
which my subsequent analysis on CSEI and Taiwan’s social order is based. To do so, I 
problematized the realist and liberal predicates which guide the extant CSEI analysis as having 
led to an asocial and ahistorical account of CSEI as occurring on two separate economic and 
political spheres. Instead, I argued that CSEI can only be theorized in terms of the capital 
defined social basis of Taiwan’s state on which both the economic and policy dimensions of 
CSEI can be accounted for. Because this harks to fundamental questions of Taiwan’s state 
autonomy, I argued that an understanding of CSEI necessitates the historicizing of how a 
previous elite bureaucratic autonomy eroded in Taiwan due to a changing social basis of its 
post-WWII state. To do so, although I accept that Taiwan was a developmental state until 1988, 
I argued that the statist literature has not sufficiently accounted for the social basis on which its 
elite bureaucratic autonomy was enabled. This, I argued, is especially crucial in terms of a 
consensual dimension by which the elite bureaucracy had to secure a sufficient assent among 
Taiwan’s major classes to enable its political autonomy and disciplinary rule. Although Taiwan’s 
statist development was crucial to this acquiescence, I also argued that the class formation and 
social transformation induced by such development eventually weakened the relative degree of 
the citizenry’s acquiescence over time which led eventually to the dissolution of Taiwan’s 
developmental state. To theorize this changing social basis of Taiwan’s state, I argued that it is 
necessary to account for important institutional, ideational and productive processes and how 
they affected Taiwan’s class composition. Although I examined a number of accounts that have 
done so, I also concluded that none have yet correctly theorized Taiwan’s eroded political 
autonomy and its capital-defined post-statist social order features. On this basis, I posited that 
the CSEI trajectory can be understood in terms of a social order shaping alliance forged between 
the CCP and Taiwan’s dominant LE capitalist class which combined impinges on and shapes 
Taiwan’s state policies.  
  
In this chapter, my analysis has shown the flawed nature of the liberal and realist predicates 
which shape the CSEI literature by drawing attention to a first variable social basis which 
defines both the economic and political dimensions of Taiwan’s social order. Once attention is 
placed on the social basis of Taiwan’s state, my analysis suggests that it is not difficult to 
overcome challenging questions that mainstream scholars struggle with as to why Taiwan’s state 
pursued a simultaneously capital advancing and sovereignty encroaching CSEI policy.  To do 
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so, however, my analysis suggests that it is necessary to first account for the nature of Taiwan’s 
state and for which it is also necessary to historicize it in terms of its post-WWII social basis. 
Because such a historicizing of Taiwan’s social order shows that Taiwan’s state became captured 
by capital interests following the dissolution of the developmental state, I suggested that CSEI 
can be theorized on the basis of a combined logic which impinges from the CCP and Taiwan’s 
LE capitalist class. To proceed on this basis, however, requires a deeper level theoretical 
account, especially in terms of how it is possible to integrate and harmonize the geo-strategic 
imperatives of the CCP with the economic interests of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class. In the 
following chapter, I will outline and develop a neo-Gramscian framework which is capable of 
not only accounting for Taiwan’s state as being defined by a Cross-Strait historical bloc, but 
which can also account for how this historical bloc became hegemonic by theorizing Taiwan’s 
social order transition from a statist to capital advancing social order.  
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Chapter 2: Neo-Gramscian Theory and Regional Order 
 
After setting out the importance of examining CSEI in terms of the social basis of Taiwan’s 
state, I develop in this chapter the neo-Gramscian framework which guides my analysis. My 
analysis is based on the Gramscian understanding of the state as being a composite of both an 
institutional apparatus of rule and its civil society basis which is shaped by inter-defining 
productive, institutional and ideational processes. Veering from a more common global 
capitalist analysis which focuses on theorizing a global neoliberal social order convergence 
process and anti-capitalist resistance against this, I argue that the Gramscian framework can also 
be applied in a much more regionally focused fashion. To do so, I develop the concept of the 
regional historical bloc as central to my analysis. By proceeding in this way, I am able to 
theorize CSEI through the concept of the Cross-Strait historical bloc forged between the CCP 
and Taiwan’s LE capitalist class as both shaping Taiwan’s social order and driving its 
internationalization toward China. In terms of the theoretical basis of my analysis, I argue that a 
regional understanding of global order is tenable because of the Gramscian understanding of 
transnational social orders as having to both emanate from and to be legitimated at the national 
level. As for a theoretical basis to theorize intra-capitalist social order variation, I argue that this 
can be understood as a combined outcome of the Gramscian framework’s national point of 
departure and the continued tendency toward intra-capitalist interest contradictions between 
regionally hegemonic capitalist class fractions. By examining CSEI on this basis, I demonstrate 
not only the necessity of theorizing CSEI in terms of social order, but also the strong 
applicability of the Gramscian framework toward examining regional social order formation 
processes more generally.  
 
In order to apply the concept of the Cross-Strait historical bloc, it is also necessary to account 
for both the CCP’s political autonomy and the process by which a similar KMT elite 
bureaucratic autonomy eroded in Taiwan. I account for both through the Gramscian concept of 
passive revolution. Because the CCP’s role in the Cross-Strait historical bloc has been largely 
consistent, I theorize its autonomy on the basis of a continued passive revolution enabled 
‘contender state’ social formation from which an outward regional order shaping logic can be 
identified. As for the KMT’s previous elite bureaucratic autonomy, I apply the concept of 
passive revolution to account for both the social basis of the state’s political autonomy and how 
its progressive change led to the eventual erosion of this autonomy. To do so, I also identify 
three additional conceptual tools as central to my analysis, transformismo, the statist historical 
bloc and the hegemonic narrative. By relying on this set of theoretical tools, I am able to 
theorize Taiwan’s social order with particular emphasis on the elite bureaucracy’s autonomy 
gaining transformismo and its historical bloc with a subservient LE capitalist class. By applying 
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this combination of theoretical tools to explore the changing social basis of Taiwan’s state, I am 
able to account for how a development induced class formation and social transformation 
process affected Taiwan’s elite bureaucratic autonomy at every juncture during Taiwan’s 
post-WWII development history. By proceeding in this way, I am finally also able to account 
for the dissolution of the elite bureaucracy’s political autonomy in terms of an LE capitalist 
class forged historical bloc which relied heavily on a hegemonic narrative which was a 
composite of an economistic narrative and a divisive national identity politics debate.  
 
Section 2.1: Neo-Gramscian Theory 
The neo-Gramscian framework can be applied to theorize CSEI within the social order 
parameter within which it is defined. But to do so, it is first necessary to outline the basic 
features of the framework so that its applicability to CSEI can be substantiated. In the broadest 
sense, neo-Gramscian theory understands international relations as being defined by historical 
blocs forged between dominant classes vested in particular modes of production and allied 
classes which extend beyond national borders to define transnational social orders. This 
understanding is a widening of Antonio Gramsci’s original theory which was developed to 
theorized national processes of historical bloc and social order formation (Gramsci, 2005). By 
theorizing the state in terms of its social basis, neo-Gramscians conceive of the state as a 
composite of both an institutional apparatus and its civil society basis which refers to the social 
foundations that must be won over before stable rule can be secured (Augelli & Murphy, 1993). 
More specifically, civil society refers to the various institutions, collective organizations and 
political spaces in which the citizenry establishes a collective identity, or put more simply, the 
realm in which the ‘I becomes the we’ (Murphy, 1994, p. 31). In other words, civil society refers 
to the social foundation on which inter-subjective meanings are established and which frame the 
parameters and ideational foundations of social orders (Cox, 1999).  
 
Within liberal democratic systems in which the visibility of disciplinary processes of rule 
recedes, the leadership of historical blocs become stable when they attain a hegemony by which 
a defining degree of assent is secured among major classes toward social orders which advance 
the interests of hegemonic classes. To secure such an assent, hegemonic classes commonly have 
to engage in the granting of limited concessions to subaltern classes. But, more importantly, a 
hegemony also entails that a hegemonic class must articulate and disseminate a hegemonic 
narrative which universalizes its interests so that it can be accepted by a majority within all 
social classes as corresponding with their interests. It is also within the realm of civil society 
that historical blocs and hegemonic narratives are challenged by potential counter historical 
blocs and counter-hegemonic narratives. Similar to the historical bloc, the counter historical 
bloc refers to an oppositional class alliance which contains a central class such as the labouring 
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class and which develops various alliances with allied classes to secure a viably expanded social 
basis on which to dislodge established hegemonies (Cox, 1983, 1999). 
 
Because of the importance of civil society, the capacity to theorize ideational processes within 
their class context is a defining feature of the Gramscian conception of social order. As such, the 
Gramscian framework is also strongly placed to incorporate insights from discourse analysis 
while being able to do so on the basis of class and social order (Bruff, 2005). A particularly 
relevant example which demonstrates the utility of a neo-Gramscian approach is the 
legitimation of a neoliberal policy course which was adopted from the 1980s onward and which 
also has some parallels with the liberal legitimation of CSEI. On purely economic terms, a 
neoliberal policy course has been legitimated both as being co-determinate with the citizenry’s 
welfare and as being economically unavoidable due to an objective globalization process 
(Steger, 2005). In addition to a direct legitimation, ideational processes have also had an effect 
on shaping the parameters on which policy debates occur. The success of the neoliberal policy 
legitimation, for instance, relied heavily on the advantage enjoyed by the capitalist class to 
utilize mass communication mediums and institutional actors to legitimate neo-liberal policies. 
Furthermore, ideational legitimation also involves the exclusion of particular perspectives from 
the popular discursive sphere as is evident in the cordoning off of economic policy as falling 
under the remit of economists and other ‘specialists’ who understand such complex issues. As 
an outcome, critical voices have been granted a much more peripheral discursive legitimacy 
while often also being presented as ideologically bound, unscientific, or ignorant by the mass 
media (Rupert, 2000; Steger, 2005).  
 
As a historicist approach, the neo-Gramscian theory’s utility lies especially in its open-ended 
framework which can account for the state within its always changing social basis. This is an 
outcome of the Gramscian framework’s state-based starting point and its triangular analysis 
which conceives of the class basis of social orders as being shaped by inter-determining 
production, institutional and ideational processes (Cox, 1981, 1983). Although the three spheres 
are not linear in their mutual inter-determination, for ease of discussion, they can be traced in a 
linear fashion. Production, for instance, shapes the objective existence of the myriad of classes 
that compose given social orders. Different modes of production are always understood as 
bringing into existence dominant classes which then seek to secure and extend the modes of 
production on which their class interests are based, a process which also simultaneously limits 
the interests of other classes. To do so, however, ascendant historical blocs must secure control 
over the state in order to establish the institutional parameters necessary. But, in order to attain 
control over the state, historical blocs also have to secure the ideational assent of all major 
social classes and for which the spread of viable hegemonic narratives is necessary.  
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On the basis of the Gramscian approach outlined thus far, it is clear that it is a highly suitable 
framework to account for historical change and the effects thereof on the state’s policy 
parameter. This being so, it also corresponds with many of the conceptual insights I developed 
in the previous chapter. But before applying the framework to theorize CSEI and Taiwan’s 
social transformation process, it is also necessary to develop a more specific account of the 
theory’s functional fit toward theorizing regional social orders.  
 
Section 2.2: Regional Social Order Variation  
Because CSEI occurs primarily at a regional level, the question of the state’s role in shaping 
transnational social orders is particularly crucial to my analysis which remains at the state level. 
In terms of Gramscian theory, although its conception of transnational social orders and 
historical blocs is state transcending, the state is also understood as being central to 
transnational social order formation processes. This is because at a most general level, 
transnational social orders have to first emanate nationally before they can be extended globally 
through transnational historical blocs while transnational social orders also have to be 
legitimated at the national level.  But, despite the open ended and continually state-based 
features of the Gramscian theory, many neo-Gramscians have instead developed a specifically 
global account of transnational social order. This is due to a very common adherence among 
Gramscians to a global capitalist perspective which understands capitalism as a largely 
monolithic and functionally coherent system. As such, global capitalist Gramscians have 
theorized global order primarily in terms of a neoliberal capitalist social order convergence and 
anti-capitalist resistance binary while social order variation has hardly factored as a matter 
warranting serious concern.  
 
Before proceeding further, it is important to first identify theoretical differences between global 
capitalist Gramscians whose analysis is developed on the foundation of the state and 
self-professed Gramscians who argue that the state is no longer central to the contemporary 
global order. Among the latter, William Robinson (2005) takes this logic furthest by arguing 
that due to increasingly global circuits of capital accumulation, that the current global order is 
one in which ‘transnational capitalists and allied dominant strata integrate horizontally and in 
the process move ‘up’ cross-nationally [by] penetrating and utilising numerous national and 
transnational state apparatuses to forge their rule’ (Robinson, 2005, p. 4).’ As an outcome, 
Robinson proposes that a transnational capitalist class now no longer relies primarily on states 
to forge its rule, but also on various transnational institutions and private bodies. But, rather 
than existing alongside of or as a transnational extension of the state, Robinson argues that 
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states are themselves being incorporated as functional components within a global capitalist 
class-managed transnational state (TNS) which is a composite of both states and transnational 
institutions of rule. Because the TNS is conceived of as a unified and singular system of rule 
which can only be theorized as a totality, Robinson argues that Gramscians should part paths 
entirely with a continually state-centred analysis (Robinson, 2005, pp. 6–7).  
 
Despite its confident analysis, the TNS thesis is unable to account for a continued variation 
among national and regional capitalist social orders. For one, in terms of CSEI, the TNS thesis 
fails to account for Taiwan’s internationalization toward China while it is also unable to account 
for China’s continued contra-neoliberal development logic. For the TNS thesis to be valid, 
given Taiwan and China’s deep economic integration within a global capitalist market, both 
should have increasingly merged to become functional components within the TNS. This has 
not occurred, however, and the reason for this discrepancy is the inability of the TNS thesis to 
account for a continued diversity of capitalist social orders because of its attempt to move 
beyond the state as a central unit of analysis which, ultimately, is at the root of such variation. In 
addition to the failure to account for the possibility of regional intra-capitalist social orders, 
Robinson’s exhortation to part paths with the state is also problematic in Gramscian terms due 
to the centrality of the state toward legitimating transnational social orders. This point is, for 
instance, made by Craig Murphy who posits that it is on national governments that institutional 
imperatives have to be created and legitimated which force civil society actors to respond to the 
logic of capitalism which operates at a more global level (Murphy, 1998).  
  
Because of the attempt by TNS theorists to sidestep the state, their analysis veers qualitatively 
from the global capitalist Gramscian approach. But, despite a continued state-centred analysis, 
Global capitalist Gramscians postulate on a very similar process of global capitalism-induced 
social order convergence (Gill, 2000, 2002; Rupert, 1998, 2003). The reason for this line of 
analysis is pointed to by Murphy’s aforementioned exhortation of a global capitalist logic which 
is the core theoretical motif on which global capitalist Gramscians develop their analysis. This 
is based, in part, on genuine processes of global capitalist policy convergence which intensified 
after the late 1970s in the context of both a conscious coordination among transnational 
capitalists and more structural processes such as an increased internationalization of production 
and financial integration (Gill, 1995a, pp. 400–402; Rupert, 2003, p. 190). But, although global 
capitalist Gramscians are correct to identify an abstract logic of capital and a general tendency 
toward policy convergence, they have problematically interpreted this tendency in very concrete 
terms. As an outcome, despite methodological differences with the TNS approach, global 
capitalist Gramscians have similarly identified a transnational historical bloc-led social order 
convergence process which advances in opposition to all other social interests throughout the 
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globe.  
 
Given the national point of departure among global capitalist Gramscians, the question quickly 
arises as to how it is that they have been able to advance an analysis of global social order 
convergence without running into difficulties at the level of the state. Even the most vocal 
advocate of a capitalist convergence process, Stephen Gill, accepts that capital ‘cannot operate 
outside of or beyond the political context, and involves planning, legitimation, and the use of 
coercive capacities by the state’ (Gill, 1995a, p. 422). As such, to justify a global social order 
convergence line of analysis, global capitalist Gramscians are careful to theorize a posited social 
order convergence in a somewhat less totalizing fashion than proponents of the TNS. Global 
capitalist Gramscians, for instance, are willing to accept that contradictions do remain cogent at 
the level of the state due to the transnational historical bloc’s continued reliance on states to 
advance its favoured policies (Gill, 1995a, p. 422). Because they accept the need for a national 
legitimation process, global capitalist Gramscians are also willing to acknowledge that there can 
exist different modes of capitalist social organization such as the East Asian, Rhineland, and 
laissez faire models and due to which they also acknowledge that a global hegemony is 
impossible to attain (Gill, 1995b).  
 
Despite accepting the possibility of inter-capitalist social order variation, Gill leaves this point 
under-theorized and proposes instead the concept of supremacy to allow for a continued focus 
on global capitalist social order convergence. Unlike hegemony, the concept of supremacy 
denotes a process by which a non-hegemonic historical bloc secures successful rule over a 
fragmented opposition through both consent and coercion. Thus, a global social order 
convergence is argued to be advanced by a transnational historical bloc which promotes an 
ideational narrative promoting neoliberal capitalism, but also through a crucial coercive 
dimension which disciplines states to pursue market conforming policy (Gill, 1995a). In terms 
of this disciplinary aspect, Gill focuses particularly on a process dubbed as the 
new-constitutionalism by which he argues that states are pressured to adopt a constitutionalized 
neoliberal policy framework and toward which they are monitored intensively. The process 
itself is conceived of as taking place through supra-national institutions such as the WTO and 
the IMF in which neoliberal policy norms and best practices are first formulated and 
constitutionalized so that such a policy course has been effectively removed from popular 
accountability (Gill, 2002).  
 
Although global capitalist Gramscians examine convergence in terms of a more pronounced 
coercive dimension, they do not examine regional contradictions which shape social order 
convergence processes and which give rise to regional social order variation. Despite 
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acknowledging the impossibility of a global hegemony, global capitalist Gramscians continue to 
base their analysis on a Northern-emanating transnational historical bloc which, along with 
regionally allied capitalist and elite classes, is said to advance global social order convergence 
(Gill, 1995a, p. 404-405; Gill, 1993, pp. 34–35). As such, Global capitalist Gramscians argue 
that the cleavage between capitalist and non-capitalist social organization has been 
internationalized while contradictions have to necessitate a conscious challenge toward the 
discipline of capital to warrant a place in their analysis. On this basis, excluding right wing 
populist social mobilization, global capitalist Gramscians have posited that a loosely organized 
global anti-capitalist alliance has come into shape within which a plethora of resistance 
movements such as environmentalists, feminists and indigenous movement are collapsed (Gill, 
2000; Rupert, 1993). But this kind of arbitrary lumping is very problematic as it postulates a 
uniformity that does not exist while also neglecting to account for the often regionally specific 
nature of class contradictions which cannot be so easily reduced to a consciously global 
anti-capitalist logic. In the case of Taiwan, for instance, the anti-capitalist heading has limited 
analytical value because it fails to account for the overwhelming and largely un-reflexive 
support among Taiwan’s citizenry toward its capital-defined social order and CSEI project. 
Furthermore, in Taiwan’s case, a misplaced class element has rather developed into a 
fully-fledged identity and cultural politics which has dominated the discursive currents of its 
political discourse.  
 
This inability of a global capitalist Gramscian approach to theorize CSEI and regional 
specificity is an outcome of its underplaying of continued fractures within either side of the 
capitalist and anti-capitalist binary. But, a Gramscian account of social order does not have to be 
applied in the reductionist fashion by which global capitalist Gramscians have applied it. Robert 
Cox, for instance, makes a strong case for the neo-Gramscian theory to be applied in a more 
open-ended way and has cautioned specifically against developing a line of analysis which is 
based too much on a first degree abstraction type understanding of capital and social order. As 
such, Cox has emphasized an increased social order variation and has foregrounded this as a 
theoretical motif which warrants particular attention in the current global juncture (Cox & 
Schechter, 2003, pp. 89–90). This is despite Cox’s instrumental role in first theorizing an 
American-led post-1970s neoliberal convergence process, a process that he now accepts as 
having become significantly weakened because of an increased global opposition to the spread 
of neoliberal values and practices (Cox, 2007, p. 522). Rather than lumping such a resistance 
process under a single anti-capitalist heading, Cox has remained more sensitive to the often 
inter-subjective cultural values which have defined instances of anti-neoliberal resistance at the 
regional level. As an outcome, Cox argues that the spread of market civilization has slowed 
down because it has had to become more socially embedded in the various civil societies and 
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social orders on which it encroaches (Cox & Schechter, 2003, pp. 89–90).  
 
Despite identifying an increased variation among regional social orders, Cox has left much of 
his analysis at a broader and more generally theoretical level. Thus, although it is a theoretical 
advance, further clarification is necessary as to why the ideational node should be singled out 
specifically within the Gramscian triangle as the most important factor which shapes social 
order divergence in the current juncture. Also, the binary identified by Cox between neoliberal 
encroachment and regional cultures of resistance risks the development of a similar global 
encroachment vs. resistance type conception of global order and the identification of regional 
anti-capitalist cultural uniformities which do not necessarily exist. By doing so, the risk also 
remains that the often class distorting and capital advancing effects of a cultural identity politics 
is underplayed. In Taiwan’s case, for example, a crucial factor for the hegemony of the LE 
capitalist class was the rise of a divisive and populist nationalist identity politics which diverted 
the citizenry’s attention from a material politics so that a simplistic economistic narrative 
secured a generally un-reflexive popular support. The fact that class contradictions often 
become entangled with and potentially overshadowed by a national identity politics clearly 
suggests that it is crucial to peer beyond static conceptions of culture so that class can continue 
to be a central variable of analysis.  
 
Despite the importance of an ideational node in shaping social order variation, it is clearly not 
the sole or even central factor which explains such variation. An identity induced support for a 
deepened capitalist social organization was not isolated in Taiwan’s case, but mirrors a more 
general tendency by which capitalist social order has secured a much higher degree of support 
outside of the global North (Stephen, 2010). What this suggests is that civil society can only 
ever be conceived of as an arena which contains a multiplicity of interests which compete 
therein. Within this tapestry of interests, it is far from assured that a strong anti-capitalist 
consensus has or is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future which may significantly challenge 
the spread of capitalist policies. Given the difficulty to develop an anti-capitalist consensus, 
attempts to theorize a specifically global anti-capitalist alliance are likely to impede the 
prospects of such an alliance from developing in the first place due to the regional specificity of 
class contradictions. This suggests that rather than an encroachment vs. resistance binary, 
whether of the global capitalist or cultural Gramscian variety, that it is more important to first 
identify the regional hegemonic nexuses within which regional orders are advanced. 
 
Section 2.3: Inter-Capitalist Regional Social Orders  
Because of the inability of a cultural or ideational dimension alone to explain Taiwan’s 
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internationalization toward China, it is clear that additional explanations are needed to account 
for this process. Because of the capitalist features of Taiwan’s social order, its 
internationalization to China also requires an identification of a specific motor which drives this 
process forward and for which the productive node of the Gramscian triangle is crucial. Once 
this dimension is theorized, it will then also be possible for me to identify the specific 
theoretical tools on which my analysis is based. 
 
2.3.1 Capital Fractions and China’s Contender State  
As the previous chapter’s analysis suggests, Taiwan’s internationalization toward China was 
driven by the fractional composition of its hegemonic sub-contracting LE capitalist class. But, 
because the effects of the factional nature of capital on social order variation and 
internationalization processes is under-developed within the Gramscian theory, a number of 
valuable insights from other Marxist accounts of the state can be integrated with the Gramscian 
approach. The specific insight referred to here is that social order variation can also be theorized 
in terms of contradictions between regionally or nationally situated capital fractions and the 
likelihood of nation-states to remain more responsive to regionally operating capital fractions. 
This is a loosening of a state-capital nexus type account proposed by scholars such as Gonzalo 
Pozo-Martin (2007) and Ray Kiely (2006) who propose a symbiotic relationship which, rather 
than occurring between states and a diffuse capitalist class, occurs between states and nationally 
situated capital fractions. Thus, they argue that although globalizing tendencies can be identified, 
that such tendencies are better understood in the context of global inter-capitalist collaboration 
which occurs on the conduit of the state and at the behest of domestically situated capital 
fractions which benefit from this process. But, the process itself is argued to occur in a context 
of competitive collaboration between different state-capital nexuses (Kiely, 2006). Such insights 
are valuable because they draw attention to the possibility of understanding capitalist state 
policy also in terms of national and regionally operating class interests as opposed to 
abstractions of a singularly coherent global capitalist class.  
 
A state-capital nexus type account of capitalist state policy is located on the other end of the 
national-transnational spectrum because of an unambiguous bias toward making the nation-state 
the main focus of analysis which runs counter to the state transcending neo-Gramscian approach. 
But, the tendency of state apparatuses to remain beholden to regional/national interests is a 
viable assumption which cannot be easily ignored by global capitalist Gramscians because of 
their continued state-based analysis. For the purpose of my analysis, a state-capital nexus is 
particularly useful as a theoretical addendum on which variation between capitalist 
national/regional social orders can be understood. As such, in accounting for a 
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national/regionalizing tendency, this should be understood as a regionalizing counter-pull 
against the globalizing tendencies theorized by Gill and Rupert. In this way, the multiple 
pressures acting on state apparatuses can be understood as linked and interrelated while 
simplistic logics of over-determination can be avoided. Not only does this allow for the 
overcoming of both national and transnational biases, but it also allows for both dimensions 
which so clearly shape the contours of the global order to be accounted for and due to which 
qualitative variation among social orders can be theorized.  
 
Once it is accepted that state apparatuses remain responsive to both a Northern-emanating 
transnational historical bloc and regionally operating historical blocs, theorizing the global order 
solely in terms of a singular neoliberal capitalist logic becomes much more difficult to justify. 
This is because despite sharing a general interest in the advance of global capitalism, different 
factions of capital fare differently under the neoliberal international order and the question 
quickly arises as to why domestically bound capital factions necessarily have to internationalize 
toward a global level in the first place. In the case of Taiwan, my analysis shows that its 
internationalization to China was affected primarily by the sub-contracting nature of Taiwan’s 
capitalist class which ensured that it was particularly susceptive to the CCP’s initiative toward 
forging a Cross-Strait historical bloc. This suggests that it is not so much the global hegemony 
or supremacy of an abstract category of capital which shaped Taiwan’s policy parameter, but 
rather Taiwan’s domestically hegemonic LE capitalist class. Therefore, Taiwan’s relatively 
weaker economic standing coupled with the sub-contracting features of its LE capitalist class 
were the most important variable which determined the economic direction of its 
internationalization toward China. Because this process can be theorized in terms of the class 
basis of Taiwan’s state policy, there is no need to revert to a territorial logic to account for it.  
 
For economically more influential countries, other than shaping the direction of their 
internationalization, the factional features of domestically hegemonic capitalist classes is also 
likely to shape the degree to which their policies will challenge a Northern emanating 
transnational historical bloc. The reason for this is the very real contradiction of interests 
between regional capitalists and advanced core capitalist classes based in the global North. For 
one, a Northern capitalist class has remained the chief beneficiary of the current neoliberal order 
which seeks primarily to advance the interest of Northern capital fractions at the expense of less 
advanced regionally situated capital fractions. Securing this are neoliberal global governance 
norms which have pressured non-Northern states to abandon infant industry or domestic capital 
advancing policies and to compete directly with advanced Northern capital fractions. With 
disparities between the global North and South protected further by rules on intellectual 
property rights, the overall outcome of an adherence to neoliberal policy norms has been that 
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value-added accrues disproportionately to core capital fractions while non-Northern capital 
fractions have tended to specialize primarily in lower value-added subcontracting type 
economic processes. As such, without a pronounced role for the state and industrial policy, both 
viable value creation and technological upgrading are next to impossible (H.-J. Chang, 2002; 
Wade, 2003).  
 
The scope of this thesis does not allow me to explore the possibility of outward historical bloc 
formation processes from liberal capitalist rising power states because China’s social order 
cannot be understood in terms of a capitalist hegemony. This is because of the strong degree of 
political autonomy enjoyed by the CCP and due to its control over and limitation on the 
development of China’s civil society. In China’s case, however, its outward regional social order 
shaping effects can be explained in terms of the class basis of its state due to the CCP’s 
successful passive revolution. Before proceeding, it is important to note that due to the strong 
parallels between China’s current statist order and Taiwan’s pre-1988 statist order, that both can 
be understood in terms of a similar passive revolution (Gray, 2010, 2011). Because I have 
already placed a significant degree of focus on Taiwan’s pre-1988 social order and because I 
will continue to do so in the following chapters, I account here mainly for the CCP’s passive 
revolution in order to first develop a stronger understanding of the Cross-Strait historical bloc.  
 
Passive revolution refers to a strategy of rule through which a dominant class secures a viable 
social order shaping autonomy by balancing the relative strengths of major classes within given 
national territories so that no single class becomes powerful enough to challenge this political 
autonomy. The primary means by which dominant classes secure a passive revolution is by 
utilizing the state’s disciplinary, absorptive and ideational apparatuses of rule. Thus, in addition 
to policy constraints which limit particular classes from gaining excessive influence, absorptive 
practices of transformismo are also relied on extensively for key class actors to be either 
absorbed into the state apparatus or to be targeted for special alliance formation (Cox, 1983). At 
the same time, ideational processes of rule are also relied on extensively through the propaganda 
apparatus of the state which is crucial to securing a popular acquiescence among all major 
class/social demographics toward a passive revolution based rule. For now, the most important 
point to make is that in the case of Taiwan and China, that their elite bureaucracy can itself be 
understood in class terms because both secured their economic and political privileges through 
maintaining an organic connection with their respective state apparatuses. Based on such an 
organic connection with the state, the pursuit of a Listian development path in China can be 
explained in terms of a state-managing class which ‘foster[s] guide[s] and direct[s] capital 
accumulation’ (van Apeldoorn at al 2012, p. 475).  
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In terms of China’s social order, a distinct outward push toward regional historical bloc and 
social formation processes is shaped particularly by its counter-hegemonic development features. 
This point is made convincingly by Kees van der Pijl who, although also basing his analysis on 
a capitalist encroachment vs. resistance schema, has identified a very useful third option to 
conceive of social order, the Hobbesian contender state. Such a contender state formation, van 
der Pijl argues, can be adopted by late-developing countries to resist Northern encroachment 
and he identifies China’s contemporary social order as the most notable contemporary example 
of a contender state. Van der Pijl’s analysis of the social basis of China’s contender state has 
parallels with Kevin Gray’s (2010) theorization of China’s social order in terms of passive 
revolution. But, van der Pijl focuses primarily on how China’s state-led development strategy 
can be conceived of as a form of resistance against a Northern capitalist encroachment process 
which seeks to open up contender states such as China and to ‘dispossess [and replace] state 
classes [by] governing class[es] submitting to liberal global governance’ (van der Pijl, 2012, 
p514). Van der Pijl argues that China is a contender state par excellence which not only challenges 
the global power structure, but that the CCP has also secured a considerable leverage and disciplinary 
capacity vis-à-vis both the capitalist and labouring classes in China (van der Pijl, 2012).  
 
Although van der Pijl has provided a convincing account of China’s role as a contender state, 
his analysis has also stopped short of examining what the outward effects of its contender state 
social formation are. This is a very crucial point as once alternative logics are identified, 
particularly in the case of a rising power state such as China, the question cannot be avoided as 
to how such rising powers will impinge on surrounding territories through regional historical 
bloc formation processes. Due to the plethora of influences that surrounding states come under, 
it is likely to be somewhat more difficult to identify so clearly the degree to which the CCP has 
shaped national policies through regional historical bloc formation processes. But, in the case of 
Taiwan, the degree to which the CCP has shaped its social order has been highly pronounced 
due to the long-term and very visible nature of the CCP policy priority to unify Taiwan to which 
enormous political and economic resources have been placed. 
 
2.3.2 Concepts of Analysis  
With the motors for China’s pull on Taiwan and Taiwan’s push toward internationalizing to 
China theorized, I can now identify the main theoretical concepts that my analysis is based on. 
In terms of CSEI, I rely most centrally on the concept of the Cross-Strait historical bloc to guide 
my analysis. Within the Cross-Strait historical bloc, I argue that it is Taiwan’s Large Enterprise 
(LE) owning capitalist class which is hegemonic. This class, although integrated within global 
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production networks, perceives its core economic interests as being intricately tied to an 
ever-deepening CSEI process. As for the CCP on the other hand, I argue that it has successfully 
relied on the economic dependence of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class on China to forge an alliance 
with it toward the specific aim of shaping Taiwan’s social order and policy parameter. On this 
basis, I theorize the CCP as an external participant within the Cross-Strait historical bloc which 
has attained a crucial capacity to discipline Taiwan’s LE capitalist class. The inclusion of the 
CCP as a central actor in the Cross-Strait historical bloc is based on the assumption that its elite 
bureaucracy has attained a distinct autonomy on the basis of China’s passive revolution enabled 
contender state. The motivation for the CCP elite bureaucracy’s aim of securing Taiwan’s 
unification can be understood in terms of its domestic regime stability concerns which have 
relied heavily on a nationalist regime legitimation. As such, the CCP’s elite bureaucracy has to 
be perceived by the Chinese citizenry as advancing China’s national interest, especially its core 
interests on issues such as Taiwan’s unification with China (Shirk, 2007).  
 
A second key concept I rely on to theorize Taiwan’s post-statist social order is the hegemonic 
narrative on which the Cross-Strait historical bloc has secured its hegemony in Taiwan. 
Taiwan’s hegemonic narrative, I argue, contains two key ideational components, the first of 
which is an economistic core that presents Taiwan’s inevitable capital advancing domestic and 
CSEI policies as corresponding to the citizenry’s collective interest. As I will demonstrate, this 
has remained a very simplistic narrative and the reason for which is the second component of 
the hegemonic narrative which relates to Taiwan’s divisive identity politics. A Taiwan identity 
politics, although not propagated specifically by the LE capitalist class toward securing its 
hegemony has, nevertheless, had such an effect because it has diverted the citizenry’s attention 
from a class and issues-based politics by creating irresolvable identity cleavages with scant 
material implications. Due to the centrality of the identity debate in Taiwan’s politics, I argue 
that it has effectively led to a de-politicization of economic policy and due to which the 
economistic core of Taiwan’s hegemonic narrative has tended to be un-reflexively accepted. 
 
Because I argue that it is necessary to theorize the social basis of Taiwan’s state to correctly 
account for CSEI, I also rely extensively on the concept of passive revolution to account for 
Taiwan’s changing social order features during its statist order. I apply passive revolution to 
theorize the KMT’s elite bureaucratic autonomy in the same way that I have applied it to 
account for the CCP’s political autonomy with the only key difference being that Taiwan was 
not a contender state. On this basis, I argue that Taiwan’s elite bureaucracy secured an organic 
relationship with the state by shaping Taiwan’s class composition so that the strengths of major 
classes were in a general equilibrium. To theorize how Taiwan’s prolonged historical change 
affected the elite bureaucracy’s autonomy, I also rely on the concept of transformismo to 
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theorize how the elite bureaucracy co-opted and depoliticized Taiwan’s major classes. This, I 
argue, was crucial for a consensual dimension to Taiwan’s statist order by which an 
acquiescence among all classes and social groups was necessary for a prolonged passive 
revolution. As a part of this process, I also rely on the concept of the statist historical bloc to 
theorize the statist order and identify a core alliance between the elite bureaucracy and a 
subservient LE capitalist class. By relying on this combination of concepts, I examine how a 
prolonged passive revolution led to a changing social basis of Taiwan’s state which necessitated 
an intensified transformismo and which, in turn, weakened the elite bureaucracy’s autonomy 
further. Occurring in parallel, I utilize the concept of the statist historical bloc to examine the 
relative advance of the LE capitalist class vis-à-vis the elite bureaucracy which culminated in 
the eventual dissolution of an elite bureaucratic autonomy when the Cross-Strait historical bloc 
became hegemonic.  
 
Now, with all theoretical concepts identified, it is important to outline explicitly how they are 
inter-related facets of a single comprehensive theoretical framework which I apply to answer 
my central research question. It is only by applying the concepts of passive revolution, 
transformismo, the statist historical bloc, the Cross-Strait historical bloc and hegemonic 
narrative together that I am able to explain how a previous political autonomy dissolved and 
how Taiwan’s state became confined within the parameters of a hegemonic Cross-Strait 
historical bloc which wielded it to advance its interests.  
 
Throughout Taiwan’s statist social order, I first rely on the concept of passive revolution to 
explain how the KMT’s elite bureaucracy secured a distinct political autonomy through coercive, 
ideational and co-optive processes of rule which enabled a prolonged class equilibrium. To 
examine the LE capitalist class’ progressively increasing influence during the statist era, I then 
apply the concept of the statist historical bloc to examine how this process occurred within the 
context of an elite bureaucracy forged and dominated class alliance with the LE capitalist class 
which was aimed at prolonging its autonomy. I analyse this alliance through the conceptual lens 
of transformismo for which the LE capitalist class was the priority target, but which I also apply 
to examine the elite bureaucracy’s policy of selective co-optation more generally which targeted 
all classes. By relying on this triangular set of theoretical tools, I analyse how an intensifying 
transformismo and weakening passive revolution enabled the progressive ascent of the LE 
capitalist class until passive revolution conditions became untenable when Taiwan transitioned 
toward a liberal democratic social order. 
 
After Taiwan’s democratization, I apply the final two concepts of the Cross-Strait historical 
bloc and hegemonic narrative to examine Taiwan’s LE capital defined social order parameters. 
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The Cross-Strait historical bloc veers from the statist historical bloc because it both included the 
external participant of a passive revolution enabled CCP elite bureaucracy and because its 
central LE capitalist class attained an effective hegemony. I explore this process through the 
concept of the hegemonic narrative which allows me to examine how the Cross-Strait historical 
bloc secured the ideational assent among Taiwan’s major classes toward the desirability of a 
capital defined social order and CSEI. As such, my application of the five inter-connected 
theoretical tools enables me to develop a single comprehensive framework to account for both 
the erosion of Taiwan’s previous statist political autonomy and its transition to a Cross-Strait 
historical bloc defined social order on which basis I examine the CSEI trajectory to date.   
  
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I developed my intended application of the neo-Gramscian framework to 
examine Taiwan’s social order and CSEI policies. I argued that a Gramscian approach is well 
suited to theorize regional social order formation processes and that it can be applied to theorize 
CSEI on such terms. Challenging a global capitalist analysis on social order convergence, I 
argued that a Gramscian framework can also be applied to account for a continued process of 
regional social order variation. In the case of CSEI, I argued that it can be accounted for in 
terms of a continued inter-capitalist social order divergence process which can be theorized on 
the basis of the Gramscian framework’s national point of departure and the continued 
intra-capital fractional contradictions which manifest themselves in an often regional fashion. It 
is on this basis that I then theorized the susceptibility of Taiwan’s hegemonic LE capitalist class 
toward a CCP emanating Cross-Strait historical bloc and Taiwan’s internationalization toward 
China. But, because I argued that the hegemonic stature of the Cross-Strait historical bloc can 
only be substantiated through a historicist account which can explain for the erosion of 
Taiwan’s post-WWII political autonomy, I also identified the concepts of passive revolution, 
transformismo and the statist historical bloc as central to my analysis. Finally, to account for the 
discursive dimension by which the Cross-Strait historical bloc attained its hegemony, I 
identified the hegemonic narrative as being further theoretical tool on which my analysis is 
based. In the case of Taiwan, I argued that its hegemonic narrative was a combination of a core 
economistic narrative and a divisive Taiwan identity politics which depoliticized economic 
issues and which also enabled the wide acceptance of Taiwan’s citizenry toward the 
economistic core of its hegemonic narrative.  
 
I have demonstrated in this chapter that the Gramscian approach is well suited to theorize CSEI. 
As my analysis suggests, not only can the Gramscian framework be applied to account for the 
relative degree of the political autonomy enjoyed by Taiwan’s elite bureaucracy at any given 
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time, but also that it can similarly account for why and how this autonomy eventually eroded. 
By proceeding in this way, my analysis demonstrates the functional fit of the Gramscian 
framework to examine CSEI without the need to rely on realist or liberal predicates of an 
un-theorized political autonomy or objective market-defined CSEI. Furthermore, my argument 
also shows how the realist and liberal predicates have led to a rigid and static analysis which is 
unable to account for the parameters of Taiwan’s state in terms of its progressively changing 
social basis. As such, by relying on the Gramscian framework, I also demonstrated how I will 
be able to theorize Taiwan’s progressive integration toward China and that it is the class and 
social order basis which is at the root of both the economic and political manifestations of CSEI. 
By doing so, my analysis also demonstrates how it is that CSEI cannot be understood in a 
relational sense as occurring between two separate state apparatuses, but rather a singular 
Cross-Strait historical bloc defined process which impinges on Taiwan’s state. Theorizing CSEI 
along such a social order logic, I am able to develop a much more coherent, succinct and 
analytically precise account of CSEI in a way that is simply not possible for a realist and liberal 
guided analysis. By relying on the framework outlined thus far, I will proceed in the following 
chapter to begin with my empirical analysis and first examine Taiwan’s hard statist era.  
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Chapter 3: The Hard Developmental State 
 
In the previous chapter, I developed my intended application of the neo-Gramscian framework 
to examine Taiwan’s CSEI policy through the concept of the Cross-Strait historical bloc. In this 
chapter, I begin my empirical analysis by historicizing Taiwan’s hard statist social order 
between 1945 and 1978 to examine how a previous elite bureaucratic autonomy was maintained 
during this time. I argue that the hard developmental state was characterized by the elite 
bureaucracy’s unchallenged political autonomy, its unresponsiveness to interest articulation 
from Taiwan’s social forces and its highly disciplinary and coercive rule. Veering from 
dominant institutional and geopolitical interpretations of Taiwan’s developmental state, I argue 
that the elite bureaucracy’s political autonomy can only be accounted for in terms of the social 
basis of the KMT’s state and I apply the concept of passive revolution to theorize it. At the 
pinnacle of the KMT’s power structure, I argue that the elite bureaucracy can be conceived of as 
a distinct elite bureaucratic class which secured its economic and political interests from an 
organic connection with Taiwan’s state. On this basis, I examine how the KMT’s disconnected 
and ethnically homogenous elite bureaucracy advanced to alter Taiwan’s class composition to 
level the influence of its most powerful classes to secure a prolonged class equilibrium for its 
passive revolution. By theorizing Taiwan’s hard statist order within its class basis, my analysis 
suggests that it is necessary to move beyond an un-reflexive and un-theorized assumption of 
Taiwan’s state autonomy to account for the social basis which enabled this autonomy in the first 
place. By accounting for the elite bureaucracy in class terms, I also show that the policy features 
of Taiwan’s developmental state can be theorized in terms of its advancement of the elite 
bureaucracy’s core interest of securing an effective political autonomy which necessitated 
Taiwan’s welfare enhancing development.  
  
The main reason for the elite bureaucracy’s prolonged commitment to a statist development path 
was its instrumental role for Taiwan’s passive revolution. In addition to facilitating a prolonged 
class equilibrium, Taiwan’s welfare enhancing statist development was crucial to the elite 
bureaucracy’s autonomy because it secured a necessary acquiescence among the citizenry to its 
one party rule. Statist development was, however, a double edged sword because it led to a 
prolonged class formation trajectory typical of capitalist development which had a diluting 
effect on the elite bureaucracy’s prolonged political autonomy. During the hard statist era, I 
argue that the elite bureaucracy preserved its autonomy through a successful transformismo by 
which it wielded the KMT’s Leninist party-state apparatus to co-opt and de-politicize Taiwan’s 
major classes. This was effective because the KMT’s ethnic rule and Taiwan’s production and 
development features combined to dilute a class consciousness on which the elite bureaucracy 
then successfully applied its disciplinary, absorptive and ideational apparatuses of rule. The only 
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exception was the LE capitalist class which enjoyed an increased economic influence and which 
was thus targeted for the most intensive transformismo. Despite the elite bureaucracy’s control 
over its consolidation, I argue that the LE capitalist class consented to its dominance because it 
owed its economic influence to a continued subservience to the elite bureaucracy and because it 
also benefitted from statist development more generally. As such, I argue that a historical bloc 
gradually came into shape between the elite bureaucracy and the LE capitalist class which did 
not, however, alter Taiwan’s statist policy parameters yet. My analysis demonstrates that it was 
only because of a consistent transformismo that the KMT’s passive revolution held and toward 
which a consensual dimension was critical. By examining Taiwan’s statist social order in this 
way, I am not only able to account for the relative degree of the elite bureaucracy’s autonomy in 
class terms, but also how the elite bureaucracy strengthened its autonomy during this time.  
 
Section 3.1: The Social Foundations of Taiwan’s Developmental State 
Taiwan was ceded to the KMT in 1945 by the allied victors of World War II on the basis that 
Japan unlawfully colonized it from China in 1985 and that it was now to be returned to China’s 
legitimate Republic of China (ROC) government which was ruled by the KMT. This ceding 
occurred despite China’s still ongoing civil war between the KMT and the CCP which came to 
an end only after the KMT’s defeat in 1949. Between 1945 and 1949, the KMT installed a 
mainlander-staffed provincial government in Taiwan which was tasked with the primary aim of 
resource extraction to fund the KMT’s war effort in China (Gold, 1986, p. 50). After its defeat, 
the KMT retreated in 1949 to Taiwan and set up its official ROC government there as having 
legal sovereignty over all of China. Due to Taiwan’s frontline state stature in a global Cold War 
context as part of the island chain surrounding the communist People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), the US provided pivotal support toward helping the KMT secure a necessary 
international legitimacy and regime stability. For one, the US quickly accepted the legal fiction 
that the ROC was the legitimate government of China and set up official relations with it on that 
basis. This ensured that the KMT received the full gamut of US diplomatic support (crucial help 
toward the securing of the ROC’s seat in the UN), military support (the Formosa Resolution in 
1955 authorized the US army to defend Taiwan if it was attacked by China) and economic 
support (Clark, 1989, p. 91; Rigger, 2000, pp. 137–138; Wade, 1990, p. 82; Zhu, 2002, p. 15).  
  
From the onset of its rule in 1945, the KMT established an authoritarian, one party state in 
Taiwan. Its success at securing a stable authoritarian rule rested on a number of factors, the most 
important of which was Taiwan’s under-developed class consciousness and civil society which 
led to a lack of viable social contestation toward the KMT’s rule. The longer-term roots for 
Taiwan’s under-developed civil society were shaped by its colonial experience during which 
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time it was incorporated into a Japanese defined colonial division of labour as an agricultural 
economy. As such, the Japanese colonial administration set up in Taiwan a coercive 
administrative apparatus in which senior administrative and commercial positions were under a 
Japanese monopoly (Wade, 1990, p. 232). Throughout the colonial period, Taiwan’s economy 
remained predominantly agricultural while farmers and peasants were subject to the colonial 
administration’s mandatory buying relations by which they had to sell their produce to 
Japanese-controlled trading houses at Japanese determined prices (Gold, 1986, p. 38). Although 
it is true that the colonial administration intensified its industrialization of Taiwan from the 
1930s onward, this remained limited while Japanese capital also accounted for 90% of 
ownership over modern industries during this time. As such, only 7% of Taiwan’s male labour 
force had experience working in the industrial sector by 1940 (W.-W. Chu, 2001, p. 55). There 
were, of course, notable examples of powerful capitalist families in Taiwan, but they were 
generally confined to a slim group of collaborators toward whom targeted legal exceptions were 
made (Gold, 1986, pp. 39–40). Thus, as a rule, the Japanese administration tended to substitute 
for the capitalist/entrepreneurial class in Taiwan while also seriously restricting its development 
of a class consciousness and active civil society (Cumings, 1984, pp. 10–11).  
 
Although the KMT succeeded at establishing its provincial government in Taiwan, the very 
turbulent nature of its rule led to an increased popular resistance against it. This, however, was 
difficult to predict as Taiwan’s colonial experience and stunted class formation not only allowed 
the KMT’s provincial government to win a strong degree of popular support at the onset of its 
rule, but also to secure control over 90% of Taiwan’s economy under mainlander-staffed state 
commissions (Roy, 2003, p. 64). The KMT’s provincial government was set up along hard 
authoritarian lines in which a provincial government-managing bureaucratic cadre enjoyed an 
unchallenged political autonomy while relying heavily on the disciplinary apparatus of the state 
to crush all dissent. The provincial government’s rule was also corrupt and, coupled with its 
intensive resource extraction, quickly led to serious economic turbulence. As such, Taiwan’s 
provincial government faced a rapidly growing popular disillusionment which was exacerbated, 
in particular, by a severe hyperinflation crisis in which annual inflation rates measured at 500% 
between 1946 and 1948 (Thorbecke & Wan, 2007, p. 55). Due to the provincial government’s 
hard authoritarian features, Taiwan’s citizenry lacked suitable arenas to vent frustrations and 
eventually revolted. This began in response to an incident on the 28
th
 of February, 1947 in which 
police officers severely beat a female street vendor and which catalysed a festering discontent to 
spill over in a regime challenging direction while rioting spread throughout the island (Y.-Y. 
Chen, 2007, pp. 93–94).  
 
Rather than engaging in a political dialogue, the KMT opted to discipline participants in 
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Taiwan’s island-wide rioting. At the same time, the KMT also relied on the pretext of quelling 
Taiwan’s revolting to seriously weaken its still relatively more defined elite and landlord classes 
which were most likely to challenge the KMT’s monopoly on power. As such, Governor Chen 
Yi called for reinforcements from China to not only suppress the revolt, but also to kill an 
estimated 20,000 islanders, an event which is commonly referred to as the 228 incident. The 
killings were carried out systematically and were aimed at Taiwan’s elite demographics which 
included lawyers, journalists, landowners, professors, entrepreneurs and students (Y.-Y. Chen, 
2007, pp. 93–94). In addition to weakening Taiwan’s elite interests, The 228 incident was also 
instrumental toward inducing a long-term political passivity among the citizenry who tended to 
associate political involvement with danger (Gold, 1986, p. 52). Aside from its psychological 
aftershocks, the 228 incident also offered a pretext for the KMT to implement martial law which 
suspended all rights and protections guaranteed by the ROC constitution in Taiwan from 1949 to 
1987 (Wade, 1990, p. 237). After this, the KMT relied extensively on the disciplinary apparatus 
of the state to secure the citizenry’s consent to its rule. As such, it also set up a vast network of 
informants to identify perceived subversives for arrest or execution, the total numbers of which 
are estimated at 90,000 and 45,000 respectively (Roy, 2003, p. 90). Because the KMT’s 
founding narrative committed the party to the democratization of China, Taiwan’s authoritarian 
rule was legitimated as a deviation from the KMT’s democratizing thrust which was necessary 
because of the unfinished civil war between the KMT and the CCP (Rigger, 2000, p. 137).  
 
The KMT’s Leninist party structure was crucial toward its prolonged rule in Taiwan by 
allowing political power to be secured at the pinnacle of the party-state structure. The KMT was 
led by the strongman leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, who held the three most powerful posts on the 
land indefinitely which were head of state, party chairman and commander of the military and 
around whom a strong personality cult was developed (Roy, 2003, pp. 82–83). Within the KMT, 
at the highest level of its power structure were the central committee and central standing 
committees, the composition of which were generally by appointment of the party chairman 
(A.-C. Tan, 2002, pp. 153–154). As such, power was monopolized by a slim group of 
mainlander elite bureaucrats who were loyal to Chiang and who along with him, most directly 
controlled Taiwan’s party-state. Underneath this level, a robust Leninist party structure 
paralleled and superseded equivalent state structures at each level and allowed for hierarchically 
organized party organs to control the state (T.-J. Cheng & Lin, 1999, pp. 225-226). To secure the 
elite bureaucracy’s carte blanche political control, the KMT also froze legislative elections and 
granted an unlimited tenure to delegates elected from thirty provinces in the 1947-48 mainland 
legislative elections (of which Taiwan counted as one) until the retaking of the mainland (Minns 
& Tierney, 2003, p. 106). In addition to its political control, the elite bureaucracy also secured a 
strong degree of control over Taiwan’s state revenues and its economically influential State 
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Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Y.-Y. Chen, 2007, p. 133). Thus, in addition to a rigorous political 
and organizational capacity, the elite bureaucracy also secured a strong economic 
self-sufficiency which further strengthened its autonomy (Y.-P. Wu, 2004, p. 107).  
 
Because the elite bureaucracy derived both its economic and political interests through its 
control over the state, it possessed a distinct class interest which held so long as it secured its 
effective political autonomy. The Leninist features of the KMT were also enormously useful 
toward this aim by securing the elite bureaucracy’s control over Taiwan’s social forces. Taiwan’s 
Leninist party-state structure was wielded in a corporatist fashion so that the elite bureaucracy 
could co-opt and control all major classes and to secure a relative class equilibrium among them 
for its successful passive revolution. All social interests were required to join state mandated 
organizations which were integrated into national level peak organizations in which major social 
groups such as labour, industry, the youth, farmers and professionals were organized. In the 
case of the capitalist class, there were three peak organizations which represented the whole of 
Taiwan’s industry. The Federation of Industry and the Federation of Commerce represented the 
manufacturing and service sectors while the National Council of Industry and Commerce 
(NCIC) represented all of Taiwan’s LE capitalist interests (Y.-H. Chu, 1994, pp. 118-119). The 
KMT’s Department of Social Affairs determined who held key positions within the three peak 
organizations whose chairman have always been party members while many have also secured 
posts in the KMT’s Standing committee (H.-H. Hsiao, 1995, pp. 86–87). Because the power 
structure of peak organizations flowed back to the elite bureaucratic level, the elite bureaucracy 
succeeded in utilizing such organizations not only to reach, but also to demobilize, control and 
co-opt Taiwan’s key social demographics (Y.-H., Chu, 1994, p. 116; H.-H Hsiao, 1995, p. 77).  
 
It is particularly remarkable how long the elite bureaucracy sustained its autonomy without it 
being eroded by newly ascending class interests. In addition to aforementioned institutional 
factors, the elite bureaucracy’s political autonomy was strengthened particularly by the ethnic 
features of the KMT regime by which the elite bureaucracy was composed only of mainlanders 
who enjoyed close relations with Chiang (Y.-Y. Chen, 2007, p. 135). The most immediate social 
basis for the elite bureaucracy’s rule was an approximately 2 million strong mainlander 
population which by 1949 had fled China to join Taiwan’s 6 million islanders. Having no 
property or jobs, a majority of mainlanders were employed as military personnel or civil 
servants who derived their interests from the state. This ensured that they also had a stake in the 
elite bureaucracy’s continued primacy in Taiwan. The elite bureaucracy was well aware of the 
autonomy strengthening utility of an ethnic strategy of rule and it set out to consciously 
strengthen the islander – mainlander cleavage to the extent that a majority within both 
demographics experienced a prolonged and mutual sense of otherness. The elite bureaucracy 
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thus secured a captive support base by circulating the narrative that it was only the KMT and its 
followers which were representative of authentic Chinese culture and who were its collective 
guardians amidst a population which occupied its outermost fringe. This cleavage was 
strengthened further by differences in spoken language between the predominantly Min Nan 
speaking islanders and Mandarin speaking mainlanders (Minns & Tierney, 2003, pp. 107–108).  
 
During the onset of the elite bureaucracy’s rule, it also advanced to radically shape Taiwan’s 
class composition and thereby secured an even stronger foundation for its long-term autonomy 
by implementing a far reaching land reform program between 1949 and 1953. Although the US 
also actively supported the program for developmental and geo-strategic reasons, the elite 
bureaucracy was its prime beneficiary because land reform was instrumental to its regime 
stability (Gold, 1986, p. 65). As a part of the land reform program, the KMT sold to peasants all 
of the farmland it gained from Japanese nationals and Taiwanese landlords who were mandated 
to sell holdings above three hectares of paddy field to the state. Much of this land was then 
re-sold to peasants at the significantly undercharged price of two and a half times the annual 
yield (Kay, 2002, p.1081; Roy, 2003, pp. 100–101). Although land reform was aimed at 
reducing the possibility of land inequality-induced social discontent, it also had the intended 
effect of pre-emptively destroying Taiwan’s still most powerful landlord class. This was mainly 
achieved by the KMT’s undervalued compensation scheme which reimbursed landlords via 70% 
land bonds and 30% stocks in four government industries. Most of the ex-landlord class quickly 
re-sold its stocks, not long after which the stock market rebounded while land prices also 
increased and due to which a majority of the landlord class became bankrupt while only a 
minority succeeded in joining Taiwan’s growing capitalist class (Ka & Selden, 1986, p. 1298).  
 
After securing a stable passive revolution, the elite bureaucracy began in the 1950s to enhance 
its regime legitimacy through prolonged tansformismo by co-opting and widening islander 
participation within permitted political spaces. Although the elite bureaucracy permitted an 
electoral politics, the logic of transformismo is clear in the fact that permitted election 
categories were carefully screened so that no national resources or powers were at stake. As 
such, permitted elections were primarily confined to non-national level political posts at the city 
council level or at the Taiwan provincial government level which was tasked with implementing 
provincial government policy, but which was legally superseded by the ROC government. Even 
in the case of permitted election categories, the KMT secured its political dominance by 
banning alternative political parties, controlling the media and utilizing the party’s enormous 
resources to secure the victory of its candidates (Roy, 2003, p. 84). Additionally, the elite 
bureaucracy also relied on party-controlled political factions, or regionally based political 
special interest groups, to secure electoral victory in Taiwan’s various permitted elections at the 
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township, county/city and provincial government level. Ideationally speaking, the elite 
bureaucracy had little to fear because its propaganda was so successful that it secured an 
overwhelming acquiescence toward its rule among the citizenry, especially because 
indoctrination was central to Taiwan’s party controlled education system. As such, the elite 
bureaucracy controlled all aspects of the curriculum to promote Chinese nationalism and to 
indoctrinated pupils to unquestioningly consent to the KMT’s authoritarian rule (Y.-Y. Chen, 
2007). 
  
The state-controlled education system in Taiwan demonstrates the central importance placed by 
the elite bureaucracy on the ideational aspects of its rule. At the core of the KMT’s regime 
legitimation was a narrative of the KMT’s rightful sovereignty claim over China and a 
progressively more important economic component which emphasized the KMT’s successful 
and welfare enhancing economic development of Taiwan. As will subsequently be argued, the 
KMT’s development was welfare enhancing and relatively egalitarian, a fact which has led 
many scholars to question the degree to which the KMT was guided by a genuine commitment 
to social equality. Some, for instance, highlight the centrality of Sun Yat-sen’s thought in the 
KMT’s founding ideology who, heavily influenced by socialist thinking, called for equitable 
income distribution, state ownership over key economic sectors and the containment of the 
excessive concentration of private capital (San, 1995, p. 28; Thorbecke & Wan, 2007, p. 56; 
Wade, 1990, p. 261). But, the influence of a genuine commitment to Sunist ideals is 
questionable in the context of the KMT’s rule in China which was predatory and rent seeking 
while the party leadership was also closely associated with landlord interests (Cho & Kim, 1998, 
p. 137; Clark, 1989, p. 89). A better route to understand the KMT’s development policy, instead, 
is pragmatic necessity. It is clear, for instance, that the KMT’s statist policies during the 1950s 
were primarily guided by the need to secure both a stable rule and to develop the physical 
capacity necessary for an eventual defeat of the CCP. Reflecting this, Taiwan’s defence 
expenditures accounted for approximately 65% of its national budget before 1965 (M.-C. Tsai, 
1999, p. 103). 
  
Although Taiwan’s economic development was a secondary policy aim during the 1950s, the 
elite bureaucracy visibly foregrounded the importance of a welfare-enhancing development as 
its central policy aim throughout the hard statist time period. This was especially so when the 
un-tenable nature of Chiang’s aim of a military re-conquest of China became clear after 
consistent US refusals to commit militarily and the CCP’s eventual testing of an atomic bomb in 
1964 (Roy, 2003, pp. 113–115). In order to secure its long-term rule, the elite bureaucracy 
correctly equated the failure to attain a welfare enhancing economic development with the 
increased risk of regime-destabilizing social discontent which was particularly cogent in the 
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context of a feared CCP encroachment on Taiwan. As such, economic development was 
coupled directly with regime security and was viewed as a necessary prerequisite toward 
winning the sufficient social acquiescence necessary for the elite bureaucracy’s continued 
authoritarian rule (Wade, 1992, pp. 314–315). This dynamic became particularly visible during 
and after the late 1960s when ever-more visible attempts were made to link the KMT’s regime 
legitimacy with Taiwan’s economic development (Gold, 1986, p. 73). Based on this, the elite 
bureaucracy circulated and extended a narrative which equated Taiwan’s economic and social 
prosperity with a continued anti-Communist, economic development drive which necessitated 
one-party rule, personal sacrifice and absolute loyalty to the party (Woo-Cumings, 1998, pp. 
335-336). This narrative was designed to appeal to all of Taiwan’s social classes so that an 
increasingly developed bourgeoisie composed of both islanders and mainlanders would consent 
due to its favouring of stability and growth while workers and peasants were also expected to 
consent in their hopes to take part in and benefit from Taiwan’s momentous economic growth 
(Gold, 1986, p. 90). 
 
Although specific policies have not been examined yet, it is clear that the elite bureaucracy 
secured firm and viable foundations for a longer-term passive revolution in Taiwan. In addition 
to securing an unchallenged political autonomy, the elite bureaucracy was also in a strong 
position to manage Taiwan’s class formation trajectory through a robust set of institutional and 
ideational levers throughout the hard statist period. 
 
Section 3.2: The Formation of the Statist Historical Bloc  
Now that the broader parameters of Taiwan’s statist social order have been delineated, attention 
can be placed on an examination of the class formation processes brought into motion by 
Taiwan’s statist development. But to do so, it is first necessary to provide a brief account of the 
KMT’s development policies. It is only after providing such an account that a more concise 
understanding can then be developed toward historicizing changes in the social basis of 
Taiwan’s state. 
 
Before accounting for the overall thrust of the KMT’s development policies, it is important to 
first identify the institutional features of its developmental apparatus. Tasked with facilitating 
Taiwan’s industrialization was a dedicated economic bureaucracy which was led and 
coordinated by a small group of powerful individuals within the executive branch composed of 
elite bureaucratic planning personnel, cabinet ministers and SOE managers who reported 
directly to Chiang (Wade, 1990, p. 195). Before proceeding, it is useful also to clarify the 
difference between the terms, elite bureaucracy and economic bureaucracy which I, at times, use 
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interchangeably in my analysis. The elite bureaucracy, as already noted, refers to the KMT’s 
regime managing elite bureaucratic cadre who were at the apex of the KMT’s party-state 
structure and who collectively shaped the parameters of Taiwan’s social order and managed its 
passive revolution. The economic bureaucracy, on the other hand, refers to specialist 
bureaucratic cadre tasked with implementing economic policy in specialist development 
agencies such as the Council for Economic Planning and Development. But, because the 
economic bureaucracy operated within the parameters set by the elite bureaucracy while high 
level economic bureaucrats also at times joined the elite bureaucracy, although my analysis 
remains focused at the elite bureaucratic level, I revert to the term economic bureaucracy when 
addressing questions of policy implementation.  
 
3.2.1 Statist Development Policies 
The KMT’s statist development path came into shape after 1949 when the elite bureaucracy first 
attempted to stabilize Taiwan’s ongoing hyperinflation crisis. This crisis was brought under 
control by the early 1950s during which time Taiwan’s industrial output also once again reached 
pre-war production levels (Roy, 2003, pp. 96–97). The first of the KMT’s policies which were 
conducive to a long-term statist development path was its aforementioned land reform which 
secured the foundations for Taiwan’s long-term egalitarian growth trajectory. As an outcome of 
land reform, some two million Taiwanese gained property rights for the first time while in the 
longer term, it was a causal factor which led to 79% of Taiwan’s farming population to work on 
its own land (Roy, 2003, p. 101). Additionally, the destruction of Taiwan’s landlord class was 
also developmental because landlord classes are traditionally most likely to oppose statist 
industrialization as it directly challenges its economic interests (Cho & Kim, 1998, p. 137).  
 
In terms of specific development policy features, the first stage of the KMT’s statist 
development took place on an Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) basis during the 1950s. 
The overall thrust of ISI involved targeted resource transfer from the agricultural sector to the 
manufacturing sector and a simultaneous upgrading of Taiwan’s industrial composition. During 
this stage, the elite bureaucracy relied particularly on its dirigisme to extract a necessary 
agricultural surplus through its monopoly over the supply of crucial agricultural inputs such as 
fertilizer (Amsden, 1979, pp. 356–357; Kay, 2002, p. 1082). Rates of exchange for the supply of 
crucial inputs were skewed so that fertilizer, for instance, measured at between 1.7 and 2.9 times 
the fertilizer import price between 1954 and 1960. The elite bureaucracy also controlled the 
agricultural export market which allowed it to secure further surplus extraction through export 
pricing discrepancies which fluctuated between 2.2 and 3 times higher than the compulsory 
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purchase price (Ka & Selden, 1986, pp. 1303–1305). Despite its exploitative nature, the KMT’s 
resource extraction policy remained tenable in the context of KMT-facilitated annual 
agricultural rate production growth which measured at 4.4% during the 1950s and 3.9% during 
the 1960s (Amsden, 1979, pp. 353–354; Clark, 1989, p. 163).   
 
Accompanying its agricultural extraction, the KMT also focused on developing targeted sectors 
such as the 1950 priority development sector, textiles. To do so, the economic bureaucracy 
implemented numerous typically statist development policies such as erecting tariff barriers and 
the provision of fiscal aid and technological support to newly established firms in targeted 
sectors
 
(W.-W. Chu, 2001, pp. 75–76). In addition to a channelling of the agricultural surplus to 
the industrial sector, Taiwan’s low cost agricultural output also aided its industrialization 
because artificially low food prices allowed for a slower than average wage growth which was 
crucial to EOI industrialization (Ka & Selden, 1986, p. 1306). As an outcome of the KMT’s 
statist development policies, Taiwan’s industrial output doubled between 1952 and 1958 while a 
substantial industrial sector also came into shape by the end of the decade which included 
plastics, artificial fibres, cement, glass, fertilizer, plywood and textiles (Wade, 1990, p. 77). The 
support of the US was also particularly important during this stage of Taiwan’s development, 
especially in terms of its provision of generous market access to Taiwanese exporters and its 
tolerance of Taiwan’s protectionist and heterodox trade policy (M.-C. Tsai, 2002, p. 144). 
Furthermore, the US aim of aiding the KMT to attain economic self-sufficiency also led to a 
generous resource transfer so that US non-military aid alone financed 40.7% of Taiwan’s gross 
domestic capital formation between 1952 and 1960 (Barrett & Whyte, 1982, p. 1068). 
 
By the early to mid-1960s, primary ISI ran its course and the KMT reoriented its development 
policy to promote a much intensified EOI development path. To facilitate EOI, the KMT passed 
a barrage of new policies which devalued Taiwan’s exchange rate, lowered the tax rates for 
exporting firms and which established Export Processing Zones (EPZ) throughout the island 
(Y.-Y. Chen, 2007, pp. 130–131; Haggard, 1986, p. 350; H.-H. Hsiao, 1995, p. 79; M.-C. Tsai, 
2002, p. 135). By the early to mid-1960s, however, the textile sector and other primary ISI 
industries began to face increasing protectionist pressures internationally while also reaching the 
summit of their respective product cycles (Ranis, 2007, pp. 39–40; Wade, 1990, pp. 79–80). 
Due to such conditions and in the context of Taiwan’s now largely industrial economic 
composition, the economic bureaucracy implemented a secondary ISI policy in which heavy 
and chemical industries were developed and shielded during this time. Generally speaking, 
secondary ISI industries were predominantly in materials (intermediates) and capital goods 
sectors which were both very capital and technology intensive and which possessed very large 
economies of scale (Schive, 1995, pp. 13–15). Many secondary ISI firms were SOEs and tended 
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to occupy the commanding heights of the economy in sectors such as petroleum refining, steel, 
shipbuilding, heavy machinery, transport equipment, and public utilities (C.-H. Huang, 2002a, p. 
101). Due to the state’s heavy involvement in the economy during this time, its share of gross 
domestic capital formation increased from 34.7% in 1973 to a high of 57.7% in 1975 while 
remaining at close to 50% throughout the rest of the decade (Gold, 1986, p. 109). By the end of 
the 1970s, Taiwan’s prolonged statist development trajectory led to the formation of a tripartite 
industrial structure in which SOE’s dominated the upstream, LE’s dominated the 
intermediate-stream while SMEs concentrated at the downstream (Y.-P. Wu, 2004, p. 105).  
 
3.2.2 The Consolidation of the LE Capitalist Class  
In terms of class, the most immediate outcome of Taiwan’s industrialization was that it spurred 
a class formation process which led to the increased economic influence of a distinct LE 
capitalist class. For the time being, the elite bureaucracy succeeded to contain and manage its 
consolidation on a continued basis of passive revolution, but it was also clear that it was the LE 
capitalist class, in particular, which was targeted for the most intensive transformismo. Over 
time, this led to the development of an increasingly defined statist historical bloc forged 
between a dominant elite bureaucratic class and a subservient LE capitalist class whose interests 
were, however, increasingly aligned. 
   
During the KMT’s first two decades of rule, due to the still relatively unconsolidated nature of 
Taiwan’s capitalist class, the elite bureaucracy secured an unchallenged and unconstrained 
political autonomy. As such, the elite bureaucracy also secured a strong disciplinary capacity 
and implemented its policy by fiat (Thorbecke & Wan, 2007, p. 55). Furthermore, to manage the 
LE capitalist class formation process, the elite bureaucracy also secured an effective control 
over the vetting process of Taiwan’s most powerful LE capitalists to ensure their loyalty and 
subservience to the regime (Gold, 1986, pp. 88–89; Y.-P. Wu, 2004, pp. 108–109). Often, the 
elite bureaucracy itself identified individual capitalists to start firms. A particularly famous 
example of this practice is Wang Yung-Ching who founded Formosa Plastic, a firm which 
eventually became dominant in the midstream of the plastics sector and which grew to be 
Taiwan’s largest business group during the 1980s, employing 31,200 employees at an annual 
sales volume of $1.6 billion (Wade, 1990, p. 66, 80). Stephen Haggard correctly understands 
this process as one in which the state has, in essence, created the industrial bourgeoisie 
(Haggard, 1986, p. 356). In addition to creating the bourgeoisie, the elite bureaucracy’s political 
autonomy was also strong enough to allow it to intervene directly in firm-level management 
decisions. This dynamic is particularly evident in the KMTs forced mergers of existing firms 
when deemed necessary to attain viable market consolidation or crucial technology-driven 
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upgrading aims. One famous example of this is the KMT’s merger of five synthetic textile 
manufacturers into the Hualong Corporation (Gold, 1986, p. 102). 
 
A prolonged history of engagement and an increase in the economic influence of Taiwan’s LE 
capitalist class also posed a challenge to the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the elite 
bureaucracy in the longer term. As such, the further into Taiwan’s hard statist social order, the 
more the elite bureaucracy had to rely on available institutional mechanisms to maintain and 
secure its continued autonomy. The elite bureaucracy’s control over the banking system was 
particularly instrumental with this respect because it enabled it to both steer capital flows and to 
discipline Taiwan’s LE capitalist class when necessary. Not only did the state own nearly all of 
Taiwan’s banks, but employees in state controlled banks were also officially civil servants who 
came under the institutionalized control of the bureaucratic apparatus (Park, 2000, p. 157). 
Taiwan’s financial control was strengthened, in particular, by its closed capital account and the 
elite bureaucracy’s absolute control over monetary policy which can be observed in the fact that 
Taiwan’s Central Bank of China reported directly to the president (C.-H. Huang, 2002a, pp. 
109–110). Although some very limited private sector involvement was permitted at the 
periphery of the finance sector, Taiwan’s financial system was overwhelmingly bank-based and 
loan-oriented. Unlike SMEs which were generally excluded from bank lending, the elite 
bureaucracy secured a decisive control over Taiwan’s LE capitalist class which was highly 
dependent on bank lending due to the lack of alternative funding streams (Wade, 1990, pp. 160–
161). But, most importantly, the elite bureaucracy’s banking control enabled it to both pursue its 
industrial policy while also actively controlling the pace of capital consolidation toward limiting 
the economic influence of the LE capitalist class outside of the party’s control (T.-J. Cheng, 
1990, p. 143).  
 
In addition to a state controlled financial system, the elite bureaucracy also relied on other 
institutional levers to constrain excessive capital consolidation. Among such levers, for instance, 
was the need of state approval for capital goods importation, technology imports, credit 
allocation and a continued state control over entry barriers in given industrial sectors (Wade, 
1990, p. 185, 270). Even in terms of handpicked LE capitalists such as Wang Yung-ching, 
continued restrictions remained on vertical integration. Thus, when Wang attempted to establish 
oil refining and supply facilities in the Middle East during the mid-1970s, he was prohibited to 
do so under the pretext that petroleum was a strategic resource which must remain in the hands 
of the state and the state owned Chinese Petroleum Corporation (Wade, 1990, pp. 128–129). In 
addition to the general aim of limiting excessive capital consolidation, Wang’s case was also 
indicative of the elite bureaucracy’s policy imperative to maintain the state’s monopoly in the 
upstream SOE sector which was important to its continued political autonomy. This was 
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especially so because SOEs were Taiwan’s most consolidated economic interests which 
measured at a total asset value that exceeded by several times the combined asset value of 
Taiwan’s top 500 private enterprises (Q. Tan, 2000, p. 50). As such, a continued elite 
bureaucratic control over SOEs not only secured it enormous financial resources and personnel 
placing opportunities, but also ensured that a vital segment of the LE capitalist class remained 
under the direct control of the state.  
  
Despite the various policy levers that were in place, the increasingly consolidated nature of the 
LE capitalist class also ensured that the elite bureaucracy had to progressively intensify its 
targeted transformismo policy to absorb and co-opt LE capitalists. One method by which this 
occurred was through the KMT’s Leninist party-state structure which allowed the elite 
bureaucracy to recruit influential business members for political office, intensify joint 
investment opportunities and to provide numerous positions to LE capitalists on governing 
boards in trade and business organizations (H.-H. Hsiao, 1995, p. 83). A prolonged 
tranformismo, however, also unwittingly led to the development of an increasingly close 
alliance between the LE capitalist class and the elite bureaucracy. As such, it was unavoidable 
that some degree of interest harmonization occurred between the two. This was so much the 
case that from the late 1960s onward, Taiwan’s social order can be conceived of as based 
increasingly on the interests of a statist historical bloc forged between a dominant elite 
bureaucracy and a subservient LE capitalist class which increasingly underpinned the stability 
of Taiwan’s statist social order. Although the elite bureaucracy actively curtailed the economic 
and political influence of the LE capitalist class, it is important to note that LE capitalists also 
voluntarily acquiesced to the elite bureaucracy’s leadership. This was to be expected, however, 
because Taiwan’s LE capitalist class owed its economic standing to its close ties to the elite 
bureaucracy while the elite bureaucracy’s statist developmental policy was also crucial to the 
economic growth from which the LE capitalist class benefitted. At a most general level, it was 
also the case that the private sector’s share within the industrial structure increased relative to 
the public sector’s share, thus signalling an overall expansion of capital accumulation processes 
despite existing limitations. 
 
The fact that transformismo was relied on so much more intensively during this time indicates 
clearly that despite Taiwan’s passive revolution, the increased capital consolidation of the LE 
capitalist class led to a marked increase of its influence vis a vis Taiwan’s other major classes. 
But, because the LE capitalist class was part of the capitalist class more generally, it is also 
important to examine how SME owning capitalists fared within Taiwan’s statist social order. 
SME's accounted for a majority of Taiwan’s firm composition and the total number of which 
rose from 51,389 in 1961 to 152,871 in 1988 (Lui & Qiu, 2001, p. 60). In terms of employment, 
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SMEs, which during this time were defined as hiring less than 100 employees, absorbed 42.7% 
of total manufacturing labor in 1966 while absorbing 47.9% by 1986 (Schive, 1995, p. 10). 
Although SME’s can now be defined to include firms hiring as many as 300-500 employees, a 
number of surveys from 1966 to 1986 show that more than 95% of all manufacturing units hired 
less than 50 employees. Due to the scale economies and the much more consolidated nature of 
SOEs and LE’s, although SMEs accounted for 97.72% of the total enterprise composition ratio 
by 1989, they only accounted for 46.3% of Taiwan’s industrial production in value terms (H.-H. 
Hsiao, 1995, p. 83). 
 
The prevalence of SMEs raises the important question as to what relationship the elite 
bureaucracy had with Taiwan’s SME capitalist class and what explains its acquiescence to the 
elite bureaucracy’s leadership despite its lack of responsiveness to SME capitalists. This is an 
especially prescient question because of Taiwan’s hierarchical relations of production in which 
LEs closer to the top of the production chain secured the majority of profit margins while 
sub-contracting SME’s bore higher risks and also reaped much slimmer profit margins (C.-H. 
Huang, 2002a, pp. 174–175). This has led some commentators to argue that the KMT has 
pursued a policy of neglect toward SMEs (Y.-P. Wu, 2004, pp. 108–110). But, other than 
structural impediments which limited SME margins, this view is difficult to sustain as the 
KMT’s export promotion policy did not discriminate between large and small enterprises while 
both benefitted from its economic development policies at a more general level (Schive, 1995, p. 
13). Furthermore, the KMT’s control of the upstream sector was also beneficial to SMEs as it 
assured the provision of stable inputs at lower average prices than equivalent prices on the 
international market (Y.-Y. Chen, 2007, p. 140; Wade, 1988, p. 47). Additionally, SME’s also 
benefited from the KMT’s role in moderating the pace of wage growth and securing labour 
peace. It is for this combination of reasons that SME owners generally acquiesced to the KMT’s 
continued one-party rule.  
 
The elite bureaucracy’s statist development policy, despite proceeding on a basis of an 
unchallenged elite bureaucratic autonomy and dirigisme, also led to the unavoidable 
consolidation of an LE capitalist class which secured a relatively increased economic influence. 
Although it is true that the elite bureaucracy succeeded at managing the process of the capitalist’ 
class consolidation, the LE capitalist class did also become increasingly economically powerful 
and enjoyed a closer relationship with the elite bureaucracy through the statist historical bloc. 
For the time being, however, the relational dynamic between the two remained one which was 
based on the elite bureaucracy’s dominance.  
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Section 3.3: Regime Legitimation and Social Acquiescence  
Although the capitalist class was the prime beneficiary of Taiwan’s statist social order, its 
acquiescence did not suffice to enable the elite bureaucracy’s prolonged political autonomy. For 
this, the elite bureaucracy also succeeded at securing the necessary acquiescence among all of 
Taiwan’s major classes and for which its impeding of the development of an independent class 
consciousness was especially crucial.  
  
Because of the KMT’s capital advancing development policies, the increased concentration of a 
working class should have been a most likely point of contradiction within Taiwan’s social order. 
But, such a contradiction did not manifest itself visibly while a self-conscious labouring class 
consciousness did not develop either during this time. One crucial impediment to the 
development of a collective labour consciousness was the bifurcated nature of Taiwan’s labour 
process in which the most intensive exploitation occurred within SMEs. This was because of the 
common practice by which larger firms externalized production nodes with fixed labour costs so 
that they did not have to manage adverse labour relations directly (Shieh, 1992, p. 82). As such, 
SMEs (especially smaller SMEs which often employed fewer than 10 employees) were 
commonly situated within a price-based subcontracting network in which they had to implement 
a long hours and low wage based labour regime to squeeze out as much of their paper-thin 
margins as possible (Gates, 1987, p. 76; C.-H. Huang, 2002a, pp. 285–286). As such, SMEs 
were often legally excused from having to provide labour protections so that firms employing 
less than 5 workers, for example, were exempt from having to provide labour insurance at all 
(C.-W. Huang, 2011, p. 146). Naturally, the bridging of a common cause between SME and 
LE/SOE labourers was exceedingly difficult because their interests within the labour process 
varied drastically.  
 
A further problem which impeded the formation of a labouring class consciousness was the slim 
size of Taiwan’s permanent labouring class itself. This was due largely to long-term legacies of 
land reform and more specific production features of Taiwan’s predominantly SME-scaled 
industrial composition which led to the development of very large petty bourgeoisie class 
segment. An agricultural demographic which tended to work its own land and a small 
businessmen/artisan demographic which hired fewer than 20 workers is estimated to have 
accounted for 32% and 15% of Taiwan’s total labouring population respectively. As such, 
although the labouring class accounted for approximately 39% of the total population during the 
1970s, scholars such as Hill Gates correctly argue that only 20% of the population could be 
considered as a permanent proletariat demographic during this time (Gates, 1979, p. 391). It is 
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obvious that egalitarian land ownership patterns have a pronounced effect on fostering the 
development of a large petty bourgeoisie, but the ease of setting up SMEs can use some further 
elaboration. At a most general level, Taiwan’s subcontracting production model encouraged and 
was based on the flexibility and ease by which single-task production lines were sub-contracted. 
As such, many labourers aspired to set up sing-task production firms, a goal which was not 
overly difficult and which also did not require a sum of capital beyond the reach of pooled 
family savings (Shieh, 1992, pp. 179–181).  
  
In addition to class consciousness weakening effects of a slim permanent proletariat in 
demographics terms alone, the ease by which SMEs could be set up also further diluted the 
formation of a labouring class consciousness. This was due to its class blurring effects between 
the labouring and petty bourgeoisie classes. Taiwan’s SME-based production model was 
simultaneously exploitative and liberating toward both the labouring and petty bourgeoisie 
classes. For one, both labourers and SME owners were tied to extremely exploitative relations 
of production with upstream firms. Many SME-owning capitalists and their family members, 
for instance, joined the labour process and often worked for even lower wages than their 
employees or, as in the case of the children of enterprise owning families, for no wages at all 
(Gates, 1979; Shieh, 1992, p. 131). But because of the capitalist status of SME owners, it was 
extremely difficult for a common cause to be developed between them and their workers. As for 
the labouring class, Taiwan’s flexible production regime is argued to have fostered a prevalent 
and class consciousness impeding petty-bourgeoisie type self-perception among many workers 
due to aspirations of joining the capitalist class. This phenomenon was popularly referred to as 
‘black hands becoming bosses’ during this time. As such, it is argued that a common ‘part-time 
proletariat’ mentality developed among most workers who perceived themselves to be passers 
through in the labour process and due to which limited demands were made toward work 
conditions (Gates, 1979). 
  
A labour process induced part-time proletariat mentality was far from the only impediment on 
the formation of a labour class consciousness in Taiwan during this time. For one, a part time 
proletariat mentality was exacerbated further by the geographical features of Taiwan’s 
decentralized and SME-based production network in which factories were dotted all across the 
island. John Minns and Robert Tierny trace this to a conscious KMT strategy which encouraged 
industrial dispersion in order to limit the over-consolidation of the capitalist class. As an 
outcome, they correctly argue that because a majority of Taiwan’s SMEs were family firms, 
labour relations within them tended to be much more personal and paternalistic and were 
layered within a rich tapestry of communal life. As such, Taiwan’s highly personalistic labour 
relations did not easily allow for a labour consciousness or an employer – employee dichotomy 
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to develop because of the thick family networks and inter-personal relationships which 
underlined the relations of production (Minns & Tierney, 2003, pp. 109–110). In addition, the 
scattered features of Taiwan’s industry are also argued to have led to a very high proportion of 
labourers to maintain close connections with family farms on which many relied upon for added 
financial supports (Moore & White, 1998, p. 134). 
 
Thus far, attention has been placed primarily on the acquiescence of Taiwan’s SME labourers 
toward the statist social order, but this does not yet account for the acquiescence of the labour 
force within larger SMEs, LEs and SOEs. To curtail the development of a common labour class 
consciousness among this demographic, the KMT intervened much more directly through its 
corporatist control over labour unions. As such, the elite bureaucracy freely utilized the 
party-controlled enterprise SOE and plant-based LE union leadership to communicate 
downward to the rank and file. In a typical Leninist fashion, all unions were required to join the 
official China Federation of Labor (CFL), the elected head of which was automatically granted 
both a seat in the Legislative Yuan and the KMT’s Central Standing Committee. Union elections 
were generally rigged by the KMT to ensure the party’s control over the CFL which is best 
understood as a tool of the KMT. To strengthen its control, the KMT also reserved the right to 
interfere in union activities and to dissolve any union within the CFL that it deemed to be 
subversive (H.-H. Chen, 2009, p. 71; Minns & Tierney, 2003, p. 111). Furthermore, outside of 
SOE unions which were enterprise based, only plant based unions were permitted while, at the 
same time, an approximately 80-90% of the workforce which worked in enterprises with fewer 
than 30 employees was prohibited entirely from joining unions. Instead, such SME workers 
joined craft unions which were unions in name only and were in reality associations which 
managed labour and health insurance for workers (C.-W. Huang, 2011, pp. 151–152).  
 
Finally, the KMT also relied heavily on the disciplinary and ideational apparatuses of the state 
to dilute and impede the development of a labouring class consciousness. From the start of its 
rule onward, the KMT consistently circulated a narrative which promoted the view that social 
status was an outcome of hard work and educational attainment and toward which all citizens 
had equal access (Gates, 1979, p. 387)
.
 Although acknowledging separate social interests and 
career categories, the narrative promulgated was that all citizens were harmoniously integrated 
to contribute toward the collective social good within which class contradictions were not 
acknowledged or were underplayed. Accompanying this, the KMT vilified the very concept of 
class due to its associations with its arch nemesis, the CCP, and any individuals that visibly 
advocated the concept risked being singled out and incarcerated as suspected communist 
sympathizers (Gates, 1987, p. 58). The successful instilling of this narrative within the wider 
population underpinned the ideational legitimacy of the developmental-state in which the goal 
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of warding off communism through economic development justified labour discipline and 
political repression on all fronts. As such, opponents of Taiwan’s developmental model were 
understood as traitors and Communist sympathizers who put the ROCs security at risk and who 
were deserving of punishment (Cho & Kim, 1998, p. 133). To return to the labour process 
specifically, what little labour agitation that existed during this time was faced with the full 
repressive apparatus of the state and a barrage of laws were in place to prohibit the politicization 
of the workplace (H.-H. Hsiao, 1992, p. 156). Such laws, for instance, eliminated the right to 
strike, granted arbitration and mediation power to the government while also stipulating severe 
punishments for labour agitation (Gray, 2010, pp. 582–583; Koo, 1987, p. 174). Identified 
labour organizers risked being tried in military courts, tortured and even sentenced to death for 
crimes such as inciting disturbances, setting up illegal labour unions or spreading seditious 
rumours which encouraged labour agitation (Minns & Tierney, 2003, p. 111). 
 
In addition to the class consciousness impeding factors examined already, it is also important to 
acknowledge that one crucial factor behind the acquiescence to the statist social order was the 
dramatic welfare improvement experienced by all social classes in Taiwan. In the context of full 
employment and the drying up of Taiwan’s rural labour reserve, despite the exploitative features 
of the labour process, wages, nonetheless, rose faster than prices at 5.4% a year annually 
between 1964 and 1973 and 20% annually between 1976 and 1980 (Gold, 1986, p. 112; C.-H. 
Huang, 2002a, p. 108). The egalitarian growth features highlighted earlier also ensured not only 
that the poverty rate declined drastically, but also that the fruits of economic development 
seeped through to all classes. This can be observed in Taiwan’s Gini coefficient which declined 
from 0.56 to 0.29 between 1950 and 1970 (Ranis, 2007, p. 44). Mirroring this trend, the income 
differential between the top and the bottom fifth of the population similarly dropped from 20.5 
in 1953 to 4.2 in 1980 (Nordhaug, 1998, p. 130). The scale of the KMT’s developmental success 
can be further observed in its halving of Taiwan’s crude death rate, increasing threefold the 
residential electrification rate (from 33% to 99%) and its successful implementation of a 
universal education system until grade 9 between 1950 and 1980 (Clark, 1989, p. 205). 
Indicative of Taiwan’s closing in with the developed world, its population growth rate in the late 
1980s fell to approximately 1% (Clark, 1989, p. 206). As an outcome of such welfare enhancing 
growth, in addition to the support among the capitalist and middle class toward the KMT’s 
one-party rule, workers and peasants also acquiesced due to a common desire to benefit further 
from Taiwan’s continued economic growth (Gold, 1986, p. 112). Needless to say, such 
developmental outcomes also facilitated the citizenry’s susceptibility to the KMT’s economic 
legitimation of its rule as based on the delivering of consistent welfare improvements and 
economic development. 
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In addition to securing the support of the capitalist class, it is clear that the elite bureaucracy 
similarly secured the acquiescence also among Taiwan’s other major class demographics. 
Facilitating this were a variety of factors which combined to impeded the development of an 
independent class consciousness in Taiwan. It is only in this context that Taiwan’s hard statist 
social order held and on which the elite bureaucracy secured a necessary autonomy for its 
coercive rule so that it could remain unresponsive toward interest articulation from Taiwan’s 
social forces throughout this time. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the social basis of Taiwan’s hard statist order between 1945 and 1978 
during which time the elite bureaucracy secured an unchallenged political autonomy, ruled 
coercively while remaining unresponsive to interest articulation from Taiwan’s social forces. To 
secure its autonomy, I argued that the elite bureaucracy advanced to alter Taiwan’s class 
composition to secure a prolonged passive revolution. Because the elite bureaucracy secured its 
interests from an organic connection with Taiwan’s state, I argued that its statist development 
consensus was guided by the aim of securing a necessary acquiescence among Taiwan’s major 
classes toward its disciplinary rule. But, at the same time, I argued that Taiwan’s statist 
development also led to a class formation trajectory which was typical of capitalist development 
processes and which the elite bureaucracy managed through a successful transformismo. I 
argued that the elite bureaucracy’s success at doing so was an outcome of direct co-optation, but 
also disciplinary and ideational processes which combined to significantly impede the 
development of an independent class consciousness among Taiwan’s major classes. In addition 
to a direct elite bureaucratic initiative to weaken Taiwan’s class consciousness, I also 
highlighted a number of important class diluting features which arose from the specificities of 
Taiwan’s SME-based industrial composition and welfare enhancing economic development 
which were crucial to the elite bureaucracy’s successful transformismo. Although Taiwan’s hard 
statist social order held, I argued that a prolonged transformismo, nevertheless, led to the 
gradual development of a historical bloc between a dominant elite bureaucracy and an 
increasingly economically influential, but politically subservient LE capitalist class. This, I 
argued, however, did not fundamentally alter Taiwan’s hard statist policy parameter because 
Taiwan’s LE capitalist class consented during this time to its subservient role. 
 
This chapter’s findings suggest that Taiwan’s developmental-state can only be theorized in 
terms of the social basis on which the elite bureaucracy’s autonomy was enabled. Although I 
acknowledge that Taiwan’s statist order benefited from a variety of internationally conducive 
factors, my findings suggest that it is important to integrate such domestic and international 
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dimensions by examining their effects on the social basis of Taiwan’s state. By theorizing the 
statist social order in this fashion, I have shown that a Gramscian framework can be applied to 
historicize Taiwan’s social change to identify the relative degree of the political autonomy 
enjoyed by the elite bureaucracy at any given time. By theorizing the elite bureaucracy’s 
political autonomy in terms of passive revolution, I also demonstrated that its statist policy 
consensus can be understood in the context of its need to secure a necessary social acquiescence 
toward its prolonged monopolization of political power. By doing so, I demonstrated that in 
addition to a class equilibrium, that a consensual dimension was equally important toward 
sustaining Taiwan’s passive revolution and statist social order. Although, the elite bureaucracy 
maintained an unchallenged political autonomy, my analysis demonstrates that this was only 
possible because of a concerted and prolonged transformismo by which it secured a necessary 
support among Taiwan’s major classes. But, despite the elite bureaucracy’s successful passive 
revolution, a hard autonomy was only secured temporarily while an intensification of Taiwan’s 
development induced class formation trajectory and associated social changes also continued to 
impinge on the elite bureaucracy’s political autonomy. In the following chapter, I will examine 
how this process eventually led to Taiwan’s transition to a soft statist social order during which 
time the elite bureaucracy became increasingly more responsive to Taiwan’s social forces only 
to secure a much weakened political autonomy.  
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Chapter 4: The Soft Developmental State 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined the social basis of Taiwan’s state which enabled its hard 
statist order. In this chapter, I examine the qualitatively separable soft statist period between 
1978 and 1988 in which a changing social basis of Taiwan’s state led to a significantly diluted 
elite bureaucratic autonomy, the preservation of which necessitated the elite bureaucracy’s 
increased responsiveness to Taiwan’s social forces. I argue that Taiwan’s transition from a hard 
to soft statist social order occurred primarily because of two inter-defining processes, an 
increasingly unmanageable social contestation and a prolonged interest harmonization between 
the elite bureaucracy and the LE capitalist class. Although the KMT’s international 
de-recognition was a catalyst, I argue that a most direct causal factor for Taiwan’s increased 
social contestation was a weakened passive revolution. This, I argue, was especially evident in 
an eroding acquiescence toward the elite bureaucracy’s continued political dominance among 
Taiwan’s increasingly defined and ever more important middle and labouring class 
demographics. The difficult to manage nature of Taiwan’s social contestation, I argue, was an 
outcome of the elite bureaucracy’s prolonged repression of a class politics from developing in 
Taiwan due to which regime, ethnic and class contradictions were channelled toward an 
anti-KMT democratization movement. Because this democratization movement contained a 
significantly expanded social basis, I argue that the elite bureaucracy only secured a sufficient 
social acquiescence to its rule because of its managed liberalization drive which elevated a 
political transformismo to the elite bureaucratic level. This suggests that rather than an 
inevitable democratization or a democracy determining international de-recognition, that 
Taiwan’s social contestation was influenced most directly by a prolonged development induced 
social change and that class is the central variable to understand this process.  
 
In terms of economic policy, a defining feature of Taiwan’s soft statist social order was that the 
elite bureaucracy became significantly more responsive to the short-term interests of Taiwan’s 
LE capitalist class. This was not surprising as an increased social contestation ensured that the 
tenability of the statist social order increasingly rested on the stability of the elite bureaucracy’s 
historical bloc with the LE capitalist class. Coupled with the democratization movement’s 
primary focus on political liberalization, this ensured that a more visibly LE capital advancing 
policy course was an unavoidable economic strategy of rule for the elite bureaucracy to secure 
its continued political autonomy. As such, I argue that the class basis of the KMT’s economic 
policy can be accounted for in terms of a prolonged transformismo and historical bloc induced 
interest harmonization between the elite bureaucracy and the LE capitalist class. But, despite 
this interest harmonization, I also argue that Taiwan’s historical bloc continued to be of a senior 
– junior partner type dynamic. This was because the elite bureaucracy still secured an effective 
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dirigisme which was, however, now applied only to absolute national priority initiatives such as 
the development of Taiwan’s IT sector. This, I argue, was because the elite bureaucracy could 
no longer risk alienating Taiwan’s LE capitalist class as it increasingly depended on its consent 
toward its continued senior role within Taiwan’s historical bloc. This demonstrates that the elite 
bureaucracy’s political autonomy, in addition to being weakened by a strained passive 
revolution among subaltern classes, was also seriously diluted within the elite bureaucracy’s 
historical bloc itself. By theorizing this process through a Gramscian lens, I demonstrate not 
only how the elite bureaucracy’s diluted autonomy can be accounted for in terms of a changing 
social basis of Taiwan’s state, but also that the specific features of the KMT’s economic policy 
can be similarly understood on such terms.  
    
Section 4.1: Civil Society Expansion and a Weakened Political Autonomy  
Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son and groomed successor, became president in 1978 
and throughout his presidency until 1988, Taiwan’s statist social order continued to hold, albeit 
only very tenuously while the elite bureaucracy also faced an increased encroachment on its 
political autonomy. This occurred both in terms of a significantly more active civil society 
which challenged the elite bureaucracy’s monopolization of political power and an increasingly 
powerful LE capitalist class which diluted the elite bureaucracy’s political autonomy through a 
prolonged process of historical bloc induced interest harmonization. To secure a continued elite 
bureaucratic autonomy, Chiang’s administration engaged in a much more extensive and targeted 
transformismo drive. In addition to a specific LE capitalist targeting component which will be 
examined subsequently, the elite bureaucracy began also to engaged in a more reactive and 
legitimacy gaining managed political liberalization and Taiwanization drive which for the first 
time promoted islanders to elite-level political posts. The elite bureaucracy’s intensified 
transformismo secured it a weakened, but still effective autonomy on the continued basis of 
passive revolution. But, at the same time, popular support for the elite bureaucracy was 
beginning to erode among Taiwan’s non-LE capitalist class demographics.  
 
Despite the managed liberalization process, the elite bureaucracy continued to secure a strong 
disciplinary capacity. Throughout Chiang’s presidency, the elite bureaucracy continued to 
dictate its policies by fiat, choose officials without oversight while also relying on various 
rubber stamping bodies such as the National Assembly to secure an institutional legitimacy for 
its continued political dominance. In addition to the immediate political apparatus of the 
party-state, the elite bureaucracy also continued to control nearly all of Taiwan’s major social 
institutions such as its educational apparatus and corporatist organizations within which all 
major social interests were organized. One factor for this degree of continued elite bureaucratic 
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control was the elite bureaucracy’s still effective propaganda which held due to its control over 
all major media platforms, including television, radio and print media. At the same time, a 
network of informants and security agents also continued to operate throughout all of Taiwan’s 
public avenues such as schools, workplaces and neighbourhoods to identify subversives (Roy, 
2003, p. 152). As such, the elite bureaucracy’s control also continued to hold in the political 
realm and it secured a strong advantage in the various permitted election categories, especially 
as opposition politicians were prohibited from utilizing the media for political advertising due to 
continued martial law restrictions (Fell, 2005, p. 880). 
 
Although it is true that the elite bureaucracy continued to secure an overall acquiescence among 
a majority of Taiwan’s citizens, it also faced increased challenges to its rule, especially from 
non-capitalist classes. This was so especially because Taiwan’s class composition became 
increasingly defined while a previous class fluidity was also significantly weakened during this 
time. This is a process which Hsiao Hsin-huang understands as reflective of Taiwan’s social 
transformation toward a modern class composition due to its successful capitalist development. 
As such, Hsiao argues that more traditional classes such as the petty bourgeoisie and small 
farmers were in decline while Taiwan’s labour middle and capitalist classes also became 
increasingly solidified (H.-H Hsiao, 2001, p. 165). Of course, this cleavage is a broad 
demarcation and does not, for instance, account for crucial divergences between the LE 
capitalist class and the SME capitalist class. But as a broad delineation, Hsiao’s analysis 
captures Taiwan’s class parameters which increasingly came into shape as an outcome of an 
ongoing social transformation throughout this time and toward which the middle and labouring 
classes were particularly crucial. 
  
Taiwan’s middle class was especially central toward an increased contestation process which 
began during the 1980s. This was largely because of a shift from its formerly more regime 
favouring petty bourgeoisie and small shop owner composition to one which was defined by an 
increased professional and managerial composition (H.-H. Hsiao, 2001, p. 165). Although many 
within the middle class continued to favour political stability, a sizeable percentage also became 
increasingly concerned with quality of life issues and became politicized. This was evident in 
the strong level of middle class support for the environmental movement and the consumer 
rights and affordable housing movements. Although less pronounced, many within the middle 
class were also sympathetic to the aims of Taiwan’s increasingly active labour movement, a 
marked contrast from a previously less sympathetic composition of shop owners and petty 
capitalists (H.-H. Hsiao, 2001, p. 169). This increased politicization of the middle class was part 
of a more general social transformation process which was induced by Taiwan’s continued 
economic development. In addition to universal education, a much higher percentage of the 
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population now also pursued higher education and university enrolment increased significantly. 
Despite a continued propagandist education system, regime propaganda became less effective 
toward a more educated and critical citizenry, many of which increasingly questioned the 
legitimacy of the KMT’s authoritarian rule. This was especially evident in a much increased 
support among Taiwan’s New middle class for political liberalization and in the instrumental 
role of intellectuals and educated classes in leading many of the protest movements which were 
active during this time (T.-J. Cheng & Lin, 1999, p. 229; Deyo, 1989, p. 160; H.-H. Hsiao, 2001, 
p. 169).  
 
Taiwan’s labouring class also became increasingly politicized, but it did not succeed in 
becoming a central force within a counter historical bloc during this time. This is a 
counter-intuitive development, especially because the labouring class accounted for at least 
43.6% of the active working population in 1980 (Cho & Kim, 1998, pp. 141–142). It is true that 
Taiwan’s labour movement became increasingly active as is evident in the increase of labour 
disputes from 907 incidents in 1984 to 1614 in 1987 and 8967 in 1988 (J.-H. Wang, 2001). But, 
at the same time, Taiwan’s labour movement also only remained one of many strains among a 
variety of issues-specific movements active during this time and which were collectively 
referred to as social movements (Shehui yundong) in Taiwan. These included a wide array of 
issue-specific movement types such as a women’s movement, aboriginal advocacy movement, 
consumer rights movement, environmental movement and farmers movement (H.-H. Hsiao, 
2001, pp. 162-163). The non-central role of the labour movement within Taiwan’s social 
movements is corroborated in terms of the issue types of mass mobilizations and actions during 
this time of which 38.3% related to economic issues, 20.1% to environmental issues while only 
19.2% related to labour issues specifically (C.-H. Huang, 2002a, p. 122).  
   
Despite its weakness, it is true that labour contestation increased significantly during this time 
while the elite bureaucracy also became more responsive to it. But, it is important to correctly 
account for this responsiveness as a reluctant reaction which was necessary toward its gaining of 
an added regime legitimacy (C.-H. Huang, 2002a, p. 137). At a more fundamental level, the elite 
bureaucracy did not alter Taiwan’s social order parameters toward a more structurally labour 
friendly pathway. This is evident, for instance, in the landmark Labour Standard Act of 1984 
which first instituted a minimum wage and which also specified a number of welfare provision 
obligations for employers (J.-J. Chu, 2001, p. 457). A major factor for the law’s passage, 
however, was the elite bureaucratic policy aim of stabilizing and institutionalizing Taiwan’s 
labour relations in a context of prolonged wage increases, labour shortages and a rising 
industrial unrest. As such, the law was primarily aimed at securing a labour peace and to assure 
investors that Taiwan’s labour relations could be managed in an institutionally stable continuum. 
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As such, even in terms of the newly mandated minimum wage stipulation, the appropriate wage 
was determined by a Basic Wage Commission in which labour was scarcely represented. 
Additionally, the labour stipulations mandated in the Labour Standards Act were also not rigidly 
enforced and it was easy for employers to evade them (Minns & Tierney, 2003, p. 114). In 
response to a continued increase of labour disputes, the elite bureaucracy eventually established 
the Council of Labour Affairs (CLA) in 1987 which was tasked with overseeing labour issues, 
but its focus remained primarily on resolving industrial disputes, not advancing the general 
interest of labour (C.-L. Huang, 2002, p. 307).  
 
The elite bureaucracy’s lack of a genuine responsiveness toward the labour movement was 
understandable because Taiwan’s labour movement failed to secure a prominent enough role 
within its social contestation process. One reason for this was that the unionized work force 
continued to of a privileged SOE and LE labour demographic which was primarily interested in 
advancing its narrower interests while remaining less responsive toward the forging of a wider 
labour movement (Kong, 2005, pp. 169–170). This is particularly crucial because 86% of 
Taiwan’s non-government labour force worked in firms hiring less than 100 employees and 
lacked union protection (Kleingartner & Peng, 1991, p. 431). Additionally, state-controlled 
unions also continued to fulfil their Leninist corporatist function of co-opting labour toward 
supporting the KMT and to pacify labour from securing a genuine role to determine wages or 
labour conditions (J.-H. Wang, 2001, pp. 351–353). As a rule, whether implicating unionized or 
non-unionized workers, labour disputes tended to remain localised and enterprise specific so 
that grievances did not easily coalesce toward the development of a powerful longer-term labour 
movement. As such, even though Taiwan experienced a wave of strikes between 1987 and 1989, 
labour actions quickly ebbed again afterward because of a limited organizational strength 
among the labour movement (C.-L. Huang, 2002, p. 309). Due to this lack of a mediating 
capacity, Taiwan’s labour market continued to be a flexible one which, despite an increased 
wage growth, was also defined by low wages, long working hours and a limited degree of social 
protection (J.-H. Wang, 2001, p. 353).  
 
Despite the elite bureaucracy’s reluctant responsiveness toward social movements, activists and 
labour organizers continued to face the disciplinary apparatus of the state. Paradoxically, this 
led to a gradual convergence of social movements toward a much more visibly 
regime-challenging and democratizing direction. The most direct catalyst for this convergence 
process was the ROC’s increasingly eroded international regime legitimacy which became 
pronounced in the 1970s during which time a majority of the ROC’s diplomatic relations broke 
off ties with it while recognizing the PRC instead. During this time, the PRC was also invited to 
regain its seat in the UN and after which the ROC withdrew in protest. The KMT was able to 
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manage the domestic repercussions of this process so long as its chief ally, the US, continued to 
maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC. But, in 1978, the US, driven by shifting Cold War 
imperatives of rapprochement, also recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China 
and broke off official diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Roy, 2003, p. 139), After this, Taiwan 
was only able to secure a continued de facto autonomy which was cemented in a prolonged 
Cross-Strait status quo. The US was instrumental in shaping the status quo parameters by which 
it stipulated in its 1971 Shanghai Communique that although there was only one legitimate 
China to which Taiwan belonged, the issue had to be settled peacefully (Roy, 2003, pp. 131–
132). Most directly cementing the status quo, however, was the US’ 1979 Taiwan Relations Act 
(TRA) which stipulated that the US would provide Taiwan with necessary military defence 
articles and services to maintain its continued self-defence capacity prior to the peaceful 
settlement of the China issue. Although ambiguously worded, the TRA also stipulated that the 
US viewed any military action against Taiwan as a ‘grave concern to the US,’ a claim which has 
often been interpreted as entailing a US commitment to defend Taiwan militarily in case of an 
unprovoked attack from China (Roy, 2003, pp. 140–142). 
 
The ROC’s almost entirely evaporated international recognition seriously destabilized the 
KMT’s internal regime legitimacy and had a catalysing role in channelling the focus of social 
movements toward a unified anti KMT direction. This occurred rapidly because a festering 
anti-regime sentiment among social movements synchronized comfortably with a liberalizing 
political current. In the context of the regime’s international de-recognition, Taiwan’s 
increasingly coherent democratization movement now had a strong enough social basis to 
seriously challenge the legitimacy of the KMT’s authoritarian rule. The goal of democratization 
was not only an outcome of strategic necessity, but also reflected a popular sentiment among 
Taiwan’s social movements that its most pressing goal must be the securing of a representative, 
liberal democracy which would then allow for social movement agendas to be addressed within 
the political process (H.-H. Chen, 2009, p. 67). As such, the oppositional alliance and its 
increasingly well-developed mutual support organization led it to increasingly resemble a 
political party, so much so that it became referred to as the Tangwai movement or ‘outside of 
the party movement’ (Minns & Tierney, 2003, p. 113). 
 
One outcome of the formation of an increasingly unified Tangwai movement was that social 
movement issues became secondary in importance to a common democratization agenda. It is 
true that social movements actively mobilized on individual issues while both labour and 
environmental contestation continued during this time. But, it was also the case that it was a 
distinct democratization agenda which became most defined among social movements as a 
whole (Gold, 1996, pp. 1110–1111). As such, although the Tangwai campaigned on a number of 
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themes, a specifically labour focused agenda never did become central. This is observable in the 
fact that a majority of movement campaigns related to political liberalization issues such as the 
ending of martial law, an increased self-determination, the right to organize an opposition party 
and the repeal of the KMT’s political privileges. Although, containing a relatively pronounced 
welfare agenda which, for instance called for increased social welfare spending, this did not 
nuance the movement’s overall narrative which was most concerned with Taiwan’s 
self-determination and liberalization (Wakabayashi, 1997, pp. 431-434). This was evident in the 
labour movement and many labour organizers framed the labour agenda as a component of 
Taiwan’s democratization process by which labour was framed as advancing to secure its 
political rights (J.-J. Chu, 2001, p. 454). Although not yet fully foregrounded, the Tanwai also 
developed an increasingly defined Taiwan identity and nationalism agenda which challenged the 
KMT’s Chinese nationalism (Y.-Y. Chen, 2007, p. 164). Because of the lack of a powerful 
enough class basis, the Tangwai did not, however, become a viable counter historical bloc 
which may have altered the economic parameters of Taiwan’s social order.  
 
Faced with a much more hostile democratization movement which had a significantly expanded 
social basis, Chiang Ching-kuo was not able to rely on the state’s disciplinary apparatus alone to 
discipline members of the Tangwai movement. This was especially so because of the KMT’s 
tarnished regime legitimacy. Although a foregrounded ideational component stressed the 
KMT’s successful economic development of Taiwan, this was also not a convincing enough 
ideational predicate on which the elite bureaucracy could justify a prolonged one-party rule. As 
such, to enable a continued elite bureaucratic autonomy, Chiang implemented a regime-led 
political Taiwanization drive which was necessary for the securing of a continued acquiescence 
among a majority of Taiwan’s citizens to the KMT’s rule (Kaeding, 2009, p. 23). But, because 
the elite bureaucracy’s ethnic rule faced increased challenges, the KMT’s political 
transformismo could also no longer take place only at the political periphery in second-tier 
positions where no real authority was at stake. As such, islanders were now also promoted to 
more central level posts within the party-state system. This is, for instance, evident in Chiang’s 
promotion of Lee Teng-Hui as vice president, Shirley Kuo as finance minister, Shi Chi-yang as 
Minister of Justice and Lien Chan as Vice Premier. In the context of Taiwan’s Leninist party 
state in which the party superseded the authority of the state, many of the same officials were 
also promoted to the highest KMT party organs such as its Central Standing Committee 
(Hughes, 1997, pp. 51–52). Despite a widened Taiwanization, a pronounced logic of 
transformismo guided the policy and promoted islanders were carefully vetted for a regime 
friendly background. At the same time, islanders were also promoted at a controlled pace so that 
they did not reach a critical mass to dilute the mainlander dominated composition of the elite 
bureaucracy.  
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Once a policy path of limited liberalization and Taiwanization was pursued, it had the 
unintended effect of significantly strengthening the democratization movement and which, in a 
circular fashion, forced the elite bureaucracy to implement further reforms. One reason for this 
was that the opposition was emboldened by the explosive combination of a very slowly 
liberalizing polity and a continued repression. In terms of Chiang’s election expansion program 
which opened additional posts for Taiwan-elected candidates, for instance, the scope of 
expansions did not allow for a meaningful democratization in the foreseeable future. In 1980 
elections, only 50 of a total 500 seats were newly created within Taiwan’s three representative 
organs while no additional seats were added in the 1983 election. This limited scope of 
liberalization led the Tangwai movement to become much more vocal in its demands, to 
organize more effectively and to widen protests and political actions (T.-J. Cheng & Lin, 1999, 
p. 236-237). In this context, key Tangwai organizers finally opted in 1986 to establish an 
official opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Although the formation of political 
parties was illegal, Chiang tolerated the DPP and constrained hard-line elements within the 
KMT from disbanding it and punishing its members (Y.-H. Chu & T.-M. Lin, 1996; Roy, 2003, 
pp. 172–173). Chiang’s decision to tolerate the DPP was particularly significant in light of the 
DPP’s putting into question the legality of the ‘alien’ KMT regime while also advocating the 
establishment of an independent state on Taiwan, an agenda which was anathema to everything 
that the KMT stood for (Kau, 1996, p. 298).  
 
At the time of the DPP’s formation, the regime-managed liberalization drive had largely run its 
course and a qualitatively new phase in Taiwan’s democratization trajectory was soon to begin. 
A most defining moment was Chiang’s 1987 decision to end Martial Law and to replace it with 
a National Security Act which continued to place some restrictions on civil liberties. Although 
restrictions remained, it was clear that the direction now was toward a further easing thereof in 
all social spheres, ranging from media to civil association. At the same time, Jiang also 
intensified the KMTs frozen mainland legislator retirement encouragement drive and the 
replacement of mainlander delegates with legislators elected in Taiwan (T.-J. Cheng & Lin, 
1999, p. 237). Finally, in terms of China policies, despite officially claiming a continued 
sovereignty over China, the KMT regime was also forced to accept the reality of a CCP 
managed China and it finally allowed mainlanders to visit family members in the PRC for the 
first time since the establishment of the ROC in Taiwan (F.-S. Hsieh, 2004, p. 485; Hughes, 
1997, p. 50). But, regardless of openings, Taiwan’s statist social order remained in place while 
the elite bureaucracy continued to enjoy a seriously weakened autonomy.  
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In the context of Taiwan’s changing social basis of the state, it is clear that its labouring 
demographic failed to secure a primacy within a potentially regime challenging 
counter-historical bloc. Rather, a confluence of forces led to the development of a political 
liberalization movement which unified issues-advancing social movements and nativist 
democratizers to pose a serious challenge toward a continued elite bureaucracy-led rule. 
Although a continued elite bureaucratic autonomy continued to hold, this required a much more 
concerted process of transformismo. Rather than a genuine elite bureaucratic responsiveness 
toward social and class articulation, however, the democratizing direction of Taiwan’s Tangwai 
movement led to a responsiveness primarily at the more general level of political liberalization.  
 
Section 4.2: A Diluted Elite Bureaucratic Consensus 
Although the elite bureaucracy preserved a continued elite bureaucratic autonomy, the degree of 
this autonomy was also significantly diluted. This occurred on a number of levels, but most 
important to which was an increased elite bureaucratic reliance on local factions for electoral 
advancement and a more diluted elite bureaucratic consensus due to the elite bureaucracy’s 
prolonged historical bloc induced interest harmonization with the LE capitalist class. Before 
examining this process, it is important to note that the institutional levers on which the elite 
bureaucracy secured its political autonomy continued to hold. Taiwan’s financial system 
remained state controlled and enabled the elite bureaucracy to continue channelling capital 
flows and to discipline individual capitalists when necessary. It is true that the KMT pursued 
some limited financial liberalization from the 1980s onward, but this also did not weaken the 
KMT’s banking control as it continued to own an absolute majority of Taiwan’s banks and 
freely dictated bank lending, interest rates and personnel policies to banks (Sato, 2002, pp. 236–
237; Thorbecke & Wan, 2007, p. 57). With such a strong degree of control, even as late as 1988, 
government-owned financial institutions still accounted for a total of 66.6% of lending and 
65.2% of deposits (Chou, 1994, p. 60). The fact that the institutional parameters securing the 
developmental state held suggest that the elite bureaucracy’s weakened autonomy is better 
accounted for in terms of a diluted bureaucratic consensus.  
 
4.2.1: Political Factions  
Because of an increased expansion of elections, one feature of Taiwan’s electoral politics during 
this time was that local political factions became more important. From the onset of its rule 
already, the elite bureaucracy has consistently relied on primarily islander composed political 
factions to secure a stable rule. Between 1954 and 1989, for instance, 62.93% of KMT 
provincial assembly candidates had factional backgrounds while factional candidates at all 
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levels of government also had a higher chance of electoral success. This was due to advantages 
arising from KMT affiliation as well as the enmeshment of factions in various vote buying 
relations with key voting blocks, a practice which was central to factional politics (Fell, 2005; 
Shiau, 1996, pp. 216–218). But, given the much more pronounced electoral expansion occurring 
during this time, the elite bureaucracy also increasingly relied on political factions so that they 
gained an added level of political importance. But, for the time being, the elite bureaucracy 
continued to secure its control over factions so that increased tensions only became fully visible 
after the late 1980s when factions first began to encroach toward the central government level 
(H.-H. Hsiao, 1995, pp. 87–88; J.-H. Wang, 1996, pp. 237–238).  
 
The reason that the elite bureaucracy secured such a strong control over factions was that a 
number of mechanisms were in place which institutionalized the hierarchical relationship 
between the two. At a most general level, political factions depended on the KMT for a number 
of economic privileges such as the right to manage localized economic monopolies, the securing 
of specialized low interest rate loans, control over public work contracts and authority over city 
planning (Fell, 2005, p. 879; Sato, 2002, p. 236). Additionally, the elite bureaucracy also limited 
both the upward and horizontal integration of factions. Limits on upward integration are 
self-explanatory in the context of the KMT’s restriction on an electoral and representative 
politics at the national level. Horizontal integration limits, on the other hand, refers to the 
practice by which the KMT ensured that there existed at least two sets of KMT affiliated local 
factions which competed amongst each other for all permitted election categories. The elite 
bureaucracy supported competing factions equally with the specific intent of balancing and 
keeping the political influence of individual factions limited. Within the confines of the elite 
bureaucratic - factional relationship, factions were effectively tied to a leash as if they stepped 
out of line or challenged the elite bureaucracy, it simply diverted resources enjoyed by one 
faction to another (Kuo, 2000, p. 91; Sato, 2002, pp. 235–236). But, despite the hierarchical 
nature of the relationship, the elite bureaucracy’s control over factions also began to weaken in 
light of its increased dependence on factions which gained progressively more political 
influence during this time (Shiau, 1996, p. 218).   
  
The growth of a factional politics raises the immediate question as to how political factions can 
be accounted for in class terms and what their role was in advancing the interests of the LE 
capitalist class in Taiwan. As noted already, political factions were special interests which 
secured policy-induced privileges by inserting themselves in the political process. But, although 
it is true that factions were vested within the political process, it is also clear that they cannot be 
collapsed with the KMT’s elite bureaucracy due to a continued factional dependence on and 
subservience to it. Economically, factions shared a common interest with Taiwan’s LE capitalist 
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class because of an interest in an intensified capital accumulation process. But, due to securing 
its interests through policy-induced favours, it also becomes difficult to collapse factions with 
the capitalist class. As such, factions are better understood as politically placed economic 
interests which secured an institutionally enabled political autonomy and which necessitated 
their political subservience to the elite bureaucracy. But at the same time, due to broadly 
convergent economic interests, political factions also quickly became an important platform on 
which a factional-LE capitalist alliance was formed and on which common political interests 
could be advanced. For the time being, however, factions had not yet significantly encroached 
on the political autonomy enjoyed by the elite bureaucracy.  
 
4.2.2: A Strained Industrial Policy  
Because a predominantly mainlander based elite bureaucracy continued to secure an effective 
political autonomy, a diluted bureaucratic consensus is better accounted for in terms of a 
prolonged process of interest harmonization between the elite bureaucracy and the LE capitalist 
class. Because industrial policy is central to statist development, the degree of its effectiveness 
is an important gauge by which the elite bureaucratic and LE capitalist relationship can be 
examined. In terms of the elite bureaucracy’s overall policy parameter, it was clear that this 
much more visibly advanced the short term interests of capital. But, although the elite 
bureaucracy became much more responsive to short-term capital interests, a strategic 
development logic also continued to guide its overall policy parameter, especially toward 
national priority initiatives such as the development of Taiwan’s IT sector. But even in the case 
of the national priority IT sector, a much more pronounced private sector interest articulation 
was evident and which was reflective of a weakened, but still viable dirigisme.  
 
In terms of the IT sector’s creation, the integrated circuit (IC) sector was very much the linchpin 
and foundation on which the sector as a whole was developed. The IC sector’s creation is also 
particularly illuminating toward the elite bureaucratic – capitalist relationship during this time. 
In order to examine the dynamic between the two, however, it is first necessary to briefly 
outline the sector’s development. The IC sector, along with other targeted IT sectors, was 
designated for priority development because it satisfied the elite bureaucracy’s ‘two-large, 
two-high, two-low’ principle which called for the development of industries in Taiwan with 
large linkage effects, large market potential, high technology intensity, a high degree of 
value-added, low energy coefficients and low levels of pollution emissions (Lui & Qiu, 2001, p. 
88). Tasked with the development of the IT sector was the Industrial Technology Research 
Institute (ITRI) which was established in 1973 as a national technology development lab to 
facilitate technology and skill diffusion to the private sector. Within ITRI, it was the Electronics 
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Research and Service Organization (ERSO) which was tasked with guiding the semiconductor 
sector’s development (M.-P. Huang, 2006).  
 
During early stages of the semiconductor sector’s development, the economic bureaucracy 
enjoyed an unchallenged dirigisme over its policy implementation. The central development 
initiative during this stage was the transferring of a seven-micron Complementary Metal Oxide 
Semiconductor (CMOS) fabrication technology from the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) 
to Taiwan. Due to the difficulty of procuring private sector interest in the project, the 
technology was commercialized through the joint private-public sector spin-off United 
Microelectronic Corporation (UMC) which was 51% private sector owned and 49% state owned. 
The 51% private sector ownership required a considerable persuasion and also some degree of 
coercion such as tax audit threats or bank loan refusals (Breznitz, 2007, p. 107) In addition to 
systematic technology transfer to the UMC, the ERSO also transferred its skilled mechanical 
and managerial staff directly to it. Even the UMC’s CEO, Tsao Hsing-cheng, was transferred 
directly from his previous post as deputy chief of the ERSO (M.-P. Huang, 2006, p. 34). The 
UMC was such a success that it became Taiwan’s most profitable publicly traded company in 
1985 by which time government ownership was already reduced to 23% (Meany, 1994, p. 180; 
Schive, 1990, p. 279). The creation of UMC, however, was only one component of a systematic 
and comprehensive IC sector development drive in which the development of an effective IC 
design sector (custom tailored IC chip design) was also central. But, because IC design firms 
were less capital intensive, the ERSO primarily transferred technology and engineers directly to 
private sector firms or encouraged its staff to setup IC design firms which then utilized the 
UMC or ERSO’s fabrication facilities (S.-H. Wu, 1992). 
 
After the successful development of the IC sector, the ERSO proceeded quickly to develop and 
commercialize a more advanced very-large-scale integration (VLSI) capacity and did so by 
spinning off the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) in 1987. In terms 
of the TSMC’s initial capital ratio, the elite bureaucracy contributed 48.3%, Philips contributed 
27.5% while a consortium of private sector investors contributed the rest (Schive, 1990, p. 279). 
TSMC was spun-off in a characteristic statist fashion, receiving not only the ERSO’s pilot plant 
and technology, but also a total personnel transfer of 98 technicians and 46 production workers 
by 1987 (Mathews, 1997, p. 36; S.-H. Wu, 1992, p. 185). The TSMC’s CEO, Morris Chang, 
was transferred directly from his previous post as head of ITRI (C.-F. Chen & Sewell, 1996, p. 
773). The establishment of the TSMC was even more of a success than that of the UMC. 
Chang’s business strategy of running TSMC as a pure-play foundry which only produced 
semiconductors on a third party basis completely redefined the standard business model for the 
whole IC sector. Soon after, the UMC also adopted a similar business model and both the 
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TSMC and UMC ranked as the world’s largest and second largest pure-play foundry firms 
while holding about two-thirds of the global market share
 
(Fuller, 2002, p. 7; S.-W. Hung et al, 
2004, p. 554).
 
 
 
Despite the TSMC’s spinoff occurring along a standard formula, it faced significantly more 
pronounced resistance from private sector actors which aimed to advance firm level interests 
that were challenged by the elite bureaucracy’s strategic development policies. A central reason 
for the rapid increase of IT sector advocacy was that the elite bureaucracy permitted an IT sector 
development course which actively encouraged capital consolidation and which led to the rapid 
increase of the IT capitalist class’ influence (Y.-P. Wu, 2004, pp. 111–112). This was a 
necessary development course, however, because sectorial features required a number of 
concentrated and consolidated firms in each sub-sector which had to attain large economies of 
scale. Because of a much increased economic influence, IT capitalists were also much more 
prone to contest the elite bureaucracy’s economic policies when it clashed with shorter term 
firm-level interests. As such, the TSMC’s spin-off was vehemently opposed by the UMC while 
its CEO, Tsao, argued that it should have been the UMC which was tasked with the 
development of the VLSI technology (Breznitz, 2007, p. 109). Furthermore, the UMC also 
publicly advocated an end to Taiwan’s state-led industrial development model by requesting 
that the ERSO should be confined to primary research only and that it should shut down its 
wafer fabrication demonstration plant which competed directly with the private sector (Meany, 
1994, p. 178). Despite facing more pronounced private sector pressure, the economic 
bureaucracy resisted and pursued its intended policy course. There are many reasons for this, 
but central to which was the priority nature of the IT sector’s development due to which the elite 
bureaucracy concentrated its remaining political autonomy to empower the economic 
bureaucracy to resist private sector pressure. But, regardless, the public nature of the UMC’s 
interest articulation is reflective of both a relative weakening of the elite bureaucracy’s 
dirigisme as this would not have been possible during Taiwan’s hard statist social order.  
 
Regardless of high profile cases such as that of UMC, it is important for the elite/economic 
bureaucracy – IT capitalist relationship not to be interpreted as one of conflict or antagonism. A 
majority of IT capitalists continued to support the economic bureaucracy’s development policy 
due to its sector advancing features and because they remained dependent on the economic 
bureaucracy for technology provision (S.-G. Hong, 1997, pp. 141–142). Furthermore, a 
considerable degree of interest harmonization occurred between IT capitalists and the economic 
bureaucracy which ensured that the relationship between the two remained amicable. This was 
particularly pronounced due to a common educational background and the high degree of 
personnel overlap between the two due to the fact that so many IT capitalists and managers 
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previously worked in the ITRI/ERSO (Ouyang, 2006, p. 1323). This overlap was an outcome of 
the ITRI’s systematic personnel transfer policy which set annual employee turnover rates at 
10-15% and which rose quickly to 30% by the late 1980s. As an outcome, employment at ITRI 
averaged at 5 years only and 85% of the total 13,995 staff that left ITRI between 1982 and 2000 
joined the private IT sector thereafter in light of higher profit and remuneration induced 
incentives (M.-P. Huang, 2006, p. 32; Ouyang, 2006, p. 1325).  
 
Because of the pronounced interest harmonization between the economic bureaucracy and the 
IT capitalist class, its policy parameter was one which unambiguously advanced the interests of 
private sector IT firms. Although that UMC’s case suggests that policies, at times, stood to 
challenge the short-term interests of private sector firms, this should also not be overstated. For 
one, in addition to crucial technological and manpower support, IT sector firms also received 
generous fiscal support from the state. This was especially so for firms in designated priority IT 
industries of IC, computer peripherals, telecommunications, optoelectronics, precision 
machinery and biotechnology which satisfied the stipulated criteria for being located in the 
Hsinchu Science Park (C.-W. Huang, 2011, pp. 176–177). Science park firms enjoyed supports 
such as reduced land and building rent, five year tax holidays, duty exemption on imported 
equipment and completed exports as well as low interest rate loans and matching R&D funds 
(Y.-H. Chu, 2007a; Lui & Qiu, 2001). Even in the case of spin-offs, it was more common for 
private sector firms to lead the process and to receive state support while doing so. One example 
of this is the Windbond Corporation which was founded in 1987 by Yang Ding-yuan of the 
ERSO. Despite securing financial backing from the private sector, Windbond was blessed with 
the full support of the ERSO and received both skilled personnel (100 of ERSO’s staff) and 
vital technology from it (C.-F. Chen & Sewell, 1996, p. 774; S.-G. Hong, 1997, pp. 57–58). 
Thus, rather than state support applying only to officially spun-off enterprises such as TSMC, 
UMC, TMC, Holtek and Syntek, it also similarly applied to private sector initiatives such as 
HMC, ADT and AMPI (S.-G. Hong, 1997, pp. 57–58; Liu, 1993, p. 306).  
 
4.2.3: Elite Bureaucratic – LE Capitalist Interest Harmonization 
The developmental state held in Taiwan because national priority policies continued to be viable. 
But, in light of an ever more visible capitalist interest articulation which defined even such 
national priority policies, the question naturally arises as to the relational features between the 
elite bureaucracy and the LE capitalist class more generally. For one, Taiwan’s LE capitalist 
class has been exposed to a much longer history of transformismo by the elite bureaucracy. But 
as explored in the previous chapter, the co-optation of the LE capitalist class also occurred in a 
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very targeted fashion by which a number of LE capitalists secured a close working relationship 
with the elite bureaucracy at the highest levels of the party-state structure. As such, a process of 
elite bureaucracy and LE capitalist interest harmonization intensified while inter-marital ties 
also tended often to further personalize the relationship at this level. A notable example of this 
phenomenon was the Koo family which controlled a business empire that ranked as the second 
largest corporate grouping in Taiwan. The Koo family’s representative, Koo Chen-Fu, served as 
chairman of the NCIC since 1958 and also gained a place in the KMT’s central committee after 
1981 (Y.-H. Chu, 1994, pp. 119–120). 
 
With this degree of inter-penetration, the elite bureaucracy was much more responsive to LE 
capitalists in already established economic sectors due to the long-term nature of the ties 
between the two. Because of the close relationship between the elite bureaucracy and the LE 
capitalist class, not only was it much more difficult for the elite bureaucracy to challenge the 
short-term interests of LE capitalists, but it also had limited incentives to do so when it came to 
non-priority development sectors. Furthermore, in light of an increased social contestation, it 
was particularly important for the elite bureaucracy to secure the continued support of the LE 
capitalist class so that the core alliance underpinning Taiwan’s historical bloc did not suffer 
unnecessary strain. As such, although the elite bureaucracy secured a capacity to discipline the 
LE capitalist class as its IT sector development policies demonstrate, this capacity was rarely 
wielded because it would have strained the elite bureaucracy – LE capitalist historical bloc. The 
increased policy responsiveness of the elite bureaucracy toward the interests of the LE capitalist 
class can be clearly observed in the significant easing of previous policy constraints toward 
capital consolidation. Indicative of this policy reversal was a new openness toward mid-stream 
LE capitalist firms to integrate into upstream operations which were previously off bounds. 
Formosa Plastics, for instance, was finally allowed to engage in crude oil refining and 
petrochemical production in 1986 (C.-W. Huang, 2011, p. 170). At a more general level, the 
degree of business consolidation can be observed in the fact that by 1988, Taiwan’s 100 largest 
business groups already accounted for 34% of its total GNP despite only employing 4.63% of its 
labour force (H.-H. Hsiao, 1995, p. 83). 
 
As an outcome of the KMT’s successful capitalist economic development, the translation of the 
economic power of the LE capitalist class into an equivalent political influence was a difficult 
trend to reverse. As such, the elite bureaucracy also became much more responsive to the 
short-term interests of the LE capitalist class. Although the elite bureaucratic – LE capitalist 
relationship was amicable, there are also a number of cases which visibly demonstrate the 
increased influence of the LE capitalist class toward shaping and reversing state policy. This is 
nowhere more evident than in the KMT’s 1981 attempt to cancel the petrochemical sector’s 
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status as a key national development sector and to discourage the continued expansion of its 
highly oil consuming and polluting intermediate stream. This decision was, however, reversed 
in 1984 by the Yu Kuo-hwa cabinet in response to mounting LE capital/SOE pressure (Y.-P. Wu, 
2004, p. 97). Similar policy reversals also occurred in other spheres such as the significant 
watering down of a proposed stock market transaction tax due to capitalist pressure and a 
successful investment strike (Y.-H. Chu, 1994, p. 129). At a more general level, the LE capitalist 
class also became more vocal in articulating its interests by, for instance, attacking perceived 
bureaucratic inefficiency and delays. But, rather than an inside - outside dynamic, the elite 
bureaucracy can be better understood as voluntarily rescinding its previous dirigisme because of 
its prolonged historical bloc induced interest harmonization with the LE capitalist class. In this 
context, visible signs of favouritism and corruption were also becoming more and more 
pronounced during the 1980s. Not only did the LE capitalist class provide crucial financial 
support to KMT candidates in Taiwan’s various permitted elections, but government officials 
also increasingly brokered backroom deals which permitted well-connected business groups to 
attain licenses and government contracts and to circumvent government regulations (Roy, 2003, 
pp. 161–162). 
 
Although Taiwan’s statist order continued to hold, it did so only in a much weakened sense and 
was reflective of a changing social basis of Taiwan’s state. Despite this changing social basis of 
Taiwan’s state, the elite bureaucracy secured a continued, but seriously weakened autonomy by 
managing a continued passive revolution through an intensified transfromismo. But, due to its 
increased historical bloc induced interest harmonization with the LE capitalist class, the elite 
bureaucracy’s autonomy was also significantly diluted. Coupled with an intensifying and regime 
challenging social contestation, Taiwan’s soft statist order was ready to rupture at any time.  
 
4.3 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I examined how Taiwan’s prolonged social transformation led to a qualitative 
reorientation from a hard to soft statist order between 1978 and 1988. I identified two processes 
as central to this, an increasingly unmanageable social contestation and an intensified interest 
harmonization between the elite bureaucracy and the LE capitalist class. Although I 
acknowledged that international factors such as the ROC’s de-recognition had a catalysing 
effect on Taiwan’s social contestation process, I examined such contestation primarily in the 
context of a prolonged development-induced social change. Although this could have 
manifested itself in a variety of ways, I argued that the elite bureaucracy’s prolonged repression 
of a class politics eventually channelled festering class, ethnic and political discontent into a 
unified anti-KMT democratization Tangwai movement. Due to the movement’s significantly 
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expanded social basis which drew heavily from the middle and labouring classes, I argued that 
the elite bureaucracy was forced to respond through an intensified and elevated political 
transformismo to secure a continued, but much weakened elite bureaucratic autonomy. 
Accompanying this was the elite bureaucracy’s increased policy responsiveness to the 
short-term interests of the LE capitalist class. This, I argued, was due to the elite bureaucracy’s 
diluted statist development consensus which was induced by a prolonged process of interest 
harmonization between it and the LE capitalist class. In the context of Taiwan’s rising social 
contestation, I argued that this interest harmonization was intensified because the elite 
bureaucracy increasingly relied on its historical bloc with the LE capitalist class to secure a 
continued political autonomy. For the time being, Taiwan’s soft statist social order held, but 
only tenuously, a fact which I argued to be particularly apparent in the elite bureaucracy’s much 
more sparingly wielded dirigisme toward national priority development initiatives.  
 
At a more general level, this chapter’s analysis demonstrates that a Gramscian approach cannot 
only theorize the social basis of the KMT’s political autonomy, but also how a change thereof 
has led to a qualitatively separable soft statist order. By doing so, I have demonstrated that the 
Gramscian concept of passive revolution is sufficiently fluid to allow for an open-ended account 
of Taiwan’s historical social order transformation process, even in relative terms within the 
statist order itself. By doing so, I also demonstrated that a Gramscian account allows for a high 
degree of analytical precision from which Taiwan’s policy features can be theorized. In terms of 
the elite bureaucracy’s increasingly capital advancing policy framework, my analysis also 
challenges asocial accounts of this as a natural outcome of economic imperatives and shows that 
such a policy change was reflective of a changing social basis of Taiwan’s state. By proceeding 
in this way, my analysis also challenges ‘embedded autonomy’ type interpretations of Taiwan’s 
social order. I demonstrate rather that Taiwan’s soft statist order was very much a transitional 
stage within a linear, but elite bureaucracy managed process of a progressively eroding elite 
bureaucratic autonomy. A Gramscian approach does not struggle to account for this because a 
passive revolution-enabled political autonomy can only be secured on a very specific class 
composition which is difficult to sustain in the context of a prolonged capitalist development 
trajectory. By this stage, Taiwan’s soft statist social order only continued to hold in a very 
tenuous sense and was ready to rupture when Taiwan’s LE capitalist class consolidated enough 
influence to forge a historical bloc. I explore this process in the following chapter and examine 
how a fractured elite bureaucratic consensus and a newly hegemonic historical bloc dissolved a 
continued political autonomy altogether and I will then proceed to examine CSEI on this basis.  
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Chapter 5: The Ascent of Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Historical Bloc 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined how a prolonged changing social basis of Taiwan’s state led 
to a qualitatively separable soft statist order during which time the elite bureaucracy secured a 
weakened autonomy and became increasingly responsive to Taiwan’s social forces. In this 
chapter, I examine the dissolution of Taiwan’s statist social order during Lee Teng-hui’s 
presidency. I argue that this was the culmination of a prolonged changing social basis of 
Taiwan’s state by which a newly hegemonic LE capitalist class forged an autonomy-dissolving 
historical bloc which backed President Lee and his political allies to secure control over the 
KMT. Reflective of the hegemonic stature of the LE capitalist class, I argue that Taiwan’s 
policy parameter was now geared primarily toward advancing the short-term interests of the LE 
capitalist class. In the context of Taiwan’s now liberalized political system, I also examine how 
its historical bloc secured the ideational assent necessary for its hegemony and place particular 
emphasis on Taiwan’s hegemonic narrative to do so. Central to this, I argue, was the rise of a 
Taiwan identity politics which fractured Taiwan’s social movements from developing the class 
basis necessary to form a viable counter historical bloc and which also increasingly diverted the 
citizenry’s attention from class and economic issues to identity issues. By conceiving of 
Taiwan’s identity politics as a component of its hegemonic narrative, I am able to explain how 
an identity politics was crucial for a pro-capital policy legitimation for politicians such as Lee 
Teng-hui to secure a captive support on the basis of identity affinities. Additionally, I also 
demonstrate how an identity politics increasingly allowed for a de-politicization and side-lining 
of economic issues so that a simplistic economistic legitimation of Taiwan’s social order was 
much more readily accepted than would otherwise have been the case.  
 
In the context of a rapidly intensifying CSEI, I argue that it is not possible to account for 
Taiwan’s historical bloc in domestic terms alone. This is because a now fully intensified CSEI 
brought into place a Cross-Strait historical bloc between Taiwan’s hegemonic LE capitalist 
class and the CCP. On this basis, I understand CSEI as simultaneously advancing the economic 
interests of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class and the geo-strategic interests of the CCP to secure 
Taiwan’s eventual unification with China. By theorizing the CCP as a passive 
revolution-enabled elite bureaucratic class, I account for it as a class actor within the 
Cross-Strait historical bloc. On this basis, I argue that the CCP’s geo-strategic policy 
imperatives were guided by the twin objectives of securing Taiwan’s economic dependence on 
China and the CCP’s social order shaping capacity in Taiwan through its alliance with its 
hegemonic LE capitalist class. Although, President Lee attempted eventually to constrain CSEI 
due to his Taiwan nationalist proclivities, I argue that the utterly unenforceable nature of his 
policy was indicative of the Cross-Strait historical bloc’s hegemonic stature. This was especially 
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so because even despite a failed attempt to constrain CSEI, Lee’s administration continued to 
proactively court the LE capitalist class for support while relying on it for a stable rule. Such 
support, I argue, was forthcoming due both to the unenforceable nature of Lee’s CSEI policies 
and his administration’s continued pursuit of an otherwise LE capital advancing policy 
framework. On this basis, my argument suggests that the Cross-Strait relationship already began 
during this time to occur within the parameters of a regionally operating Cross-Strait historical 
bloc which imposed a combined logic on Taiwan’s state.  
  
Section 5.1: The Hegemony of the LE Capitalist Class  
Chiang Ching-kuo passed away unexpectedly in 1988 and after which his vice president, Lee 
Teng-hui, became acting president. Lee was a dedicated Taiwanese nationalist and 
independence advocate who shrouded such views during his ascent towards the highest levels of 
the KMT party-state power structure. Immediately after his appointment, a majority of the 
mainlander-dominated elite bureaucracy opposed Lee due to their fear that he would fully 
Taiwanize the party and dilute the privileges they enjoyed. Anti-Lee forces quickly coalesced 
into an anti-Lee Teng-hui non-mainstream alliance against which Lee’s democratization alliance 
came to be known as the mainstream alliance which was composed primarily of promoted 
islander elite bureaucrats and some reformist mainlanders. To resist attacks from the 
non-mainstream alliance and to dislodge the mainlander dominated elite bureaucracy from its 
control over the KMT, Lee’s mainstream alliance was faced with the necessary task of securing 
a viable social basis. To do so, Lee identified the LE capitalist class and the KMT’s local 
factions as his most important social basis (Shiau, 1996, p. 223; J.-H. Wang, 1996). 
 
5.1.1: KMT Power Struggles and the Ascent of Taiwan’s Historical Bloc 
The intra-KMT power struggle was inter-twined with Taiwan’s democratization. From the onset, 
it was clear that the non-mainstream alliance was reactionary and advocated both a continued 
mainlander-led one party rule and the repression of free expression. This was problematic for 
Lee because immediately after his appointment to the presidency, he faced the prospect of 
having to be reappointed by a mainlander dominated National Assembly in 1990. Due to his 
still weak position, Lee placated his opponents by nominating the mainland nationalist hardliner, 
Hau Pei-tsun, as premier of his new cabinet in 1990. This won Lee’s successful reappointment 
and provided a period of relative political calm during which he utilized the power that came 
with his position as party chairman and president to install allies at all levels of the party-state in 
order to strengthen the mainstream alliance (A.-C. Tan, 2002, p. 157). By collaborating with 
pro-reform forces, Lee succeeded already in 1991 to implement the subsequent elections for the 
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Kaohsiung and Taipei mayorships, the complete dissolution and replacement of the mainland 
elected legislature with a Taiwan elected composition and the amendment of the Criminal Law 
100 by removing the vaguely worded ‘sedition’ clause which allowed for a marked increase of 
Taiwan’s freedom of speech (Chao & Dickson, 2002, p. 6-9; Lu, 2002, p. 64). 
 
Although Lee’s mainstream alliance was in a defensive position after his presidency, 1993 was 
a watershed by which the non-mainstream alliance lost control over the KMT and by which a 
prolonged changing social basis of the state culminated with the hegemony of the LE capitalist 
class. This was because after a prolonged DPP campaign and a rising popular organization 
against Hau Pei-tsun’s continued premiership, the KMT’s mainstream alliance also for the first 
time publicly called for Hau’s resignation, not long after which he resigned (Hughes, 1997; Tien 
& Chu, 1996, p. 82). Hau’s resignation signalled the defeat of the non-mainstream alliance 
while Lee’s historical bloc also ensured that a passive revolution was no longer tenable so that a 
continued elite bureaucratic autonomy quickly eroded. As such, the party was now confined to 
the policy parameters set by Taiwan’s newly forged historical bloc between the LE capitalist 
class and political factions (J.-H. Wang, 1996). Once Lee established control over the KMT, his 
administration quickly secured Taiwan’s full democratization. By 1994 already, Lee succeeded 
at initiating a constitutional reform process which implemented Taiwan’s first 1996 direct 
presidential election in which Lee was also successfully re-elected (H. M. Tien & Y.-H. Chu 
1996, pp. 1151–1152). Although some intra-KMT conflict continued after 1993, this became 
much less intense and Lee was able to further his Taiwanization agenda. This culminated in the 
disbandment of the provincial government of Taiwan by the end of the decade which signalled 
that the ROC’s policy was now subject directly to the mandate of Taiwan’s citizenry.  
 
Because both the mainstream and non-mainstream alliances attempted to widen their respective 
social bases, it is important to account for why the mainstream alliance succeeded at securing 
the support of both political factions and the LE capitalist class. In terms of political factions, 
factional politicians coalesced around Lee largely by default of his islander ethnic background 
and as a natural reaction against prior limitations that factions faced from the mainlander 
dominated elite bureaucracy. As for the LE capitalist class, it is true that it enjoyed conducive 
relations with the elite bureaucracy in the past and from which it secured numerous benefits, 
albeit from a position of subservience. This being so, both the mainstream and non-mainstream 
alliances organized vehemently to gain the backing of the LE capitalist class during the KMT’s 
power struggle (Y.-H. Chu, 1994, pp. 126–127). Ultimately, however, it was Lee’s mainstream 
alliance which secured its support due to a number of factors which included ethnic affinities, 
the desire for democratization (read liberalization) and the more apparent willingness of the 
mainstream alliance to accommodate the needs of capital (Gold, 1996, p. 1104; Lu, 2002, pp. 64–
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65).  
 
Unlike a previously non-hegemonic historical bloc which underpinned Taiwan’s statist social 
order, a newly forged historical bloc did not rely on visibly coercive and disciplinary 
apparatuses of rule to secure its dominance, but instead secured a successful hegemony. Within 
the historical bloc, it was the LE capitalist class which became hegemonic while non-hegemonic 
political factions attained an enormous degree of influence. The reasons for this increased 
factional influence was that Lee reversed the previous policy of constraining factions and 
instead unleashed and empowered them by abolishing both vertical and horizontal controls 
which were previously in place to limit factional growth. As such, factions not only came to 
enjoy unprecedented political and financial resources, but were also granted a central role in 
national level policy making (Y.-Y. Chen, 2007, p. 251; J.-H. Wang, 1996). But, although 
gaining a pronounced national influence, it was the nature of political factions which ensured 
that they did not secure a hegemonic stature. This is because factions had not developed an 
inter-factional interest, competed viciously amongst each other and lacked an awareness of the 
importance of hegemony to secure stable rule. Thus, without concern toward popular perception, 
the modus operandi of factions was for them to insert themselves in the political process to 
capture public resources (J.-H. Wang, 1996, pp. 164–165). This, coupled with the fact that the 
corruption and transparency distorting effects of factional politics impeded even capitalist 
development, ensured that factional politics became the scourge of public anger throughout the 
1990s. This did not, however, seriously impact Lee’s popularity who secured a strong support 
because of his democratizing and Taiwan identity advancing roles (Lu, 2002, pp. 61–66). 
 
That the LE capitalist class became hegemonic in Taiwan’s historical bloc during the 1990s was 
due to a number of reasons. Firstly, unlike political factions, the LE capitalist class was not only 
vested in a wider mode of production, but also possessed a clearly defined class consciousness 
(Gold, 1996, pp. 1103-1104; J.-H. Wang, 1996, p160). Illustrating its influence, the LE capitalist 
class enjoyed close relations with high-level KMT officials, participated in KMT party affairs 
and most importantly, financed ever more costly campaigns in Taiwan’s legislative politics 
(Mcbeath, 1998 p. 317; S. Tang & C. Tang, 1999, pp. 357-358). That LE capitalist influence 
reached the highest echelons of political power was plainly visible in the anecdotal evidence, for 
instance, of various golf groups which developed around key politicians and their LE capitalist 
supporters. Among them were the ‘Teng-hui’ open team which linked President Lee, the 
Dachong team which linked James Soong (Taiwan provincial governor) and Siew Wan-Chang 
(Prime Minister) and the ‘Yung-Lien Association’ which linked Lien Chan (vice president) with 
their key LE capitalist backers (S. Tang & C. Tang, 1999, p. 357). By this time, the borders 
between policy makers and the capitalist class crumbled entirely while the political 
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establishment had to visibly accommodate the dictates of the LE capitalist class to garner its 
continued support (H.-H. Hsiao, 1995). 
 
The most instrumental reason for the LE capitalist class’ capacity to shape Taiwan’s national 
policy was a financial liberalization drive which severed the elite bureaucracy’s continued 
political control over the financial sector. As such, the possibility of a residual political 
autonomy which could genuinely challenge the interests of dominant classes in Taiwan was no 
longer possible due to the loss of a previously enjoyed capital steering and capital disciplining 
capacity. The watershed of Taiwan’s banking liberalization drive occurred in 1991 when based 
on 1989 Banking Law revisions, 15 new private banks which satisfied a 10 billion NTD capital 
requirement were allowed to open (Y.-H. Yang, 2001, p. 354). The influence of private banking 
interests grew consistently thereafter and toward the end of the decade, a total of 47 private 
banks were in operation (Sato, 2002, p. 241). Further financializing Taiwan’s economy, Lee’s 
administration also removed continued limitations on financial sector integration and promoted 
universal banking by permitting banks to engage in activities such as short-term note brokerage 
and in house stock trading (Y.-H. Yang, 2001, p. 359). Furthermore, numerous funding streams 
were now also available to the LE capitalist class through various financial liberalizations such 
as the permission for private enterprises to issue overseas bonds, the establishment of an over 
the counter market and Taiwan’s Futures exchange (Chan & Hu, 2000, pp. 434–438; C.-W. 
Huang, 2011, pp. 220–221). As an outcome, institutional investors increased their ownership of 
Taiwan Stock Exchange listed companies from 6% in 1990 to nearly 25% by 1998 (X. Zhang, 
2009, p. 398). Lee also liberalized Taiwan’s current and capital accounts so that the current 
account was almost completely liberalized toward the end of the 1990s while the capital account 
was still subject to some remaining controls, especially toward foreign investment in Taiwan’s 
stock market (Yu, 1999, p. 299).   
 
Because of the political autonomy dissipating effects of Taiwan’s financial liberalization drive, 
it was a crucial aspect of Lee’s defeat of the KMT’s non-mainstream alliance. This was 
especially clear in terms of the active non-mainstream resistance toward Lee’s banking 
liberalization drive due to his perceived intention of pursuing it to dismantle the elite 
bureaucracy’s continued social, political and economic control. As such, Lee also advanced 
incrementally and first appointed likeminded allies to head various government agencies such as 
the Ministry of Finance which were crucial to the success of banking sector liberalization (Sato, 
2002, p. 241). Of course, the fact that the banking liberalization drive was based on legislative 
revisions meant that the legislature was also important to the liberalization process. This was 
part of a more general trend in which the legislature became ever more central to Taiwan’s 
rapidly democratizing polity and in which, coincidentally, Lee’s factional allies were also most 
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strongly placed (Sato, 2002, pp. 238–239; Y.-S. Wu, 2007, pp. 982-986). In addition, Lee’s 
financial liberalization drive also secured the support of the DPP due to the party’s aim of 
ending the KMT’s one-party rule (C.-W. Huang, 2011, p. 170). 
  
5.1.2: A Short-term Capital Advancing Policy Reorientation  
Although Taiwan’s developmental state dissolved while the LE capitalist class became 
hegemonic, Taiwan’s social order cannot be understood as an abstract-capital advancing 
neoliberal night watchmen state. Rather, Taiwan’s social order was confined within the regional 
features of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class so that it can be better understood as a state supported 
capitalist order with a strong domestic bias which furthered the interests of Taiwan’s LE 
capitalist class (Wang, J.-H. 1996, pp. 131–133). This dynamic is clearly indicated in the case of 
Taiwan’s remaining capital account controls which were aimed at limiting the influence of 
foreign capital in its stock market (Yu, 1999, p. 299). One thing was for sure, however, and that 
was that a strategic national upgrading imperative was no longer feasible because of the 
short-term capital interest advancing features of Taiwan’s historical bloc. Because this was a 
transitional stage for Taiwan’s social order, genuine strategic upgrading imperatives continued, 
at times, to guide the policy thinking of the economic bureaucracy. But, it was also the case that 
such imperatives did not translate toward successful policy implementation due to the fact that 
they challenged short-term capital interests and thus failed to secure the compliance of the LE 
capitalist class.  
 
The financial liberalization drive has already been covered at some depth, but the relational 
dynamic between the rapidly consolidating financial capitalist class and Lee’s bureaucratic 
apparatus has not yet been examined. Firstly, the relationship mirrored wider trends of 
business/government inter-penetration. This can be observed in the case of the chairman of the 
15 newly established private banks in 1991 of which three were former government officials 
and four were former directors of state-owned banks. Also, of the 15 bank chairmen, 11 had 
work experience at some point in state-owned banks (Y.-H. Yang, 2001, p. 353). Although the 
relationship was one of LE capitalist-bureaucratic inter-penetration, the financial capitalist class 
now defined the policy parameters of the economic bureaucracy. This is clearly illustrated in the 
1991 banking sector opening drive in which only 6 licenses were originally to be granted to new 
entrants due to sectorial stability concerns. But, due to intense corporate advocacy and Lee’s 
stated support, the executive branch was eventually forced to issue 15 licenses instead (Sato, 
2002, p. 241). But again, this need not come as a surprise in the context of the increased 
influence of Taiwan’s financial capitalist class. Its influence can, for instance, be observed in 
the case of the previously mentioned Koo group which held a majority stake in China trust and 
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16 billion USD in total assets by 1997 (Green, 1998). By this time, it was the group’s chairman, 
Koo Lian-Song, who sat on the KMT’s Central Committee (Chung, 2008).  
     
An even more illuminating example of the elite bureaucracy’s eroded autonomy and its capital 
servicing nature can be observed in its policy failures and reversals toward the IT sector. To 
return to the semiconductor sector, the economic bureaucracy continued to identify 
technological development imperatives and during this time targeted sub-micron technology for 
development because it was deemed necessary for a viable DRAM industry in Taiwan (M.-P. 
Huang, 2006, pp. 37–38). Initially, the ERSO’s plan called for the ERSO to diffuse the 
developed technology in a characteristic spin-off fashion, but this provoked fierce resistance 
from IC manufacturers who were concerned that such a spin-off would negatively impact their 
interests. Eventually, the ERSO was forced to redraw its plan on the principle of state-private 
sector collaboration so that the developed technology was immediately diffused to existing IC 
producers through various industry organized associations (M.-P. Huang, 2006, p. 36-37). As 
for the spin-off itself, agreement was reached in 1994 that the DRAM specializing Vanguard 
International Semiconductor Corporation (VIS) would be run by 13 already existing high tech 
firms, among which TSMC held the largest ownership share (Tu, 2001, pp. 287–289). 
Furthermore, in response to industry concerns and criticism, the VIS spinoff plan also included 
many strict conditions which stipulated that the new products developed could not compete with 
those of already established firms while the technology also had to be one that current 
manufacturers were not able to develop independently (M.-P. Huang, 2006, p. 46).  
 
The unprecedented private sector advocacy in the most advanced national priority IT sector was 
only a sign of things to come and eventually culminated in the disciplining of the IT 
bureaucracy itself toward accepting its industry-servicing role. This strong policy shaping 
capacity of the IT capitalist class was to be expected because of its increased consolidation and 
influence which is evident in the fact that 4 of Taiwan’s 10 largest firms were IT firms by 1999 
(Fuller, 2002, p. 13). On the more extreme end, some industry leaders such as Acer’s Stan Shih 
argued for the breakup of ITRI with the justification that business conditions no longer 
warranted its existence (Kraemer, 1996, p. 234). Calling for the ITRI’s breakup, however, was 
only a minority position among the IT capitalist class and a majority were concerned mainly 
with protecting their interests in market segments which were already developed. Overall, the IT 
capitalist class stood to gain from the continued existence of ITRI and the continuation of 
Taiwan’s state-supported technology development model which allowed IT firms to 
substantively externalize costs. But, the changing social basis of Taiwan’s state and the LE 
capitalist class’ now hegemonic position necessitated that specialist economic planning agencies 
such as ITRI had to be reoriented toward a more specifically industry servicing role. It is in this 
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context that The Ministry of Economic Affairs budget cut of 200 million NTD and a similar 
Legislative Yuan budget cut toward ITRI in 1993 can be understood (M.-P. Huang, 2006, pp. 
46–47).  
 
Following the re-stabilizing of relations between the economic bureaucracy and the IT sector, 
the ITRI willingly redefined its role in 1994 toward an industry servicing course. As an outcome, 
ITRI was restructured to focus only on more risky areas for IT development in which there was 
not yet a private sector interest and to perform preliminary exploration for industry while all 
commercial activities were to be left to the private sector (M.-P. Huang, 2006, pp. 47–48). As 
such, it is clear that a hierarchical bureaucratic – IT capitalist relationship was a thing of the past 
and that IT sector firms were also no longer responsive to state sponsored technology upgrading 
programs, especially when such programs contradicted their interests. An illuminating example 
of this dynamic is the failure of the IT bureaucracy’s late-1990s ASTRO plan which called for 
the establishment of an IC sector research consortium to research process technology upgrades. 
The reason for the plan’s failure was that the project was not feasible because of the TSMC and 
UMC’s refusal to join due to the ASTRO plan’s primary beneficiaries being less technologically 
sophisticated IC firms (Fuller, 2002, pp. 12–13). But, the extent to which the relationship 
between the elite bureaucracy and the IT capitalist class was antagonistic should also not be 
overstated as ultimately, the bureaucracy continued to service the interests of IT capitalists as a 
whole. Furthermore, planning personnel and IT capitalists also continued to share a common 
perspective due to the high personnel overflow between the two in which approximately 40% of 
Hsinchu Science Park firm managers, for instance, had work experience at the ITRI (M.-P. 
Huang, 2006, p. 44). As such, although some disciplinary processes defined the ITRI’s 
re-orientation toward an industry servicing path, this reorientation was a primarily voluntary and 
organic process.  
 
The cessation of a long-term development plan ensured that a strategic industrial upgrading no 
longer defined Taiwan’s economic development. This, coupled, with a much more directly 
capital defined social order and an increased capital flight, ensured that Taiwan’s economic 
development became less welfare enhancing than it was during the statist era. As an outcome, 
Taiwan’s unemployment rate almost doubled from 1.7% to 3.2% between 1990 and 2000 (Kong, 
2005, p. 176). Rather than only affecting the blue collar labour force, Taiwan’s declining 
socio-economic environment affected the interests of the labouring class as a whole by further 
increasing the bargaining power of the capitalist class to set labour conditions. One direct 
outcome of this was that real wages began to decline from 1994 onward despite continued 
annual labour productivity growth rates which measured at double the wage growth rate 
(Coolloud, 2012). At a more general level, Taiwan’s society also became more unequal as 
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evident in the growth of the income differential between the lowest 20% and highest 20% of 
families which increased from 4.21 in 1981 to 5.51 in 1998 (Lue, 2009, pp. 29–30). 
Additionally, Taiwan’s increased inequality also contained a spatial pattern in which the 
northern population surrounding the Taipei metropolitan area participated in a predominantly 
commercial, service and IT based job market. The southern population, on the other hand, 
tended to participate in a more agricultural, labour intensive and SME based job market (Y.-Y. 
Chen, 2007, pp. 227–228).  
  
By now, not only is it clear that Taiwan’s democratization and the intra-KMT power struggle 
was a culmination of a prolonged process of a changing social basis of Taiwan’s state, but that a 
newly forged historical bloc also secured a successful hegemony. As such, the newly hegemonic 
LE capitalist class successfully shaped the parameters of Taiwan’s social order while a previous 
political autonomy secured on a basis of passive revolution dissolved. Reflective of this, 
Taiwan’s social order now specifically advanced the short-term interests of capital which also, 
for the first time, correlated with a more visible social welfare decline.  
 
Section 5.2: Legitimating a Capital-advancing Social Order   
The capital advancing features of Taiwan’s social order and the marked deterioration of its 
collective social welfare should have been a fertile ground for an increased social contestation. 
But, although contestation did occur, Taiwan’s historical bloc secured an unchallenged 
hegemony among the citizenry while also impeding Taiwan’s social movements from 
developing into a viable counter historical bloc. Many factors influenced this and central to 
which was the rise of a Taiwan identity politics which can be theorized as a central component 
of the historical bloc’s hegemonic narrative. In order to understand how Taiwan’s identity 
politics pacified a class politics, it is necessary to first examine how it was that an identity 
politics became so central in Taiwan and also to account for the discursive features thereof. It is 
only after doing so that it is possible to examine how an identity politics led to a strengthening 
of Taiwan’s LE capitalist hegemony and how it became a tool of political legitimation.  
  
5.2.1: Social Contestation  
Because of a deteriorating socio-economic environment and its disproportionate effects on 
Taiwan’s labouring class, Taiwan’s labour movement should have gained a centrality among 
social movements during this time. This was especially so because blue-collar workers were 
Taiwan’s largest class during the 1990s, measuring at a total of 40.3% of the working 
population. Furthermore, a previous class fluidity also now increasingly gave way toward a 
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more static class composition while a previous phenomenon of multiple class spanning 
households was now also increasingly replaced by single class households (H.-H Hsiao, 2001, 
pp. 164–166). Taiwan’s labour movement remained active during this time as can be seen in the 
number of strikes which increased from 1878 in 1993 to 2600 in 1997 (Y.-Y. Chen, 2007, p. 
231). Taiwan’s labour movement was particularly active in targeting the state due to its central 
role in legitimizing, enforcing and perpetuating Taiwan’s capital defined production 
environment (C.-H. Huang, 2002b, p. 23). This was especially evident in the centrality of a 
union autonomy agenda which was aimed at facilitating the breaking away of member unions 
from the state-controlled CFL. The DPP, with which Taiwan’s labour movement remained 
closely allied, offered crucial support and 7 of the 8 counties and cities in which independent 
city/county labour unions formed were administered by DPP city/county governments. Even in 
the only exception of Kaohsiung which was administered by a KMT city government, it was the 
DPP controlled city parliament which forced its mayor to recognize Kaohsiung’s breakaway 
union through the threat of freezing the city’s budget (C.-L. Huang, 2002, pp. 316–317). In 
addition to successes at forming local city/county labour unions, Taiwan’s labour movement 
also succeeded at forming national-level labour organizations such as the Taiwan Labour Front 
(TLF) in 1992 and unions such as the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU) in 1999 
and which was officially recognized only in 2000 (C.-L. Huang, 2002, p. 317; Rice, 2006, p. 
169). 
 
Despite having attained some increased organizational autonomy, Taiwan’s labour movement 
did not succeed in altering the parameters of the political economy of labour. Not only did the 
overall environment for labour organization remain restrictive, but overtly political strikes also 
remained illegal while union leadership tended to be cautious and moderate. Furthermore, union 
membership itself peaked at 29% of the total labour force in 1993 and dropped to 21.2% in 
1998 (Buchanan & Nicholls, 2003, p. 228-229). This number is also misleading, however, as 
most of Taiwan’s union membership was accounted for by occupational unions which 
continued to function as government sponsored labour associations that provided health and 
labour insurance for its membership (C.-L. Huang, 2002, pp. 313–314). Even among 
non-occupational, industrial unions, there tended to be a considerable degree of uncertainty 
among the union membership toward the function of unions and the progressive potential that 
unions entailed. Such outcomes were partially a carryover of Taiwan’s previous corporatist 
labour regime so that many unions continued to serve the primary role of providing a social 
avenue for bonding or entertainment (J.-J. Chu, 2001, pp. 445–446). Therefore, even when 
labour unions advocated the interests of their membership, they tended to do so in a more 
self-serving and insular fashion while a majority of labourers continued to be excluded from 
union membership. As such, a progressive labour movement remained weak and even though 
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the explicitly labour advancing Labor Party (1987) and Workers Party (1989) were formed 
during this time, both failed to generate sufficient support to attain a political relevance (Y.-W. 
Chu, 1996, p. 508). As such, it is not surprising that collective bargaining was virtually 
non-existent as a factor determining wages (Buchanan & Nicholls, 2003, p. 230).  
 
During Taiwan’s democratic transition, the labour movement continued to be one among many 
active social movements. But, as a whole, Taiwan’s social movements failed to constrain 
President Lee’s capital advancing policy parameter. One reason for this was that already at the 
immediate onset of Lee’s presidency, Taiwan’s LE capitalist class leveraged its influence over 
the democratizing state apparatus to repress Taiwan’s social movements. This was evident in a 
4
th
 of July Economic Daily op-ed piece titled ‘the anger of the capitalist’ signed by a number of 
influential LE capitalists such as Formosa Plastic’s Wang Yung-ching and Acer’s Stan Shih. 
The signatories argued that Taiwan’s labour and environmental contestation threatened the 
survival of enterprises and they urged the government to quell it. To pressure the government to 
do so, the signatories stated that they would only support Legislative Yuan candidates in 1989 
elections who were able to create a healthy investment climate (Y.-W. Chu, 1996, pp. 507–508; 
K.-L. Hsu, 2002, pp. 272–273). In addition, Wang also threatened an investment strike by which 
Formosa Plastic would halt all planned investment and personnel expansions in Taiwan to 
signal its discontent to the government (C.-L. Huang, 2002, p. 308).  In response, both 
President Lee and Premier Hao indicated their agreement and stated famously that ‘the 
government’s task was to make money for capitalists.’ To signal its pro-capital policy course, 
Lee’s administration announced that it was determined to promote the controversial 5th and 6th 
petrochemical plants and to forge ahead with the building of Taiwan’s fourth nuclear plant, 
initiatives which were vehemently opposed by Taiwan’s environmental movement, the most 
influential and well-organized of Taiwan’s social movements. In a symbolic move, the 
government also deported long-time Irish missionary and labour activist, Neil Magill (K.-L. Hsu, 
2002, p. 287-288; C.-L. Huang, 2002, p. 308). 
 
5.2.2 The Rise of a Taiwan Identity Politics 
Although the state’s disciplinary and institutional apparatus confined Taiwan’s social 
movements, the inability of movements to shape the policy parameter is due primarily to the 
failure of developing a coherent progressive agenda which could resonate with the wider 
citizenry. This is counter-intuitive not only because of social welfare declines during this time, 
but also because of Taiwan’s successful democratization which should have meant that social 
movements could have organized on the basis of a class politics. But, an increased centrality of 
a Taiwan identity politics impeded this because of its fracturing effect on the development of a 
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coherent social movement agenda and its diverting effect on the citizenry from a more class or 
issues-based political discourse.  
 
The rise of Taiwan’s identity politics was in no way pre-determined, but was rather a latent 
possibility which relied on interested parties to articulate it before it could gain a discursive 
primacy. The reason for the latency of an identity politics is that a nativist current always 
remained present in Taiwan, but it was subdued by the KMT’s authoritarian rule. For one, it was 
impossible for the scale of the KMT’s 228 killings not to have solidified a them versus us 
mentality within large swaths of the islander population and which remained particularly cogent 
due to the incident’s unresolved and festering nature (M.-C. Lo, 1994). The KMT’s ethnic rule 
strengthened this cleavage further due to its continued culturally discriminatory rule which can 
be seen in its banning of the Min Nan dialect in public domains such as primary and secondary 
schools and television and radio programs (Minns & Tierney, 2003, p. 108). Additionally, the 
KMT’s ethnic policies also led to an exaggerated ethnic cleavage to develop in Taiwan through 
its practice of registering citizens according to their father’s place of birth. As an outcome, an 
inflated 13% of the population were registered as mainlanders despite only 5.7% having been 
born in China (Hughes, 1997, p. 96). Combined, such features of the elite bureaucracy’s rule 
ensured that ethnic emotions remained strong in Taiwan and could be easily re-articulated by 
conscious political actors.  
 
Despite Lee’s instrumental role in re-articulating a Taiwan nationalist agenda, he was unable to 
do so during his early office. As such, it was the DPP that was most crucial to first advancing a 
Taiwan nationalist agenda while Lee steadily secured the viable institutional foundations on 
which it could become manifest. From the onset of his presidency, Lee manoeuvred to secure an 
increased political operating space for a de jure independent ROC government. To secure a 
pretext for the ROC’s continued autonomy over Taiwan, Lee already acknowledged in 1989 that 
China was ruled by the CCP under a separate PRC government. But, to secure the necessary 
support from unificationists within the KMT, Lee also set up the National Unification 
Guidelines and the National Unification Council which committed Taiwan toward an eventual 
unification with China (Hughes, 1997, pp. 66-69). During this time, Lee publicly voiced his 
support for increased economic integration across the Strait and stated in 1992 that a Chinese 
people in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China were in the process of establishing an inter-dependent 
regional trade relationship which would ‘improve the lives of the whole body of the Chinese 
race’ (Hughes, 1997, p. 112). Because of the CCP’s denial of Taiwan’s sovereignty and its 
refusal to engage with official ROC state organs, Lee also set up important semi-private entities 
such as the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) to negotiate with its Chinese counterpart, the 
Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) (Chao & Dickson, 2002, p. 10).  
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Lee’s Cross-Strait strategy was shaped by the overall parameters within which his 
administration operated and for which he first had to secure the political space necessary to 
pursue a more pronounced Taiwan nationalist agenda. Despite Lee’s apparent commitment 
toward Taiwan’s eventual unification with China, he also advanced its effective autonomy at the 
same time by ensuring that his stated commitment toward unification was long-term in nature. 
The National Unification Guidelines which framed Lee’s overall China policy, for instance, 
stipulated that although unification was an eventual goal, that there had to be a number of 
conditions which China first had to meet before that time. Such preconditions included the call 
for a gradual implementation of rule of law, democratic governance, the development of free 
market capitalism and the attainment on China of Taiwan standard socio-economic development 
(Hughes, 1997, pp. 66–67; Roy, 2003, p. 213). As Lee consolidated his control within the KMT, 
the prospect of unification was pushed back even further as the official narrative on Taiwan 
began to increasingly stress the independent sovereignty of the ROC as subject to the popular 
mandate of Taiwan’s citizenry. In other words Lee aimed to facilitate a transformation of the 
‘old Republic of China into the ROC on Taiwan’ (Kaeding, 2009, p. 24). As such, an autonomy 
strengthening policy was quickly pursued in which the ROC sought membership in a wide 
plethora of international organizations such as the UN and its affiliated agencies (C.-W. Lin, 
2004, pp. 187-188; Kaeding, 2009, p. 6). In addition to advancing Taiwan’s official autonomy, 
Lee’s political strategy also allowed for a further Taiwanization which could be framed in 
relation to Chinese opposition and belligerence (T.-J. Cheng & Lin, 1999, pp. 250–251). 
  
In terms of forging a specific Taiwanese identity, Lee’s administration only began to do so after 
the mainstream alliance won an effective and decisive control over the KMT. Lee’s charisma 
and stature as Taiwan’s first islander president allowed him to play a central role in influencing 
and shaping the identity conceptions of Taiwan’s citizenry. As such, Lee’s administration was 
highly successful at propagating a Taiwan identity narrative which presented islanders and their 
native culture as having been continually exploited by outside forces which included mainland 
China. In response to such encroachment, Lee emphasized the need for the Taiwanese to 
develop a living community based territorial identity which was centred on a Taiwanese polity 
and an identification of the populace with their lived experiences in Taiwan, not an association 
with an alien Chinese experience. By 1995, Lee propounded this stance much more forcefully 
and stated that the country needed to develop a culture in which the land was loved and 
identified with by all (Hughes, 1997, pp. 97–100). To attain such a distinctly Taiwanese identity, 
the cultural policy of the state was reoriented to emphasize Taiwan’s history and cultural 
experience (Chao & Dickson, 2002, p. 5). Eventually, Lee’s indigenization policies crystallized 
around the ‘New Taiwanese’ concept in which a Taiwan sized polity based on a Taiwanese 
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identity was said to be coming to the fore and which all citizens could attain provided they 
embraced this identity. As such, the state now played an incubator type role toward the 
realization of a Taiwan sized polity (Kaeding, 2009; Y.-H. Chu & J.-W. Lin, 2001, p. 103). 
 
The solidification of a separable and pronounced Taiwan identity would have been much more 
difficult to attain had it not been for the complicit role of the CCP as the ‘hostile other’ toward 
which a distinct Taiwan identity formed much more easily. Prior to 1995, aside from issuing 
verbal warnings toward a ‘creeping Taiwanization’ and blocking Taiwan’s initiatives at gaining 
diplomatic recognition, the CCP refrained from directly hostile actions and focused primarily on 
strengthening CSEI between Taiwan and China. But, this quickly changed after Lee’s 1995 visit 
to Cornell University which the CCP perceived as provocative due to its apparent signalling of 
Taiwan’s independent sovereignty and statehood. Identifying Lee as China’s chief opponent, the 
CCP engaged in a series of missile tests across the Strait in order to send a clear message to 
Taiwan’s citizens not to vote for Lee in the 1996 presidential election (Hughes, 1997, pp. 91–
93). This incident was significant both on an external and an internal level. Externally, it 
illustrated the parameters of the triangular relationship which secured a continued status quo 
across the Strait. The US, which viewed any non-peaceful resolution to cross-straits affairs with 
‘grave concern’, quickly sent two aircraft carriers to signal that it would intervene if status quo 
conditions were disrupted unilaterally and in response to which the CCP toned down its 
belligerent stance (Roy, 2003, p. 200).  
 
In addition to its Taiwan identity solidifying effect, the 1996 missile crisis was also instrumental 
to Lee’s visible intensification of a political Taiwan nationalist agenda during his second term in 
office. This was largely an outcome of the enabling role of China’s missile tests which enabled 
Lee to wage a highly nationalistic election campaign in which he won 54% of the total vote due 
to a predictable ‘rally around the leader’ effect. Coupled with the DPP’s Peng Ming-min 
winning 21% of the vote, this signals that a majority of Taiwan’s citizens adopted a much more 
pronounced Taiwan identity by this time, albeit a measured one in which a majority also 
continued to favour the Cross-Strait status quo (T. -J. Cheng & Lin, 1999, pp. 250-251). Based 
on Lee’s nationalistic campaign, his administration not only framed China as a hostile other and 
existential threat, but also attempted to constrain a deepening process of CSEI between Taiwan 
and China. Lee’s intensified anti-China policy parameter finally culminated in his 1999 ‘special 
state-to-state’ relationship statement in which he declared that Taiwan and China relations 
should be conducted on a state-to-state basis (Chao & Dickson, 2002, p. 11). This time, Lee was 
prepared to amend the ROC constitution to inscribe such a change unambiguously, an act that 
would have amounted to a break from the status-quo. But, learning from its errors during the 
1996 missile crisis, the CCP relied on America’s role as guarantor of the status quo to subdue 
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Lee in his plans (Roy, 2003, p. 221). Regardless of the continued Cross-Strait status quo, it was 
clear that a Taiwan identity politics now became the central and defining issue within Taiwan’s 
political discourse.  
 
5.2.3 Taiwan Nationalism and Social Order Legitimation  
Although the rise of a Taiwan identity politics did not completely supersede a more tangible, 
issues-based political discourse, it did ensured that non-identity issues receded in their relative 
degree of importance while also diluting a distinct class agenda from developing among 
Taiwan’s social movements. As argued already, the coherence of Taiwan’s social movements 
was diluted significantly due to their convergence with a nativist democratization movement 
toward a unified Tangwai movement. Following Taiwan’s democratization, a nativist 
component quickly developed into a fully-fledged nationalist agenda and filled an immediate 
discursive vacuum due to the attainment of the Tangwai’s primary goal of political 
liberalization.  
  
The centrality of an identity agenda among Taiwan’s social movements was particularly 
pronounced because of the close relationship between social movements and the DPP. Due to 
the multiplicity of agendas within the DPP, it remained a possibility that it could have defined 
itself as a progressive and left of centre political party. But, the party leadership opted instead in 
1991 to inscribe a Taiwan Independence Clause into the party constitution which stipulated that 
the DPP’s central political goal was to establish an independent state in Taiwan (T.-J. Cheng & 
Hsu, 1996). For the time being, the DPP continued to maintain elements of a progressive 
political agenda because a sole Taiwan nationalist position was still insufficient for electoral 
advancement during the 1990s. This was especially so in the context of Lee’s pursuit of a 
largely identical Taiwan identity agenda which Taiwan independence supporters could tactically 
align with, but which also attracted more moderate Taiwan identity supporters who favoured a 
continuation of the status quo. Such a two pronged electoral strategy was unavoidable because 
even as late as 2000, Taiwan’s voters still predominantly supported the status quo (46.1%) 
while unification (32.4%) and independence (21.5%) supporters remained a political minority 
(F.-S. Hsieh, 2004, p. 484). Furthermore, because a significant degree of the public’s attention 
was also focused on issues such as social welfare and clean governance, the DPP’s two-pronged 
strategy proved to be a sensible strategic choice (Kau, 1996, p. 301). As such, the party 
succeeded at winning an average 29 to 33% of the popular vote in Legislative Yuan elections 
throughout the 1990s (F.-S. Hsieh, 2004, p. 484).   
  
Despite its continued adherence to a progressive political agenda, the tendency of social 
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movements to ally with and rely on the DPP to advance a progressive political cause, 
nevertheless, had a pronounced agenda and coherence diluting effect. This was especially so 
because the DPP became progressively more homogenized as a Taiwan nationalist party in the 
1990s so that Taiwan nationalism increasingly became the first instance variable on which the 
party’s rank and file could be organized. Some social movement supporters were uncomfortable 
with the increased centrality of the DPP’s Taiwan nationalist agenda and broke away from the 
party (T.-J. Cheng & Hsu, 1996). But, a majority tended to maintain their close alliance with the 
DPP or to enter the party directly because they either shared a similar Taiwan nationalist 
proclivity or because of more pragmatic political calculations. The increased centrality of a 
Taiwan nationalist politics among social movements, however, ensured that a distinct 
progressive political agenda was now diluted significantly. As such, Taiwan identity cleavages 
also became increasingly pronounced among social movements. This was particularly evident 
among labour organizations in which distinct cleavages developed between Chinese nationalist 
and Taiwan nationalist groups which will be explored at more depth in the following chapters. 
  
Coupled with its diluting effect on social movements, the rise of a Taiwan identity politics also 
led to its establishment politics to become relatively less receptive to non-identity issues. This 
was because identity perception cleavages became more central toward dividing partisan 
politics between a Taiwan nationalist and Chinese nationalist binary. As such, even though a 
majority of Taiwan’s voters were stability minded and supported a continued status quo, they 
still tended to veer in either a more independent or unification supporting direction. It was 
primarily because of the increased centrality of an identity politics, for instance, that Lee 
maintained his popularity by becoming a figurehead and symbol for the Taiwan nationalist 
movement. Many of Lee’s supporters perceived him to be an infallible hero who could do no 
wrong and who selflessly dedicated himself to Taiwan’s interests. Lee himself had a role to play 
in this narrative through his self-identification as being intrinsically Taiwanese and as being in 
tune with the pain and humiliation of Taiwan’s citizens. At times, Lee even identified himself as 
Taiwan’s Moses who was leading his people away from bondage (Moody, 2002, p. 40). Because 
of the emotive nature of Taiwan identity politics, many of Lee’s supporters also tended to 
perceive his Chinese nationalist opponents as anti-Taiwanese conspirators who attempted to 
subvert Taiwan’s sovereignty (Lu, 2002, p. 61). As for Chinese nationalists, on the other hand, 
most perceived Lee to be a corrupt and unethical politician whose promotion of a Taiwan 
identity was a betrayal of Chiang Ching Kuo’s legacy (Lu, 2002, pp. 61-63). During this time, 
Taiwan’s identity cleavage also developed an increased spatial pattern in which Northern 
Taiwan, due to its higher percentage of mainlanders, developed a more China-friendly identity 
pattern while the South developed a stronger Taiwanese identity pattern (Y.-Y. Chen, 2007, p. 
231).  
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Although the interests between Taiwan’s hegemonic historical bloc and non-hegemonic classes 
clashed, a combination of institutional and ideational processes ensured that the Cross-Strait 
historical bloc’s hegemony was secured. As demonstrated thus far, central to this hegemony was 
the rise of a Taiwan identity politics which had a fracturing effect on social movements and an 
increasingly diverting effects on the citizenry from an issues-based political discourse. Thus, at 
a more general level, Taiwan’s hegemonic narrative clearly mirrors Wang Jenn-hwan’s 
understanding of it as a composite of both a populist nationalism and a naturalized and 
un-reflexive support for capitalism and the interests of the LE capitalist class (J.-H. Wang, 
1996).  
 
Section 5.3: CSEI and the Cross-Strait Historical Bloc 
Although promoting a capital-friendly agenda on all fronts, there was one exception to this, 
namely the increased CSEI process which intensified from the late 1980s onward. Due to Lee’s 
ideological anti-China stance, his administration attempted to curtail CSEI, but it failed 
miserably in doing so because of the mistaken assumption that Taiwan’s fully cemented 
historical bloc would remain responsive to a state-led circumvention policy. It is true that the 
KMT still controlled many resources, but such resources were meaningless toward an LE 
capitalist class that was no longer subject to the state’s dirigisme. As such, not only did CSEI 
continue, but Lee’s administration faced the additional challenge of a Cross-Strait historical 
bloc which came into operation during this time and which secured a powerful capacity to shape 
Taiwan’s social order.  
  
CSEI began meaningfully from the late 1980s onward when Taiwan’s capitalist class began to 
experience a tremendous pull toward investing in and setting up production bases in China. This 
was driven largely by Taiwan’s appreciating currency, rising labour costs and the increased 
social contestation which took hold during this time. In the context of a predominantly 
sub-contracting based economic composition, Taiwan’s China-bound investment drive was 
aimed primarily at securing lower production costs (in terms of labour, land, utility, regulatory 
costs and so forth), but also the supplying of China’s domestic market (T.-J. Chen, 2003, p. 85; 
H.-H. Hsiao, 2001, pp. 189–190). The CCP further amplified this pull by courting Taiwan’s 
capitalist class to invest in China. This can be traced to the CCP’s 1979 ‘Temporary Regulations 
Opening Trade with Taiwan’ statement which asserted that Cross-Strait trade was a special form 
of trade that would ‘create conditions for the unification of the motherland’ (Roy, 2004, p. 1). 
To draw in Taiwan’s investment, the CCP also enacted stipulations such as its 1988 ‘Regulation 
for the Encouragement of Investment by Taiwanese Compatriots’ which implemented 22 
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measures to encourage Taiwanese investment in China. The measures not only extended to 
Taiwanese investors all special treatments enjoyed by Northern investors, but also added some 
additional ones (C.-H. Huang, 2002b, pp. 9-10).  
 
In addition to general incentives to win the favour of Taiwanese capitalists investing in China, 
or taishang, the CCP also set up a network of agencies and dedicated government bodies 
charged with building relations and supporting taishang interests in China. Such support 
occurred both in terms of the specifics of particular investment projects, but also policy level 
support (Meer, 2006). Taishang, due to both their political and economic importance, have been 
offered VIP treatment in China during this time, securing generous tax breaks as well as 
dedicated local level government provision of requested services such as the building of roads, 
provision of land and so forth (Cavey, 2003, p. 19; A. T. Cheng, 2001; Hammond-chambers, 
2002, p. 5). As such, two-way trade increased rapidly from 1.5 billion to 22.5 billion USD 
between 1985 and 1995. Taiwanese FDI in China by 1996, on the other hand, was estimated to 
have measured anywhere between the 6.1 billion USD measured in more conservative 
Taiwanese statistics and the 24.3 billion USD measure in Chinese statistics (Hughes, 1997, pp. 
109–110; T. Y. Wang, 2002, p. 132).  
 
Because the CCP’s Cross-Strait strategy was so successful, it could finally be considered as an 
external participant in Taiwan’s historical bloc by the early to mid-1990s. Although the CCP 
prised Taiwanese investment on economic terms due to the still more advanced features of 
Taiwanese capital during this time, this was also coupled with the CCP’s policy aim of shaping 
Taiwan’s social order. This can be clearly observed in the CCP’s United Front policy 
framework (used not only toward Taiwan, but also toward Hong Kong) which calls for the 
active courting and building of rapport between the CCP and China-friendly social forces in 
Taiwan (van Kemenade, 2001, p. 61). The central aim of the United Front policy was the 
formation of an alliance with Taiwan’s LE capitalist class to foster Taiwan’s economic 
dependence on China and to constrain the autonomy of its state apparatus vis-à-vis China (Bolt, 
2001). The reasoning for the CCP’s identification of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class as central to 
its alliance formation process was its hegemonic role in Taiwan. This was a sensible strategy 
because the LE capitalist class’ hegemonic stature ensured it a strong degree of influence toward 
circulating hegemonic narratives and to influence election outcomes (Kuo, 2000, p. 97). Due to 
its socio-political dominance, the CCP also correctly identified Taiwan’s LE capitalist class as 
possessing the capacity to constrain Taiwan’s political parties toward a CSEI-conducive policy 
path, a strategy which furthered the CCP’s long-term policy interest of securing Taiwan’s 
eventual unification without the necessity of military force.  
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Lee viewed Taiwan’s increased economic dependence on China and the ever closer relationship 
between the CCP and Taiwan’s LE capitalist class developments with great alarm and was 
convinced of the need to re-establish the state’s regulatory control over CSEI. Publicly, such a 
policy course was justified both in terms of the political risks that CSEI posed for Taiwan’s 
political sovereignty, but also because of the need to contain the hollowing out of Taiwan’s 
more advanced economic sectors to China which risked undermining its competitiveness and 
which could strengthen a hostile enemy (Y.-Y. Chen, 2007, p. 200; Kastner, 2005, p. 11). Thus, 
already by 1993-1994, Lee’s administration began to implement an attempted ‘go south’ policy 
which encouraged Taiwanese business to invest and outsource their business operations instead 
to ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia (Dent, 2005, p. 401).  Following the 1996 
missile crisis, Lee escalated this policy by initiating the ‘no haste, be patient’ policy framework 
which further limited China-bound investment. This, for instance, prohibited investments 
measuring at 50 million USD and above while also implementing blanket investment bans in IC 
and other key high-tech sectors while offending parties were liable to fines and prison terms 
(Landler, 2001). At the same time, Lee tried to ease business animosity through his continued 
pursuit of capital friendly policies in Taiwan and his opening of lucrative investment 
opportunities. One example of such a compensation type policy was the High Speed Rail system 
project in which private sector interests were allowed to take the lead while they were also 
granted immense leeway in land development opportunities around planned stations (J.-Y. Hsu, 
2011, p. 613). 
  
Excluding a limited number of highly visible investment reversals, it is widely perceived that 
Lee’s ‘no haste, be patient’ policy framework was a resounding failure. Most Taiwanese firms 
could easily circumvent existing constraints by channelling China-bound investment through 
third party destinations such as Hong Kong or the Cayman Islands. Ironically, the ease by which 
‘no haste’ restrictions could be skirted was a direct outcome of the financial liberalization drive 
which President Lee supported (Y.-Y. Chen, 2007, p. 205). According to Taiwanese statistics, 
mainland investment between January and September 1997 alone amounted to a total of 3.23 
billion USD as compared to the pre ‘no haste’ 1995 investment total of 2.93 billion USD (Green, 
1998). By 2000, it is estimated that 40000 Taiwanese companies had operations in China while 
total cumulative investment was estimated at ranging between 45 Billion to 60 billion US 
dollars, between 40 and 50% of Taiwan’s total FDI (Dent, 2005, p. 399-400). In addition, the 
government’s aim of limiting technological outflow also failed to halt the trend toward an 
increased electronics and IT sector investment in China which was measured as having 
increased from 20% to 60% of the total China-bound investment between 1997 and 2000 (Sutter, 
2002, p. 529-530). Thus, although Lee continued to pursue his ‘no haste’ policy, the fact that 
capital could circumvent it so easily helps to explain why, despite pronounced public advocacy 
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toward CSEI liberalization by firms such as Formosa Plastic and TSMC (T. Y. Wang, 2002, p. 
134), there never did occur a head on collision between the LE capitalist class and Lee. 
   
The ease by which capital could operate in such blatant contradiction to the government’s policy 
dictates clearly illustrates the state’s dwindling autonomy vis-à-vis the interests of Taiwan’s 
hegemonic LE capitalist class. But because the policy was unenforceable, the LE capitalist class 
proceeded to intensify CSEI for the time being while continuing to offer its support to Lee 
Teng-hui’s otherwise capital advancing administration.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined how a prolonged changing social basis of Taiwan’s state culminated 
in the dissolution of its soft statist social order and its transformation into an LE capital 
advancing social order. I argued that this occurred in the context of a hegemonic LE capitalist 
class-forged historical bloc which aided President Lee’s reformist alliance to secure control over 
the KMT and Taiwan’s state. After this, I argued that President Lee’s policy became confined 
toward advancing the short-term interests of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class. I then examined how 
the historical bloc secured its hegemony among Taiwan’s citizenry and argued that a rising 
Taiwan identity politics was crucial to this process and that it was a core component of 
Taiwan’s hegemonic narrative. This, I argued, was because a Taiwan identity politics fractured 
a possible class agenda from developing among social movements while also increasingly 
diverting the citizenry’s attention from class issues toward identity issues. As an outcome, it 
was much easier for President Lee to secure a necessary electoral support on the basis of 
identity affinities while also not facing serious electoral constraints to moderate his 
capital-advancing policy course. The only exception to this dynamic, I argued, was a rapidly 
intensifying CSEI which President Lee attempted to constrain. But, I argued that this ended in 
utter failure and was indicative of the hegemonic stature of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class. Even 
more importantly, I argued that Taiwan’s LE capitalist class now became incorporated into a 
Cross-Strait historical bloc with the CCP which jointly advanced to intensify CSEI. Although 
the CCP’s long term policy goal was guided by its aim of securing a capacity to shape Taiwan’s 
social order through its LE capitalist class, I argued that its immediate policy goal of securing an 
intensified CSEI harmonized with the economic interests of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class. 
Because the Cross-Strait historical blocs’ short term aim of an intensified CSEI was unimpeded, 
I argued that it did not withdraw its support from the otherwise capital advancing Lee Teng-hui 
administration.  
 
Combined, this chapter’s analysis demonstrates not only that Taiwan’s statist social order 
dissolved during Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, but also that Taiwan’s state was now confined 
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within the policy parameters arising from a Cross-Strait historical bloc. As such, it is clear that 
the CSEI process cannot be understood in a relational sense as occurring between two separate 
states, but rather should be understood in terms of the social basis of Taiwan’s state which the 
CCP has secured a clear capacity to shape. Because the Cross-Strait historical bloc was forged 
between a contender state managing elite bureaucratic class and Taiwan’s LE capitalist class, 
my analysis suggests that CSEI can only be theorized with a specific emphasis on class and 
social order. In terms of legitimization processes, my argument also suggests that Taiwan’s 
national identity politics was central to the hegemony of the Cross-Strait historical bloc. By 
incorporating a Taiwan identity politics as a core component of Taiwan’s hegemonic narrative, I 
have demonstrated both its centrality to political legitimation processes and its causal role 
toward enabling the wide acceptance among Taiwan’s citizenry of the economistic core of its 
hegemonic narrative. In Taiwan’s case, it is clear that the relationship between an identity 
politics and class politics was zero-sum in nature. As such, provided an identity politics 
remained central to Taiwan’s politics, the historical bloc’s hegemony would also remain stable. 
Thus far, I have examined how President Lee’s administration reluctantly tolerated CSEI 
because of his powerlessness to stop it. But, because of the Cross-Strait historical bloc’s 
hegemonic stature, it was only a matter of time before it advanced to alter the state’s CSEI 
policies toward a more enabling path, a process which I will examine in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 6: Taiwan Nationalism and the Cross-Strait Historical Bloc 
 
In the preceding chapter, I argued that Taiwan’s statist order dissolved during Lee Teng-hui’s 
presidency because a Cross-Strait historical bloc became hegemonic which was evident in Lee’s 
failure to constrain a deepened CSEI. In this chapter, I examine how the Cross-Strait historical 
bloc advanced to secure a substantive lifting of existing CSEI constraints and how paradoxically, 
this occurred under a self-professed Taiwan nationalist DPP administration. In many ways, this 
is hardly surprising due to the hegemonic stature of the Cross-Strait historical bloc and the 
DPP’s much more tenuous political position. But, rather than being pressured to adopt a capital 
friendly policy course, I argue that the DPP proactively courted the LE capitalist class from the 
onset of its rule while it also successfully dissociated itself from and co-opted its previous social 
movement allies. It is within this context that I argue that the DPP’s enabling role toward lifting 
CSEI restrictions can be understood. My analysis suggests that rather than Taiwan’s state 
internationalizing toward a transnational level as proponents of global capitalist convergence 
would assume, that its internationalization has occurred more regionally and primarily toward 
China. Furthermore, my analysis also suggests that the degree to which the internationalization 
of the state tilts regionally or transnationally can be better accounted for by a narrowing of 
hegemonic class categories beyond common abstractions such as the transnational capitalist 
class. In the case of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class, I argue that its predominantly sub-contracting 
nature and the fact that its immediate economic interests were based in China have led it to 
come under the orbit of China’s contender state-managing CCP. 
  
Accounting only for class and alliance formation is also not sufficient to explain the vicissitudes 
of the CSEI trajectory during the DPP’s rule. This is especially so in the context of Taiwan’s 
worsening socio-economic malaise which raises the question why there had not been a more 
concerted contestation against the DPP’s capital advancing domestic and CSEI policies. To 
account for this, I continue to examine the pacifying and diverting effects of Taiwan’s national 
identity politics. In the context of the DPP’s pro-capital reorientation, I argue that the party 
leadership rebranded the party on solely Taiwan nationalist terms while relying on a highly 
emotive Taiwan identity discourse to do so. This, coupled with the KMT’s increasing embrace 
of a China-friendly orientation, led to identity perceptions taking the centre stage toward 
defining voter orientation during this time. As an outcome, I argue that more tangible issues of 
class and economic organization were almost entirely side-lined while the DPP’s Taiwan 
nationalist supporters also did not significantly constrain the party’s CSEI policies which were 
legitimated on the basis of economic necessity. But, as I argue toward the end of this chapter, 
despite the DPP’s CSEI enabling role, the CCP eventually succeeded to wield its influence over 
Taiwan’s LE capitalist class to secure the DPP’s electoral defeat in 2008. Central to this was the 
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development of a successful economic narrative designed to appeal to Taiwan’s centrist vote 
bloc which blamed Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise on continued DPP CSEI restrictions. This 
suggests that in addition to specifically economic ideational legitimation processes, that cultural 
and identity processes can have a similarly powerful role within hegemonic narratives. This, as 
my analysis will show, was so powerful that it side-lined the citizenry’s attention from 
economic issues almost entirely. 
  
Section 6.1: The Cross-Strait Historical Bloc and the DPP  
In 2000, the opposition DPP’s Chen Shui-bian was elected to the presidency. In terms of the 
election itself, the pan-blue ticket was split and both Lien Chan of the KMT and James Soong of 
the newly formed People’s First Party (PFP) ran against each other. Chen, Song and Lien won a 
respective vote total of 4,977,697 (39.30%), 4,664,972 (36.84%) and 2,925,513 (23.10%). A 
core factor for the KMT’s poor faring was that voters became deeply unsatisfied with Taiwan’s 
corrupt politics of the 1990s for which the KMT was blamed. As for the DPP, its electoral 
support was made up of three major social blocks, Taiwan identity and independence supporters, 
the reform-minded middle class as well as the more marginalized classes which were ignored 
within Taiwan’s capital friendly social order during the 1990s (J.-Y. Hsu, 2009, p. 296). In 
addition to relentlessly criticizing KMT corruption, Chen also ran a campaign platform on clean 
politics, full democratization and social justice. Due to Chen’s own limited mandate and his 
minority government, it was impossible for the DPP to govern successfully without the implicit 
support of the opposition. Chen was not, however, successful at attaining such support and 
faced hostile legislative obstruction instead throughout his two-term administration. 
 
Despite the DPP’s close historical relationship with social movements, the party quickly 
adopted a capital-friendly policy after its victory. This reorientation was partially influenced by 
the minority nature of Chen’s administration and the difficulty that challenging Taiwan’s 
hegemonic historical bloc would have posed for the party. This was especially prescient, 
because the DPP did not have access to the vast economic resources as the KMT and due to 
which it was particularly susceptive to business pressure (Kastner, 2004, pp. 17-18). This 
dynamic became particularly evident in 2001 when business leaders took advantage of Taiwan’s 
ongoing recession to pressure the DPP to abandon its perceived anti-China and anti-business 
policy orientation. Not long after, both Chen and DPP Chairman, Frank Hsieh, signalled a 
moderation of the party’s perceived radicalism (Kastner, 2004, pp. 17–18). But, far from 
involuntarily pursuing a capital-friendly policy framework, the DPP leadership was itself 
proactive in courting the LE capitalist class for support and maintained visible ties with many of 
Taiwan’s most influential LE capitalists throughout the 2000 campaign. Many, such as Chi 
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Mei’s Hsu Wen-long, Acer’s Stan Shih and Evergreen’s Chang Rung-fa openly stated their 
support for Chen (Y.-H. Chu, 2009, pp. 52-53; Kong, 2005, p. 177). As such, Chen already 
branded himself as an adherent of Anthony Gidden’s third way during the presidential election 
which signalled an acceptance of capital’s determining role in shaping the social democratic 
policy sphere. Following its electoral victory, in addition to continued attempts at winning 
long-term business support, the DPP also immediately reversed course on a number of its 
pre-election commitments as evident in its backtracking on nearly all of its labour manifesto 
promises (W.-I. Lin & Chou, 2010, p103).
4
 
 
The DPP’s pro-capital reorientation required a very careful course of legitimation given the 
party’s previous association with Taiwan’s social movements. As such, Chen’s administration 
legitimated its new policy course on a narrative of necessity to ‘salvage the economy’ from the 
serious recession which began from the time Chen came into office. To add further credence to 
the DPP’s legitimation of a pro-capital reorientation, Chen’s administration also held an 
Economic Development Advisory Conference (EDAC) in 2001 to build both a national 
consensus on economic development and to develop the appropriate policy framework to 
facilitate Taiwan’s economic recovery. Of delegates present, 34% were from the business 
community while an absolute majority were business friendly in orientation. This ensured that 
business interests had the most direct influence in shaping the overall policy recommendations 
which Chen relied on to justify a pro-capital policy course (Kastner, 2004, p. 23). After this, the 
DPP adopted a general KMT-style national economic development position in which economic 
growth was prioritized above all other variables (M.-S. Ho, 2005, pp. 412-413).  
 
In allying himself with Taiwan’s LE capitalist class, Chen also came under immense pressure to 
moderate president Lee’s more confrontational CSEI policy. Thus, Chen announced on his 
inauguration that the DPP would pursue a more moderate Cross-Strait policy and committed his 
administration to the Five No’s policy framework. This promised that Chen’s administration 
would not declare independence, change the ROC’s official title, amend the constitution, hold a 
plebiscite on Taiwan’s future and also that the National Unification Guidelines and the National 
Unification Council would not be abolished (Chao, 2004, p. 688). It is, however, true that 
Chen’s pursuit of a more temperate Cross-Strait policy cannot yet be reduced solely to his 
responsiveness toward Taiwan’s hegemonic LE capitalist class. This is because one of the 
central reasons for Chen’s commitment to the Five No’s policy was the very real international 
constraints his administration faced which confined Taiwan to the status-quo. At the same time, 
there is also no denying that electoral calculations influenced Chen’s more temperate 
                                                     
4 Interview with Chien Hish-chieh in December 17, 2012; Chien, an ex-DPP legislator, helped Chen Hsui-bian’s campaign draft its Labor Manifesto. 
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Cross-Strait policy course so that in the context of Taiwan’s status-quo supporting majority, 
Chen’s early approval ratings quickly soared to a high of 77% (Y.-H. Chu, 2009, p. 47). As such, 
it is not an unfair generalization that the DPP also attempted to project a more temperate image 
to win the support of Taiwan’s centrist vote bloc. 
 
The DPP’s pursuit of a more temperate Cross-Strait policy cannot be reduced solely to its 
complicity with Taiwan’s LE capitalist class, but its subsequent CSEI openings can. Although a 
moderation of the DPP’s Cross-Strait policies was welcomed by the LE capitalist class, its core 
demand during this time was that Chen’s administration lift Lee Teng-hui’s ‘no haste, be patient’ 
policy. Chen faced enormous pressure to do so, especially because all of Taiwan’s capital 
fractions had an interest in lifting the ‘no haste’ policy. This can be observed in the policy’s 
critics which included Wang Yung-Ching of Taiwan Plastics (traditional ISI enterprises), Kao 
Ching-yuen of President enterprises (retail and traditional ISI), Chang Yung-fa of Evergreen 
(shipping, airlines and similar services sector industries) and Morris Chang of TSMC (T.-J. 
Cheng, 2005, p. 111). In response, Chen publicly voiced his support for increased Cross-Strait 
economic, trade and cultural integration as a means to build more friendly relations between 
Taiwan and China (Tung, 2005b, p. 348). Not long after, the DPP replaced Lee’s ‘no haste’ 
policy with its ‘active opening, effective management’ policy in 2001. This policy lifted the 50 
million USD investment restriction to China, lifted cumulative investment limits of publicly 
listed companies from 20% to 40% of company net worth while also implemented an automatic 
approval process for all investment under 20 million USD (Kastner, 2004, p. 22).  
 
In addition to the lifting of general constraints on investment sums to China, Chen’s 
administration also lifted a number of sector-specific restrictions on Taiwan’s IT sector which 
enabled large swaths of the sector to outsource to China. But even before the DPP’s lifting of 
restrictions, many IT firms were secretly moving their operations to China, a practice which the 
DPP was unable to or unwilling to constrain. This applied particularly to smaller-scale firms in 
sectors such as IC design in which clandestine migration to China was a common and difficult 
to trace practice (M.-C. M. Chu, 2008, pp. 61–62). As for larger firms which were much more 
visible, investment restrictions had a moderate effect by making clandestine investments in 
China relatively more difficult. But still, this did not stop firms such as UMC from forging 
ahead anyway which secretly channelled 1 billion USD to China through a Virgin Islands 
holding company to set up an 8 inch semiconductor manufacturing plant. Rather than being 
exposed by the government, the UMC’s clandestine investment project only came to light after 
a 2002 Wall Street Journal article broke the story (Klaus, 2003, p. 243). In response, Chen’s 
administration brought forward legal action against the UMC which culminated in a 150,000 
USD fine in 2006, a miniscule sum when compared to the UMC’s 2.82 billion USD annual 
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revenue in 2005
 
(M.-C. M. Chu, 2008, p. 60; Meer, 2006). As such, it is clear that Taiwan’s 
restrictions on IT sector migration to China were not an effective deterrence, but are better 
conceived of as an inconvenience which many IT capitalists were capable of sidestepping. 
Furthermore, even when exposed, due to its close alliance with Taiwan’s hegemonic LE 
capitalist class, it is clear that the DPP had no intention of seriously penalizing law breaking 
corporate entities and their CEOs.  
 
Despite the uneven enforceability of CSEI limitations on the IT sector, Taiwan’s IT capitalist 
class remained hostile toward such restrictions and placed enormous pressure on Chen to lift 
them. Although all IT sub-sectors facing CSEI restrictions intending to invest in China lobbied 
the DPP, a particularly illuminating case is that of the semiconductor sector. Due to its advanced 
nature, the DPP’s proposed lifting of sectorial investment restrictions to China garnered 
significant opposition and alarm in Taiwan. The specifics of semiconductor opening relates to 
industry lobbying toward the lifting of technological restriction on investments in China to set 
up lower-end production processes utilizing 8 inch technologies (S.-W. Hung & C. Yang, 2003, 
p. 400). In addition to lobbying the DPP directly, semiconductor firms such as TSMC and UMC 
also led a very public sectorial advocacy campaign in which CSEI restrictions on the sector 
were publicly criticized. Due to the special nature of the semiconductor sector, Chen even faced 
resistance from within the DPP from some particularly outspoken and dedicated Taiwan 
independence officials and party members. Despite such opposition, Chen’s administration 
eventually agreed to lift restrictions on 8 inch semiconductor migration to China in March 2002 
(T.-J. Cheng, 2005, p. 120). 
 
The DPP’s lifting of semiconductor sector restrictions was only the most controversial case of a 
much wider IT sectorial opening drive. Immediately after coming into office, the DPP already 
lifted restrictions on 122 IT products in less controversial IT sub-sectors such as notebook 
computers and mobile phones (T.-J. Cheng, 2005, pp. 119-120). In April 2002, along with the 
semiconductor sector, more advanced sectors such as light emitting diodes (LED) and liquid 
crystal displays (LCD) were also added to the deregulation list, but some limitations remained 
on technological sophistication of permitted Chinese production (Kobayashi, 2005, p. 14). In 
the semiconductor sector, for instance, restrictions stipulated that only 3 companies were 
allowed to set up 8 inch plants in China prior to 2005 and that companies transferring 8 inch 
technology must first demonstrate a production run in Taiwan of more advanced 12 inch wafer 
manufacturing for at least six months. But, such restrictions did not mean much as the reality of 
the matter was that Taiwan’s major semiconductor firms never intended to move 12 inch 
manufacturing capacity to China while companies permitted to set-up 8 inch plants in China 
also already all expanded into 12 inch semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan (Clough, 2003, 
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p. 54). This mirrors wider IT sector trends in which remaining restrictions on high-end 
investment to China did not really challenge the interests of Taiwan’s IT capitalist class because 
IT firms tended to maintain their most advanced operations in Taiwan. This was, however, due 
primarily to business strategy calculations in which high-end investment in China was perceived 
as a risky strategy due to IPR, logistical and outsourcing cost concerns.
5
 
 
Because of the largely un-reflexive acceptance among the citizenry of an economistic narrative 
which equated capitalist economic development with Taiwan’s collective welfare, it was not 
difficult for the DPP to legitimate its pro-capital reorientation. But, the legitimation of CSEI 
openings was much more challenging for it due to its pronounced Taiwan identity stance and 
the party’s continued dependence on a Taiwan nationalist vote block for electoral advancement. 
As such, the DPP’s legitimation of its CSEI liberalization was planned with great care so that an 
intensified CSEI could be plausibly legitimated as being necessary for Taiwan’s economic 
welfare and that it did not contradict the DPP’s Taiwan identity stance. To do so, Chen relied on 
a TINA type narrative while also relying heavily on EDAC recommendations which presented 
CSEI openings as economically necessary for Taiwan’s continued economic prosperity and for 
it to address the recession it faced. But to signal the DPP’s continued Taiwan nationalist 
credentials, Chen also very publicly refused to endorse the EDAC proposal that his 
administration accept the ‘one China principle’ based on the 92 consensus (Hammond-chambers, 
2002, p. 3-4; Kastner, 2004, p. 23). This ensured that Chen’s administration enjoyed a continued 
symbolic association with the Taiwan identity and independence causes while framing its 
discontinuation of the ‘no haste, be patient’ policy as a purely economic matter  
 
Thus far, it is clear that already from the onset of its administration, that the DPP proactively 
advanced the interests of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class and that it willingly confined itself within 
the policy parameters of the Cross-Strait historical bloc. But, veering from the Lee Teng-hui 
administration, the DPP now also proactively advanced the historical bloc’s CSEI agenda by 
lifting numerous existing CSEI restrictions. Because of its attempts at securing a widened 
centrist support base, the DPP’s success at doing so now depended on whether or not it could 
deliver on its CSEI legitimation. 
 
Section 6.2: Processes of DPP Policy Legitimation  
Had the material outcomes of the DPP’s CSEI openings resulted in an improved 
socio-economic welfare, it would have been possible that the DPP’s legitimation of CSEI could 
have been convincing enough for it to secure longer-term centrist support. But this did not 
                                                     
5 Interviews with anonymous interviewees 1, 3 and 4 in November 30, December 1, December 9, 2012. 
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follow and Taiwan’s economic malaise continued to intensify as an outcome of the party’s 
capital advancing policy framework and an intensified China-bound capital flight. As such, the 
DPP’s ideational legitimation of its CSEI openings was no longer tenable and it quickly 
positioned itself instead as a hard-line Taiwan nationalist party to a secure continued electoral 
support.  
 
6.2.1 A Deepening Socio-economic Malaise 
The intensification of Taiwan’s economic malaise was influenced heavily by a rapidly 
intensifying capital flight which no longer only affected more labour-intensive production 
segments, but now also began to affect higher value-added production segments as well. The 
main reason for this was that when Taiwan’s strategic economic development upgrading came 
to an end during the 1990s, a majority of firms have not yet ascended to core positions while 
possessing limited brand value and generally lacking product-oriented frontier technologies. As 
such, Taiwanese firms remained integrated at the mid-stream of Northern managed commodity 
and distribution chains in which they specialized in OEM/ODM sub-contracting while only 
enjoying very slim margins. It is because of this feature of Taiwan’s economic composition that 
its LE capitalist class faced such an enormous pressure to secure cheaper production costs and 
for which China was particularly appealing.  
 
There were a number of factors which led to China’s appeal for Taiwan’s LE capitalist class 
during this time. A most commonly acknowledged factor was that China’s wages were 
significantly lower than wages in Taiwan. In 2003, for instance, it was still possible for 
assembly labour wage to measure as low as 48 USD in China compared to Taiwan’s minimum 
equivalent of 518 USD (Cavey, 2003, p. 19). In addition, China also had a large number of 
skilled workers who earned significantly lower wages than their counterparts in Taiwan. 
Furthermore, China’s wages rose slower than would normally have been the case due to its 
large number of available workers, regional disparities which ensured that production could 
move inland and CCP imposed limitations on collective bargaining and the right to strike (T.-J. 
Chen, 2003, p. 85). Labour costs, were only one reason for China’s appeal and other important 
factors included its reduced land, utility, construction and regulatory costs as well as the stable 
political and production environment provided for by the CCP. In addition to such general 
factors, China was also especially appealing for taishang who had a strong track record of 
navigating China’s local-level political environment to secure special policy favours such as 
below market rate land (Berger & Lester, 2005, pp. 12–13). This successful navigation of 
China’s local politics was an outcome of both a linguistic and cultural proximity and the CCP’s 
continued courting of taishang. This not only enabled taishang firms a higher degree of ease to 
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set up Chinese operations, but also to manage all aspects of Chinese operations in which good 
relations with Chinese government officials were paramount.  
 
During the time of the DPP’s rule, the pull to China was particularly strong for Taiwan’s most 
advanced and highest value-generating IT sector. The reason for this pull was that despite its 
most advanced nature in Taiwan, the IT sector was defined by similar OEM/ODM features as 
the rest of Taiwan’s industrial composition. Thus, lacking frontier technologies and brand value 
while occupying narrow OEM/ODM sub-contracting production segments within global 
production chains, Taiwan’s IT firms relied on a large production volume for a continued 
profitability in light of their razor thin margins. Due to their narrow specialization, Taiwanese 
IT firms also tended to become locked in at the sub-contracting node for which not only 
economies of scale were a prerequisite, but also consistent reinvestments in manufacturing and 
process level upgrades in order to continue delivering on the low prices set by Northern buyers. 
Due to such industry features, Taiwan’s IT firms have continued to pursue a business model 
which relied heavily on cost-down production while securing a competitive advantage primarily 
in terms of price, quality, production speed and process level technology upgrades (Berger & 
Lester, 2005; Breznitz, 2005; Fuller; C.-W. Huang, 2011). This demonstrates that although CSEI 
impinged negatively on Taiwan’s social welfare, that it is important to account for this within 
Taiwan’s OEM/ODM defined production model which was a causal factor driving its capital 
flight to China.  
 
In the context of Taiwan’s OEM/ODM defined production features, more and more production 
nodes within the IT sector migrated to China. A particularly illuminating example of this 
dynamic is the LCD sector which, because of its relatively more advanced nature, was singled 
out along with the semiconductor sector for priority support under the DPP’s ‘two trillion, twin 
star’ priority support program. Such support, however, was not state co-ordinated and was 
primarily fiscal in nature. Without a viable upgrading plan or effective dirigisme, supported 
LCD firms did not develop pioneering technology or global brand recognition and have 
remained confined instead within an OEM/ODM based business model. Taiwan’s two largest 
LCD firms, AU Optronics and Chi Mei Optronics, for instance, relied primarily on external 
technology purchases and have invested large sums of capital to attain the economies of scale 
necessary to secure a sufficient revenue from the slim margins they secured (Fuller, 2005, pp. 
163–165). Thus, mirroring sectorial trends, despite capturing 30% of the global LCD market, 
Taiwanese LCD firms similarly experienced a tremendous pull toward down and mid-stream 
migration to China. As such, although 97% of Taiwanese LCD firm production was still located 
in Taiwan by 2000, this only accounted for 8.3% by 2005 during which time 88.7% of 
production took place in China (Fuller et al., 2003, pp. 189–190; Y.-S. Wu, 2007, pp. 995–997).  
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Because outsourcing has occurred across Taiwan’s value chain, it has led to an increased 
unemployment, a downward pull on wages and has also impeded Taiwan’s industrial upgrading. 
A major justification for outsourcing to China has always been that some job losses are 
necessary for the creation of white collar jobs to replace obsolete blue-collar jobs. Clearly, this 
has not panned out due to a failure of a viable economic upgrading in Taiwan. It is true that 
existing firms tend to maintain their most capital and technology intensive production segments 
in Taiwan, but it is also clear that this has not translated into added employment because such 
firms tend only to hire a slim labour force in Taiwan. As such it is not uncommon for IT firms 
like Quanta, Taiwan’s market leader in the notebook sector, to hire only a total of 5000 
Taiwanese high-end staff while locating a majority of its production in China.
6
 At the very least, 
such production and employment features illustrate the urgency by which economic upgrading 
is necessary so that new sectors or sub-sectors can be created to offset the job losses resulting 
from outsourcing. Because this has not taken place, the legitimacy of the government’s 
continued priority financial support for the IT sector also becomes very difficult to justify. 
Science park firms, for instance, continue to operate within a tax free zone and receive a barrage 
of subsidies such as a near-zero tax rate for imported equipment or exported goods, heavily 
subsidized utilities and zero percent interest rate loans.
7
 Because much of this support 
prioritizes existing firms, it is more reflective of a general tendency among Taiwan’s politicians 
to service the interests of its most powerful IT capitalists while helping to cushion the sector as 
a whole within a no longer tenable OEM/ODM production model  
 
Although an OEM/ODM based production model has challenged the interests of Taiwan’s 
labouring class, it is important to account for this within the context of Taiwan’s LE capital 
advancing social order more generally. With a continued OEM/ODM production induced 
capital flight, Taiwan’s unemployment rate grew from 2.99% in 2001 to a yearly average of 
between 4 and 5% after 2002 (Driffield & Chiang, 2009, p. 20). An intensified CSEI has also 
further increased the dominance of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class by enhancing its labour 
condition and wage setting capacity due to its high degree of capital mobility between Taiwan 
and China. As such, Taiwan’s labour regime also continued to be based on an intensive labour 
environment. Average annual work hours, for instance, measured at 2,256 in 2006 and secured 
Taiwan a place among the world’s 5 longest working countries (C.-W. Huang, 2011, p. 255). 
Similarly, Taiwan’s capital advancing social order has also led to a decline in its wage growth 
rate and a decoupling from its economic growth and wages. As such, despite Taiwan’s 18% 
GDP growth rate between 2000 and 2010, its average real wages shrank by approximately 4% 
                                                     
6 Interview with anonymous interviewee 6 in January 1, 2013. 
7 Interview with anonymous interviewee 1 and 4 in November 30, 2012 and January 9, 2013.
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during this time  (L. Wang, 2011, p. 67). Combined, such trends have intensified Taiwan’s 
rising inequality which can be observed in the increase of the income gap between the richest 
1/5 and poorest 1/5 of households from 4.97 in 1991 to 6.16 in 2002 (Ku, 2004, p. 315).
 
Similar 
trends can also be observed in Taiwan’s Gini coefficient which increased from 27.7 in 1980 to 
33.8 in 2005 (C. Lee, 2007, p. 201). 
 
6.2.2: The Centre-Stage of Taiwan Nationalism 
With Taiwan’s marked socio-economic malaise, the DPP clearly had to develop a more 
sophisticated policy legitimation in order to continue pursuing a capital advancing policy course. 
Ironically, the DPP succeeded in doing so through the intensification of a Taiwan nationalist 
discourse which diverted the citizenry’s attention from material and economic issues almost 
entirely. As such, Chen’s more temperate cross-strait policy only held for a short window and 
his administration quickly pursued a much more confrontational state-level Cross-Strait policy 
in order to secure a viable Taiwan nationalist support base. 
 
The DPP’s self-repositioning as a predominantly Taiwan nationalist party was a highly 
successful strategy and allowed it to shape the wider political discourse in Taiwan toward an 
almost solely identity politics defined path. This process, of course, has its roots in the 1990s, 
but the DPP now succeeded in elevating the issue toward the absolute political centre-stage 
while it also stressed a much more specific ethnic dimension to its identity narrative (Kaeding, 
2009, p. 29). In the 2004 presidential campaign, for instance, the DPP appealed directly to a 
Taiwanese identity while relegating the opposition as not only pro-China, but also as 
anti-Taiwanese. More generally, the DPP also adopted the campaign slogan of ‘love Taiwan’ as 
defining its position for all major electoral campaigns during this time (Hickey, 2006, p. 467). 
The emotive nature of the DPP’s identity strategy becomes particularly apparent in the party’s 
organization of massive mobilizations such as its February 28 ‘hand-in-hand’ surround Taiwan 
rally in which more than 1 million DPP supporters formed one continuous chain throughout 
Taiwan’s coast and which coincided with Chen’s 2004 re-election campaign. By tapping into 
the intense emotions that a Taiwan identity politics unleashed, the DPP’s electoral strategy was 
so successful that the now more China-friendly KMT and the PFP also came under immense 
pressure to adopt a defensive position in order to underplay their more China-friendly policy 
stance.
8
 This is most evident in a 2004 pan-blue rally during which the KMT’s Lien Chan and 
his PFP vice presidential candidate, James Soong, symbolically lied down on the ground and 
kissed Taiwan (Tanner, 2007, pp. 109–110). 
                                                     
8 This reorientation took place after the KMT’s ouster of President Lee following its 2000 presidential defeat. 
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After the KMT’s presidential defeat in 2004, Taiwan’s populist identity politics became 
particularly defined due to the pan-Blue’s adopting of a much more visibly China-friendly 
position and its open engagement with the CCP. As an outcome, Taiwan’s political discourse 
came to be defined almost entirely by a polarizing and emotionally charged identity politics in 
which core pan-Blue supporters leaned toward a much more visibly China friendly position 
while core pan-Green supporters leaned toward a more pronounced Taiwan identity and 
independence position (Y.-H. Chu, 2009, pp. 58-59; Niou, 2004, pp. 560-561). As such, the DPP 
successfully secured a captive support base and provided the party continued to embrace a 
visible Taiwan identity stance, its electoral base continued to support and defend the party 
regardless of its policy course. Although the DPP’s capital advancing policy framework tended 
to contradict the interests of its predominantly grassroots constituency, instead of pressuring it 
to pursue a less capital defined policy course, it tended to support the party unconditionally due 
to the narratives promulgated regarding national identity.  From this point onward, the key 
cleavages that dominated Taiwan’s politics were Taiwan vs. China, democratic (DPP) vs 
authoritarian (KMT’s past; CCP now and Taiwan in the future if it engaged too closely with 
China) and Taiwan identity vs Chinese consciousness (Lay, Yap, & Chen, 2008, p. 785). Such 
cleavages overshadowed entirely a material and issues-based politics and effectively assured 
that both the DPP and the KMT were no longer tied to any distinct economic or policy 
framework by their electorate, allowing the DPP to liberalize, privatize and further a generally 
capital friendly policy parameter in Taiwan. It is for this reason once again that identity 
narratives should be understood as a core component of Taiwan’s hegemonic narrative which 
was strengthened significantly during this time.  
 
In pursuing such an identity politics type strategy, one question that must be addressed is how it 
is that the DPP could rely on a core Taiwan nationalist support base while still continuing to 
pursue a policy of CSEI liberalization. One reason for this was that the DPP’s legitimation of 
CSEI as an economic matter was so successful that even its electorate tended, by and large, to 
accept CSEI as economically necessary. Much more importantly, however, was the fact that the 
focus of Taiwan’s electorate was channelled to a primarily political and state-level focus which 
did not have any direct implications on the economic dimension of CSEI. This can be seen, for 
instance, in DPP campaign themes which focused on issues such as China’s international 
‘bullying’ of Taiwan and Taiwan’s failure to gain membership in international organizations. In 
terms of potentially status quo impeding campaign promises, however, the DPP rarely delivered. 
A particularly notable example of this was Chen’s 2004 campaign pledge to establish an 
independent Republic of Taiwan constitution which was dropped entirely after his reinstatement 
(Y.-H. Chu, 2004, p. 511). But even in the case of the DPP’s failure to deliver on such campaign 
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promises, due to the emotive features of Taiwan’s politics, the DPP’s captive support base 
remained loyal to the party due to its intense mistrust of the China-friendly pan-Blue parties. It 
is true that Chen’s administration threatened to pursue an increasingly hostile cross-straits 
policy toward the end of his second term, but this was guided primarily by his need to further 
animate the DPP’s support base to rally behind him in light of the various corruption scandals 
implicating him which were coming to light during this time. Because the CCP and the US were 
aware of Chen’s intentions, both chose instead to ignore and marginalize his administration 
while the US signalled instead its support for the KMTs 2008 presidential candidate, Ma 
Ying-Jeou (Y.-H. Chu, 2007b, pp. 47–48). 
 
Although the DPP’s identity politics strategy was highly successful as a tool of legitimation, the 
party also did not neglect to engage in a concerted co-optation of its already much weakened 
social movement allies. To do so, the party successfully placed key persons from Taiwan’s 
social movements within various government agencies or advisory committees. A particularly 
important example of the DDP’s successful co-optation was its securing of the support of the 
Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU) leadership so that the whole union became an 
affiliate of the DPP. To this day, it remains a common lament among many labour organizers 
that the DPP’s co-optation of the previously most progressive TCTU was the single biggest 
blow to Taiwan’s labour movement from which it has yet to recover fully.9 Because of the 
DPP’s successful co-optation of Taiwan’s social movements, a distinct progressive agenda was 
fractured even further. This was because identity dispositions and partisan political affiliations 
now became the central cleavages within Taiwan’s social movements. This is especially evident 
in the case of the labour movement with the DPP-affiliated TCTU and KMT-affiliated CFL 
mobilizing and organizing protests in competition to each other  (Minns & Tierney, 2003, pp. 
120–121). 
 
In addition to an increasingly foregrounded identity cleavage, Taiwan’s labour movement also 
continued to face challenges such as a continued tendency toward union insularism. This is a 
weakness which is commonly acknowledged by labour organizers who note that Taiwan’s 
unions have continued to remain primarily geared toward firm level grievances while practices 
such as sympathy strikes or cross-sectorial union formation support are virtually unheard of.
10
 
Due to the self-serving nature of Taiwan’s union’s, labour organizers are also prone to point out 
that the public perception toward organized labour has remained overwhelmingly negative and 
that unions tend to be popularly perceived as self-serving special interests.
11
 Because of such 
                                                     
9 Interviews with Lin Tzu-Wen and Wu Yong-yi in December 25, 2012 and January 7, 2013.  
10 Interviews with Ke Yi-Min and Hang Hsr-Hsien in December 27 and December 27, 2012. 
11 Interviews with Chieh Hsih-chieh and Pan Han-shen in December 17, 2012 and January 4, 2013.
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union fragmentation and insularism, union membership rates have also continued to decline 
from just under 40% in 2001 to approximately 35% in 2006 while industrial union membership 
dropped from approximately 21% in 2001 to between 17 and 18% by 2006 (Y. Chiu, 2011, p. 
59). 
 
It is clear that Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise was heavily influenced by its sub-contracting 
based industrial composition. But, this is not surprising in the context of Taiwan’s social order 
and CSEI both of which advanced the economic interests of its LE capitalist class which was at 
root of Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise. It is in this context that the DPP develop a strategy of 
policy legitimation by escalating a divisive populist Taiwan identity politics to the discursive 
core of Taiwan’s political discourse. But, regardless of its successful legitimation, it remained 
the case that a deepening CSEI tilted Taiwan ever closer into China’s political orbit.  
 
Section 6.3: The Cross-Strait Historical Bloc and the CCP  
The Cross-Strait historical bloc’s primary aim during this time was to intensify CSEI and by 
securing the DPP’s CSEI openings, it advanced the combined interests of both the CCP and the 
LE capitalist class. But, in addition to securing substantive CSEI openings, the CCP also 
became much more visibly active in shaping Taiwan’s politics during this time by wielding its 
LE capitalist class to weaken the DPP administration.  
  
During the DPP’s time in office, the CCP’s cross-strait strategy remained largely consistent 
within its long term policy parameters, but at the same time, a qualitative strategy reorientation 
was also evident. This is especially so in terms of the Cross-Strait policy footprint of the Hu 
Jin-Tao administration which came to power in 2003 and which moderated a previously more 
confrontational Cross-Strait policy. Hu’s overall strategic framework contained both hard and 
soft elements and has sometimes been interpreted as seeing China’s hard hand get harder and its 
soft hand get softer (Keng & Schubert, 2010, pp. 290–292). This interpretation, however, is 
misleading, especially in terms of the so-called hard hand components which has not veered 
from the long-term status quo parameters of China’s Cross-Strait strategy. For instance, 
although Hu now proactively welcomed the US to constrain Chen’s administration when it 
appeared to veer from the status quo, this also did not differ qualitatively from China’s previous 
reliance on the US to constrain Lee Teng-hui (Chu, 2004, p. 494; Tung, 2005b, pp. 358-359). 
Similarly, China’s Anti-secession Law, which for the first time stipulated the legal conditions 
for China’s threat of war, also remained within China’s long-term policy parameters and was 
designed to lock in Taiwan within the status quo. The passage of the Anti-secession Law can 
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also be understood as an attempt by the CCP to institutionalize its defensive straits policy to 
de-necessitate a need for visible threats thereafter (C.-P. Lin, 2008, pp. 4–5).  
 
Although the CCP’s so-called hard hand policies have remained largely consistent with its 
long-term strategy, a much more significant alteration of its strategy occurred in the soft hand 
sphere. Hu’s administration widened a previous CCP practice of engagement with Taiwan’s LE 
capitalist class and elite interests in Taiwan to also engage with additional target demographics 
(Keng, 2010, p. 5). This widened engagement was guided by the logic of the CCP’s United 
Front policy, but was now also widened toward developing a more convincing narrative of 
CSEI as advancing the interests of all of Taiwan’s citizens. This strategic reorientation was 
emphasized, in particular, to challenge Taiwan’s rising nationalism and was aimed at 
destabilizing any social consensus which may have emerged on the desirability of Taiwan’s 
political independence during this time. Central to the CCP’s promulgated narrative was the 
theme that regardless of identity-based bickering, that the Taiwanese and Chinese were of the 
same people and culture. Because of this cultural kinship, the CCP developed an economic 
narrative by which it projected itself as safeguarding Taiwan’s interests and welfare throughout 
the CSEI trajectory. On this basis, the CCP and Taiwan’s LE capitalist class continued to share 
an interest to present CSEI as the only sure-hand path to safeguard and advance Taiwan’s 
collective economic and social wellbeing.  
 
Understanding the importance of winning the support of Taiwan’s major classes, the CCP 
expanded contacts with most of Taiwan’s social segments such as the academic, young adult, 
cultural and labouring demographics (C.-P. Lin, 2008, p. 4; Sheng, 2002, p. 127).
12
 In order to 
strengthen the cogency of its economic narrative, the CCP also offered numerous incentives to 
its targeted demographics. To court Taiwan’s student population, for instance, it implemented 
an equal tuition fee regime in China for Taiwanese students, announced that Taiwanese degrees 
would be accepted in China while also offering a barrage of scholarships for Taiwan’s 
China-bound student population (Keng, 2009, p. 12; Xin, 2010, pp. 529–530). To court 
Taiwan’s young professionals, the CCP announced the waiving of visa requirements for 
Taiwanese while also allowing Taiwanese professionals in previously restricted fields such as 
medicine and architecture to take professional licence exams in China (C.-P. Lin, 2008, pp. 20–
21). Nowhere are the CCP’s aims of winning the goodwill of Taiwan’s major social 
demographics more evident than in its agricultural policies aimed at securing a heightened 
goodwill toward the CCP in Southern Taiwan where a Taiwan identity and nationalism are most 
strongly defined. Due to the high percentage of farming and agricultural workers in southern 
                                                     
12 Interview with Hang Hsr-shian in December 27, 2012. 
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Taiwan, the CCP has focused extensively on altering the perceptions of this demographic and 
has rolled out numerous incentives to do so. Among such incentives were the CCP’s 2005 
inclusion of 15 Taiwanese fruit types for duty free status and its announcement of a sped up 
customs procedure of 30 minutes as opposed to 2 days for Taiwanese agricultural and aquatic 
products. At the same time, the CCP engaged in a widely publicized policy by which it 
facilitated the purchase of Taiwan’s agricultural produce (T.-I. Tsai, 2005). 
  
In addition to its comprehensive strategy of winning added popular support for CSEI, the CCP 
also side-lined the DPP administration during this time while engaging only with Taiwan’s 
pan-Blue parties. After the 2004 election, when the KMT and PFP visibly adopted a 
China-friendly disposition and engaged directly with China, the CCP eagerly rolled out the red 
carpet treatment for both Lien and Song during their party visits. While in China, both met with 
Hu Jintao and other high ranking CCP officials and following which regular pan-Blue and CCP 
Cross-Strait talks became the new norm (C. Lee, 2007, pp. 205–206). As a part of its DPP 
marginalizing strategy, the CCP also announced some of its united front incentives such as 
agricultural tariff lifting immediately after Lien Chan’s visit in order to secure an added public 
support on Taiwan for the pan-Blue alliance (Business Week, 2005). Because the CCP’s UF 
strategy was systematic, it did not only target key persons at the decision making level, but it 
engaged in an all-encompassing fashion with Taiwan’s politicians at all levels. One common 
practice by which the CCP expanded contacts, for instance, was the blanket offer of all expenses 
paid for trips to China for legislators and city/county level councillors and their supporters to 
engage with Chinese officials and enjoy a barrage of lavish wining and dining.
13
 
  
Although engaging on a variety of levels toward facilitating an increased goodwill toward CSEI 
and China, the most immediate aim of the CCP was the continued solidification of its core 
alliance with Taiwan’s LE capitalist class which underpinned the Cross-Strait historical bloc. 
Although the CCP secured its capacity to shape Taiwan’s social order through its alliance with 
the LE capitalist class, the relationship between the two became increasingly hierarchical. For 
one, it was increasingly clear that in China, it was the contender state wielding CCP which 
enjoyed the capacity to discipline Taiwan’s LE capitalist class despite its hegemonic stature in 
Taiwan. This capacity can be observed, for instance, in the CCP’s planting of party cells in 
nearly all Taiwanese business operations in China and its successful limiting of market access 
and vertical integration opportunities in China (T.-J. Cheng, 2005, pp. 109–110; Tucker, 2002, 
pp. 25–26). Because China’s rapid economic upgrading led to its development of viable 
domestic capital fractions, the CCP has also become much less economically dependent on 
                                                     
13 Interview with anonymous interviewee 17 in December 30, 2012; The anonymous Tainan councillor confirmed that he been on such a visit before.  
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Taiwan’s LE capitalist class to facilitate its economic development and upgrading as it was 
during the 1990s (Schubert, 2010, pp. 91–92). As such, in addition to an institutionally secured 
capacity, the CCP also secured the sufficient economic self-sufficiency necessary to foreground 
its geo-strategic strategy and to discipline individual Taiwanese LE capitalists without 
reservation.  
 
Generally, the CCP secured the complicity of an absolute majority of Taiwan’s LE capitalists 
through economic interests alone. But, it also relied on its disciplinary capacity to pressure a 
handful of DPP-friendly CEO’s to publicly dissociate themselves from the party and to embrace 
a China-friendly stance. The first visible signs of this policy can be traced to 2000 when the 
CCP warned through the Xinhua news service that it would impede the investments of Taiwan 
independence advocating taishang in China (Tanner, 2007, pp. 114–115). Subsequently, CCP 
officials also began to intimidate DPP-friendly companies and their CEO’s to revert their stance. 
Not long after, both Chang Rong-fa of Evergreen and Stan Shih of Acer distanced themselves 
from the DPP, publicly declared their opposition to Taiwan independence while also expressing 
a unification-favouring stance (Leng, 2002, pp. 226-227; Tanner, 2007, pp. 114-117). A most 
dramatic example of the CCP’s disciplining of DPP-friendly capitalists occurred in the case of 
Chi Mei’s Hsu Wen-Long who was not only one of Chen’s most loyal supporters, but also 
Taiwan’s most public and vocal Taiwan nationalist captain of industry (Tanner, 2007, pp. 127–
128). In order to pressure Hsu to reverse course, the CCP continually subjected Chi Mei’s 
Chinese petrochemical and LCD plants to serious environmental/industrial inspections and tax 
auditing while also ordering Chinese companies not to source orders from Chi Mei (Tanner, 
2007, p. 115).
14
 Following this, a June 2004 Chinese newspaper article which threatened green 
businessmen as unwelcome in China publicly named Hsu as one such businessman (Tanner, 
2007, p. 92). As an outcome of such concerted pressure, Hsu eventually dissociated himself 
from the DPP in 2004 while announcing that he ‘oppose[d] Taiwan independence’ and that 
‘Taiwan and China belong to one China’ (Hickey, 2009, pp. 52–53). 
  
In the context of a solid CCP - LE capitalist policy consensus, the DPP’s identity strategy turned 
out to be a resounding failure in the longer-term. This is because the electoral support from a 
hard-line Taiwan identity demographic was simply not enough for prolonged electoral success. 
For this, the DPP would have had to rely on Taiwan’s relatively more status quo and stability 
oriented centrist vote block. In order to influence it, however, the DPP would have had to win a 
favourable public perception crucial to which would be the support from the LE capitalist class. 
But, throughout its two terms in office, the party faced its increased animosity instead. A central 
                                                     
14 Interview with anonymous interviewee 8 in December 22, 2012; While serving as plant manager in Chi Mei Petrochemicals China, the interviewee was 
directly involved in the incident. 
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reason for this was that no matter how capital friendly the DPP came to be, Taiwan’s LE 
capitalists generally continued to support the KMT due to the DPP’s relatively more 
constraining CSEI policy, the KMT’s anticipated CSEI openings and the CCP’s stated support 
for the KMT. With this, an ever more coherent narrative was spun in Taiwan by which its 
perpetually worsening economic performance was blamed not on CSEI or Taiwan’s 
sub-contracting economic composition, but rather continued restrictions which remained on 
CSEI and for which the DPP was blamed (Chase et al., 2004). This narrative, due to its wide 
circulation (excluding pan-Green media outlets) and seemingly objective nature, swayed a large 
segment of Taiwan’s citizens so that a majority perceived their material welfare as being tied to 
further economic integration with China (Tanner, 2007, pp. 34-34; Chao, 2004, p. 698). This 
being so, popular support for the KMT was a foregone conclusion while both the CCP and the 
LE capitalist class played a central role in facilitating this.  
 
Because of the intensification of CSEI, the CCP secured a decisive role to shape Taiwan’s 
social order. But, despite having expanded its engagement with all of Taiwan’s major social 
demographics, the hegemony of the Cross-Strait historical bloc remained tenable and through 
which the CCP has secured the capacity to shape Taiwan’s social order. Within the Cross-Strait 
historical bloc, it was also, however becoming apparent that despite the hegemonic stature of 
Taiwan’s LE capitalist class, that the CCP now secured a capacity to discipline it toward 
advancing its interests.  
 
6.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I examined a marked CSEI deepening which occurred during Chen Shui-bian’s 
presidency and toward which his administration played an enabling role. I argued that the DPP’s 
proactive role toward enabling a CSEI deepening was driven by the party leadership’s 
pro-capital reorientation and an advance by the Cross-Strait historical bloc to secure a 
significant CSEI opening. But, because a deepened CSEI occurred in the context of an 
OEM/ODM induced capital flight, Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise also became much more 
pronounced during this time. As such, legitimation processes were particularly central to the 
DPP’s CSEI opening and I argued that the party relied heavily on a divisive Taiwan nationalism 
to do so. This was because the class-diluting and issues-diverting effects of Taiwan’s identity 
debate led to the wide acceptance of the economistic core of the historical bloc’s hegemonic 
narrative which equated Taiwan’s capital defined social order and CSEI with the citizenry’s 
collective welfare. As such, I continued to conceive of a Taiwan identity politics as crucial to its 
hegemonic narrative and argued that it effectively enabled the DPP a carte blanche to pursue its 
capital advancing policy. In terms of the DPP’s CSEI liberalization more specifically, I argued 
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that this was not an issue which registered for serious concern among the DPP’s Taiwan 
nationalist supporters because it was legitimated as a purely economic matter. In the context 
also of the DPP’s successful co-opting of a majority of Taiwan’s social movements, I argued 
that a progressive politics ceased to resonate at all within Taiwan’s identity-defined discursive 
climate. But, despite the DPP’s capital advancing and CSEI enabling role, I argued that the CCP 
remained hostile to it and that it disciplined Taiwan’s LE capitalist class to wield its hegemonic 
influence toward securing the KMT’s eventual re-election in 2008.  
 
Combined, this chapter’s analysis demonstrates the clear capacity of the Cross-Strait historical 
bloc to shape Taiwan’s social order and government policy parameters. Because of the regional 
features of the Cross-Strait historical bloc, I demonstrated that an intensified capital-led CSEI 
did not internationalize Taiwan toward an abstract transnational social order, but rather 
specifically toward China. Because Taiwan’s internationalization toward China occurred on the 
basis of a hegemonic Cross-Strait historical bloc, I also demonstrate the importance of 
theorizing Taiwan’s CSEI policy in terms of the social basis of its state. Therefore, I stressed the 
vital role of Taiwan’s hegemonic narrative toward enabling CSEI and illustrated how the 
Taiwan identity debate, paradoxically, advanced CSEI further. This was so much the case that 
the centrality of Taiwan’s identity politics continued to dilute a class consciousness from 
developing while also leading to a pronounced de-politicization of economic policy altogether. 
Without this ideational process, an effective hegemony would have thus been much more 
difficult to attain in Taiwan which was reflected in the minimal degree of interest ceding from 
the historical bloc toward subaltern classes. As such, even in the context of a prolonged 
socio-economic malaise and ever more apparent class contradictions, the attention of Taiwan’s 
citizenry continued to be drawn toward identity debates. But, it was also unlikely that a 
hegemonic historical bloc which secured its hegemony so centrally on the basis of an attention 
diverting national identity debate could remain stable in the longer term. As such, I will proceed 
in the following chapter to examine how it was that a relative nuancing of Taiwan identity 
politics and a continually worsening socio-economic malaise led to a significantly weakened 
CSEI legitimation and the resurfacing of an increased social contestation in Taiwan.  
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Chapter 7: Cross-Straits Détente and Taiwan’s Material Politics 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the DPP was instrumental toward enabling a deepened and 
intensified CSEI and that this was because of the party’s wilful complicity to operate within the 
confines of Taiwan’s Cross-Strait historical bloc. In this chapter, I argue that the Ma Ying-jeou 
administration’s following Cross-Strait rapprochement and institutionalization of CSEI was a 
logical culmination of the Cross-Strait historical bloc’s long-term policy parameter. This being 
so, I argue that the CCP placed significantly more emphasis on ideational processes of CSEI 
legitimation by intensifying its self-projection as ceding China’s economic interests to benefit 
Taiwan. Despite such an interest ceding, I argue that Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise 
worsened because of its continually OEM/ODM LE capitalist defined social order and CSEI 
process. I argue that what has changed rather was the gradual receding of an emotive identity 
politics in Taiwan which, coupled with the undeliverable nature of Ma’s optimistic and 
materially framed CSEI legitimation, has led to a relative reorientation of popular debates 
toward economic issues. In addition to the heightened receptivity of the citizenry toward 
economic issues, a receding centrality of the identity debate has also been crucial to a 
resurfacing of Taiwan’s social movements. This suggests that although identity type pacifiers 
can be instrumental in allowing for regional hegemonies, that such hegemonies are likely also to 
be more fragile in nature due to the necessary interest ceding processes not occurring. In the 
context of Taiwan’s prolonged socio-economic malaise, my analysis shows that once the 
over-determining effect of its identity pacifiers were weakened, that the more fundamental 
variable of class became relatively more pronounced again.  
  
Rather than a conscious class politics, I argue that Taiwan’s rising social discontent has spilled 
out primarily in a CSEI and CCP challenging direction. I argue that such contestation has not, 
however, altered Taiwan’s longer-term policy parameter because Taiwan’s social movements 
have not yet developed into a viable counter-historical bloc. This is because of their failure to 
develop a core class basis on which further class alliances can be forged. But, in the context of 
an atypical and geo-strategically influenced Cross-Strait historical bloc, I argue that the 
increased contestation against CSEI has, nevertheless, had a moderating effect by making the 
elite-led nature of CSEI more difficult to justify. On this basis, I explore how the CCP’s 
détente-induced policy imperative of winning support for a CSEI deepening also eroded 
significantly. This, I argue, was due particularly to the socio-economic malaise exacerbating 
effects of CSEI which was especially cogent in the context of Ma’s undeliverable economistic 
legitimation of CSEI as unambiguously leading to Taiwan’s economic prosperity. Although the 
Cross-Strait historical bloc remains intact, its regionally defined nature has ensure that the CCP 
and Taiwan’s LE capitalist class continue to be guided by varying long-term interests which 
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cannot be captured so easily within a capitalist vs anti-capitalist schema. Because of this feature, 
my analysis again suggests the importance of accounting for CSEI in terms of the fractional 
features of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class and the CCP’s contender state stature which allow for a 
precise analysis on both Taiwan’s internationalization toward China and China’s pull on Taiwan. 
The necessity of theorizing CSEI through a more regionally sensitive analysis is mirrored in the 
fact that rather than a transnational anti-capitalist struggle, that contestation processes in Taiwan 
have been primarily focused on challenging the CCP and CSEI  
   
Section 7.1: A Geo-Strategically Motivated CSEI Deepening 
Against the backdrop of a serious corruption scandal in which Chen Shui-bian was implicated, 
the DPP’s defeat in 2008 was a foregone conclusion and the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou returned to 
power with 54.45% of the vote. Ma’s campaign was run on the central theme of clean politics, 
rejuvenating Taiwan’s economy, rapprochement with China and a general commitment toward 
maintaining the sovereignty of the ROC (Chai, 2008, p. 84; Muyard, 2010, pp. 5–6). More 
specifically, Ma pledged that his policy would lead to the so-called 6-3-3 projection which 
promised a 6% annual GDP growth rate, below 3% unemployment and a per capita GDP of 
30,000 USD by 2016. Ma’s campaign emphasis on economic and material issues was 
influenced heavily by his China-friendly identity stance and mainlander background which 
meant that he had to underplay a specific identity dimension during the campaign. To reassure 
the approximately 80% unification opposing public (a composite of a Taiwan independence 
bloc and a majority status quo bloc), Ma also pledged a Cross-Strait policy of ‘no unification, 
no independence and no use of force’ (Kaeding, 2009, p. 19-20, 26; Keng & Schubert, 2010, p. 
288; Romberg, 2010a, p. 13). Ma’s strategy was well suited for Taiwan’s predominantly status 
quo favouring citizens who did not wish to see their government make any radical moves likely 
to potentiate a military attack, but who also sought to preserve Taiwan’s autonomy and liberal 
democratic institutions. Although Ma secured a relatively high level of public support during his 
first term which is reflected in the comfortable margins by which he was re-elected in 2012, his 
popularity dropped rapidly during his second term in office. This was due largely to the 
perceived inefficiency of his government, his administration’s evermore apparent elitist and 
business friendly leanings as well as his continued failure to deliver on promised economic 
outcomes. 
 
After his swearing in, Ma cemented the institutional foundations necessary for a Cross-Strait 
détente process and Cross-Strait talks were quickly elevated from a party-to-party basis to a 
resumed ARATs and SEF basis. In order to resume ARATS and SEF dialogue, Ma’s 
administration embraced the so-called 92 consensus in which both China and Taiwan agreed 
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that there was only one China to which both belonged, but the meaning of which could be 
interpreted differently by both. As such, the 92 consensus allowed Ma’s administration to secure 
a continued administrative autonomy for a state-like apparatus in Taiwan which was based on 
the Republic of China constitution (Romberg, 2010a, pp. 9-13). Proceeding on this framework 
allowed Ma to avoid issues of unification and independence entirely while building a pragmatic 
institutional relationship across the Strait in a manner acceptable to the CCP (Romberg, 2009, 
pp. 3–4). With the foundations in place for a Cross-Strait détente, a barrage of agreements were 
quickly signed which significantly reversed CSEI restrictions on all levels. By 2011, 12 
agreements were already reached and the most significant of which was the Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) (Teng & Lu, 2011, pp. 17–18). 
 
On China’s side, the CCP leadership pursued an accommodating policy and demonstrated a 
keen awareness toward Taiwan’s domestic constraints against a rapid unification process. 
Pursuing a continued long-term unification strategy, the CCP’s primary aim was to tackle less 
controversial Cross-Strait issues first while at the same time building the necessary long-term 
institutional and cultural rapport necessary for an eventual unification (Muyard, 2010, p. 6). 
This dynamic is evident in Hu Jintao’s ‘six-point proposal’ speech which acknowledged that the 
unification process would take a long time and toward which China and Taiwan needed to first 
facilitate a web of relationships to serve as a foundation for unification (Romberg, 2010a, p. 10). 
Xi Jinping, who assumed office in 2012, continued Hu’s CSEI policy and in addition to his 
stated support for a continued development of Cross-Strait relations on the basis of the 92 
consensus, Xi’s policy also continued to place a strong emphasis on soft targets such as the 
deepening of mutual understanding across the Strait (A. Chang, 2014). As such, a Cross-Strait 
status quo based on the 92 consensus continues to be favoured by both the CCP and the KMT 
for the time being as it allowed Beijing to proclaim ‘one China, two systems’ and Taipei to 
proclaim ‘two sides, one China’ (Bulard, 2012). Due to radically shifting Cross-Strait détente 
parameters, the CCP placed much greater emphasis on the ideational dimension of CSEI toward 
the aim of altering Taiwan’s long-term cultural orientation and disposition toward China. But, 
for the time being, this continues to rest on the pragmatic economic orientation of Taiwan’s 
citizens of which 69.2 % continued to favour a CSEI deepening in 2009 because CSEI was 
perceived as being economically beneficial (Ma, 2009, p. 18).  
 
Although numerous agreements were signed, the cornerstone to a deepened CSEI was the 
ECFA agreement which came into effect in September 12, 2010. The ECFA was a framework 
agreement which committed Taiwan and China to a long-term negotiation process toward 
signing more specific economic agreements which would liberalize and institutionalize 
economic openings between Taiwan and China. Despite ongoing negotiations, an Early Harvest 
135 
 
List immediately came into effect and a large number of product categories were subject to 
tariff phasing in Taiwan and China. Veering from standard FTA norms, ongoing negotiations 
were not confined to a specific timeframe as the ECFA agreement only called for negotiations 
to be completed ‘as soon as possible’ toward the long term goal of ‘diminish[ing] or 
eliminate[ing] tariff and non-tariff barriers’ on ‘the majority of goods exchanged’ between 
Taiwan and China (T.-L. Hong, 2011, pp. 9–10). As such, although the ECFA required both 
sides to commence negotiations on trade in goods and services within six months of its signing, 
only the loosely defined timeframe was stipulated that the two parties should ‘expeditiously 
conclude these negotiations.’ Never, in the agreement, is mentioned a 10 year transitional period 
common to FTAs, a fact which has been understood by some as arranging for more open-ended 
negotiations than is normally the case with FTAs (P. L. Hsieh, 2011, p. 148).  
 
The looser time constraint for follow-up negotiations is only one aspect of the ECFA’s atypical 
nature and its veering from common FTA norms. Another important aspect of the ECFA’s 
atypical nature is the less extensive scale of openings it calls for. This can already be observed 
in the ECFA’s preamble section which although stating that the agreement’s aim is to gradually 
reduce or eliminate trade and investment barriers ‘in line with the basic principles of the WTO,’ 
also stipulates that openings take into ‘consideration […] the economic conditions of the two 
parties’ (P. L. Hsieh, 2011, p. 146). The General Principles chapter further illustrates the 
ECFA’s gradualist tempo in which Articles 2.1 and 2.2 call only for ‘gradually reducing or 
eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in a substantial majority of goods’ and 
‘restrictions on a large number of sectors in trade and services between the two parties.’  The 
trade and investment chapter goes further by stipulating that traded goods included in the 
agreement are divided into three categories, ‘goods subject to immediate tariff elimination, […] 
phased tariff reduction, and exceptions or others’ (Article 3). In principle, the ECFA agreement 
also allows for post-hoc changes in which Articles 13 and 14 of chapter 5 specify the 
consultative process by which annexes can be written into the agreement and by which 
amendments on the agreement can be reached.  
 
Regardless of its atypical features, the ECFA was criticized relentlessly by the DPP which 
warned that it would lead to Taiwan’s over-reliance on China, was economically harmful and 
that it stood to threaten Taiwan’s sovereignty. This re-focusing on economic issues was an 
outcome of the DPP’s necessary strategic repositioning following Cheng Shui-bian’s corruption 
scandal. Projecting itself as advocating the interests of Taiwan’s middle class, working class and 
smaller-scale SME capitalist demographics, the DPP warned that the ECFA would intensify 
Taiwan’s industrial hollowing out, threaten the survival of domestically oriented SMEs and that 
it would impede Taiwan’s collective social welfare (M.-T. Chen, 2012). This line of criticism 
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against the ECFA is based on the assumption that it was a standard FTA interim-agreement 
which must be translated into fully-fledged economic liberalization within a 10 year time period. 
This mirrors arguments made in the economic nationalist literature which posits that ECFA will 
lead to a flooding of cheaper Chinese produced goods to Taiwan which are likely to spell an 
existential threat to its SMEs in more traditional and labour intensive sectors (L. Wang, 2011, p. 
67).   
 
Because the ECFA agreement was Ma’s signature policy, much emphasis was placed on its 
legitimation. At a broader level, the ECFA was legitimated as being conducive to the economic 
welfare of the majority of the citizenry and was presented as a catch-all solution to Taiwan’s 
ongoing economic malaise (J. Wang, 2010, pp. 152–153). Ma’s administration, for instance, 
predicted a 1.4% rise of Taiwan’s GDP as an outcome of the ECFA (Cooke, 2009, p. 8). 
Similarly, The Council of Labour Affairs also estimated that the ECFA would create 100,000 
jobs in Taiwan and that without it, Taiwan would lose 470,000 jobs (J. Wang, 2010, p. 154). At 
a more specific level, Ma also targeted low and medium income households and SME owners to 
convince them that they stood to benefit from the ECFA agreement (Romberg, 2010b, p. 4). 
Although many of Ma’s promises were vague, some specific assurances were also made which 
promised farmers and labourers that the ECFA would not result in a full opening of Taiwan’s 
agricultural and labour markets to China (J. Wang, 2010, p. 153). In addition to a positive 
component, the ECFA’s legitimation also contained a pronounced TINA type element which 
presented the ECFA as the only sure-hand path to Taiwan’s economic prosperity by lifting it 
from its increased international irrelevance due to its continued exclusion from global and 
regional economic integration processes (Muyard, 2010, pp. 11–12).  
 
In terms of the economic outcomes of ECFA, it is difficult to make the case that it harmed 
Taiwan’s interests or that it has resulted in economically scarring outcomes. This is due to the 
agreement’s atypical features which promise Taiwan an unusual degree of flexibility toward 
economic liberalization. Pasha Hsieh, for instance, highlights that the ECFA agreement only 
calls for sectorial openings of a ‘substantial majority of goods’ rather than ‘substantially all of 
the trade’ and ‘substantial sectorial coverage’ as stipulated by the WTO. Due to his liberal 
free-market perspective, however, Hsieh struggles to account for the atypical features of ECFA 
and he anticipates that the ECFA’s contra-free trade practices will be corrected subsequently by 
superseding WTO rules (P. L. Hsieh, 2011, pp. 149–150). This, however, is a problematic 
interpretation because of a failure to account for the CCP’s political and strategic imperatives 
for signing the ECFA agreement of which its atypical features are an explicit manifestation.  
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The CCP’s primary strategic imperative for signing the ECFA was to secure the goodwill in 
Taiwan toward both an intensified CSEI and an immediately increased electoral support for the 
KMT. As such, it is important that the ECFA must be perceived positively by Taiwan’s 
citizenry. Wang Yi, the director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), for instance, 
specifically stated that the ECFA agreement would see more items for tariff reduction on the 
Chinese side, the protection of Taiwan’s weaker industries and also no increase in Chinese 
agricultural exports or labour flows to Taiwan (Leng, 2011, p. 369). Two months later, the 
economic director of China’s Ministry of Agriculture also stated not only that China would not 
press Taiwan to open its still protected agricultural market, but that it would also significantly 
ease Chinese limitations on Taiwanese agricultural exports to China (Romberg, A.D., 2010b, p. 
2). Nowhere is the CCP’s interest ceding more evident than in the ECFA’s early harvest list 
which has included 539 items for tariff phasing which are worth an estimated export value of 
138.4 billion USD on China’s side while Taiwan has only included 267 items worth an 
estimated export value of 28.6 billion USD (P.-L. Hsieh, 2011, p. 127). Such pronounced 
interest ceding on China’s part mirrors assurances made by Wen Jiabao that China would yield 
asymmetrically preferential tariff reduction rates in the early harvest list and that the CCP would 
‘sacrifice some of Beijing’s interests to benefit Taiwan’ (D. P. Chen, 2011, p. 25).  
 
The atypical and contra liberal features of ECFA were only the most visible manifestation of a 
more general CCP permitted contra liberal trade relationship between Taiwan and China which 
was long in place before Ma came into office. This is particularly evident in the example of 
China’s zero-tariff treatment of a selected list of Taiwanese agricultural products despite 
Taiwan’s systematic exclusion of 865 agricultural and 1377 industrial product types from China 
as late as 2010. Although this was in breach of the WTO’s most favoured nation treatment, 
China refrained from filling complaints (P. L. Hsieh, 2011, p. 128-130). The ECFA agreement 
institutionalized such contra-free trade practices further which enabled the CCP to enhance its 
self-projection of China as economically benefitting Taiwan. China’s economic interest ceding 
was easily within the CCP’s capacity due to Taiwan’s deep economic reliance on China and the 
asymmetric relationship between the two. This dynamic is particularly clear in Taiwan’s 
consistent annual trade surplus with China which measured at 116 billion USD in 2013 (Bodeen 
& Evav, 2014). This remained viable, however, because of Cross-Strait asymmetries which can 
be observed in Taiwan’s exports to China accounting for approximately 40% of its total exports 
while only accounting for 8% of China’s total imports (D. P. Chen, 2011, p. 29). Furthermore, 
although China was Taiwan’s largest trading partner in 2008, Taiwan was only China’s seventh 
largest trading partner (J. Wang, 2010, p. 148).  
  
The atypical CSEI relationship was not only confined to trade in goods, but also applied to 
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Cross-Strait financial and labour flows. Although the CCP has lifted many existing restrictions 
on Taiwanese investments in China, the same was not the case in Taiwan and Chinese capital 
continued to face serious restrictions. This is evident, for instance, in Taiwan’s ‘negative list’ 
exclusion system which was aimed at restricting Chinese investments deemed to pose potential 
security or environmental concerns. As an outcome, Chinese investment in Taiwan still only 
measured at the pithy some of 150 million USD by 2011. Although Ma’s administration lifted 
many existing restrictions, many also remained on Chinese capital, whether in terms of sectorial 
restrictions as in the case of semiconductors, LCD, LED and machine tools or in terms of 
general ownership restrictions which, for instance, stipulated a 50% Chinese ownership limit for 
joint ventures (China Post, 2012a). Thus, even though the KMT liberalized many restrictions on 
Chinese capital, as late as 2012, 58% of business categories in Taiwan’s manufacturing were 
still closed to Chinese investment (China Post, 2012a). But, because the Cross-Strait historical 
bloc was valued by the CCP primarily to promote its unification aims and because Taiwan’s 
market was not crucial to Chinese capital, Taiwan’s continued restrictions on Chinese capital 
and labour flows were tolerated.  
  
Guided by a policy which was heavily influenced by the logic of perception management, the 
CCP’s CSEI strategy also proceeded on a number of other important pathways. One of these has 
been the practice of high-level CCP provincial and city official-led procurement group visits 
which have placed orders for a large quantity of Taiwanese produced goods. One such group 
headed by Guangdong Provincial Governor, Huang Huahua, was estimated to have placed 
orders worth a total of 5.2 billion USD (Novak, 2010). Among noteworthy beneficiaries of the 
CCP’s procurement policy were Taiwan’s now-struggling LCD firms such as Chi Mei which 
became the largest supplier of monitors to six of China’s major television brands in 2012, a 
market which accounted for 38% of Chi Mei’s total sales volume (China Post, 2012b). Such 
procurement purchases were driven to a large degree by the CCP’s capacity to discipline and 
steer the investment and purchasing decisions of Chinese capitalists. This can, for instance, be 
observed in a Chinese delegation of 46 home appliance firms which in June, 2009 purchased 
billions of dollars worth of electronics as a part of the Chinese ‘Home appliances shipped to 
countryside policy’ (Chen, H.-H. N., 2011, p. 186) Although correlation does not always imply 
causation, Wang Yi’s 2008 announcement that China would adopt measures to aid Taiwan to 
face difficulties arising from the global financial crisis are particularly telling (Novak, 2010). 
 
To facilitate the KMT’s electoral prospects, the CCP faced pronounced pressures to 
manufacture a public goodwill toward the party through immediately perceived unilateral 
economic benefits (The Economist, 2010a). Because the CSEI trajectory was now on path, the 
CCP intensified its perception management strategy by projecting itself as delivering 
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specifically toward the interests of Taiwan’s citizens. As such, specific promises were also 
made toward high-priority CCP targets such as Taiwan’s agricultural, labour and SME capitalist 
demographics (Leng, 2011, p. 369). This dynamic, however, places the CCP in a double-bind 
situation in the longer term by which it needs to genuinely benefit the material interests of 
Taiwan’s non-capitalist classes in order to secure a necessary support for a continued CSEI. As 
a subsequent section will demonstrate, support for CSEI has decreased of late due specifically to 
a failure of CSEI to benefit the interests of Taiwan’s non-capitalist classes, but for the time 
being, a broad consensus does remain toward the continued desirability of CSEI.  
 
In addition to a process of an unprecedented institutionalization of CSEI and a marked 
Cross-Strait détente, it is clear that the overall parameters of CSEI remain largely unchanged 
and that the Cross-Strait historical bloc continued to hold unambiguously. But, what has 
changed is that the CCP has increasingly streamlined ideational narratives aimed at securing 
Taiwan’s continued popular support for CSEI and for which it has publicly projected itself as 
ceding China’s interests to benefit Taiwan’s citizenry. This being so, the success or failure of 
delivering on promises of CSEI-induced welfare enhancements naturally plays an ever more 
important role toward influencing the public’s support for Ma’s Cross-Strait policies.  
 
Section 7.2: Taiwan’s Ongoing Socio-Economic Malaise  
Regardless of the atypical and interest ceding features of CSEI, Taiwan’s economic malaise 
continued due to its fundamentally unaltered social order features. This is so especially because 
China’s interest ceding was primarily aimed at public perception management and consequently 
did not lead to a structural transformation of Taiwan’s economic base. Even in terms of the 
CCP’s interest ceding, most resources have accrued to Taiwan’s capitalist class. This, however, 
is an unavoidable outcome of Taiwan’s historical bloc defined and capital advancing social 
order and CSEI features.  
  
Since Ma came to office, Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise intensified due to its continued 
OEM/ODM based economic composition and its LE capital defined social order features. 
Because of Taiwan’s sub-contracting industrial composition, the scale of capital flight to China 
continued to intensify significantly and China-bound investment sums rose from 64.9 billion 
USD to 97.3 billion USD between 2007 and 2010 (Tung, 2011). Like Chen Shui-bian’s 
administration, Ma’s administration was supportive of such trends and eased existing 
investment restrictions toward China by, for instance, raising the upper limit of China-bound 
investments for publicly listed companies from 40% to 60% of total firm assets (H.-H. N. Chen, 
2011, p. 172). More specifically, a continued capital flight within Taiwan’s highest value-added 
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IT sector also continued and many Taiwanese IT firms now had as much as 80% of their 
production capacity in China (K. Cheng et al 2011, p. 526). Because CSEI was propelled by 
Taiwan’s continued OEM/ODM based industrial composition, rather than leading to sectorial 
upgrading, it instead further cushioned Taiwan’s IT firms within their sub-contracting role in 
global production chains. As such, Taiwan’s economy continued, as a whole, to be defined by a 
cost-down production based business model in which branding and innovation remained as 
elusive a goal as ever (Leng, 2011, p. 370).  
  
It is true that some Taiwanese firms have attempted to pursue a non-OEM/ODM based 
upgrading strategy, but such firms are the exception while a majority continue to secure margins 
typical of OEM/ODM production. Among firms that have attempted to develop an original 
brand manufacturing (OBM) strategy, most have continued to focus on development and design 
as opposed to more basic R&D or branding which are essential towards ascending to the global 
frontier. Also, most firms which have attempted an OBM type development strategy such as 
Acer and Asus continue to pursue a two-leg approach by which they also continue to produce 
under an OEM/ODM business model. Although it appears that predominantly OBM type firms 
such as HTC have emerged, even it is better understood as a sub-major firm which has only 
enjoyed success due to specializing in niche segments while its faring of late has also not been 
promising (W.-W. Chu, 2009, p. 1065). But, even if firms such as HTC, Asus and Acer were 
granted a position as successful OBM-type firms, it remains the case that alongside the bicycle 
firm, Giant Manufacturing, these remain the only globally known Taiwanese brands (China Post, 
2012c). As such, although the revenue of Taiwan’s top 1000 enterprises have tripled between 
2003 and 2012, their average profit margins shrank from 6.3% to 2.2%. The same dynamic is 
apparent in Taiwan’s service sector in which margins have dropped from 4.8% to 2.6% during 
the same time (Hsiung, 2014). 
  
Due to the scale and prolonged timeframe of Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise, the causal role 
of Taiwan’s sub-contracting economy in exacerbating this malaise has been much more difficult 
to ignore of late, especially in the context of China’s meteoric economic development. Because 
of Taiwan’s primarily commodity-type market specialization, it has been particularly vulnerable 
to global competition such as that posed by China which is already more competitive than 
Taiwan in many sectors due to the success of the CCP’s long term national development plan.15 
As such, it has come as a shock in Taiwan that many of its most advanced IT sub-sectors have 
fared so poorly of late that the very future of Taiwan’s DRAM sector is in doubt while the LCD 
sector also faced declining and, at times, negative margins. Some firms such as Chi Mei 
                                                     
15 Interviews with anonymous interviewees 3 and 4 and 5 in December 1, December 9 and December 19, 2012.  
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Optronics have even faced solvency issues which have prompted a government-led credit 
rollover agreement (K. Chen, 2012; Yamashita, 2014). As such, Taiwan’s failure to upgrade its 
economy from an OEM/ODM business model has become increasingly acknowledged as an 
issue warranting national concern (The Economist, 2010b). But, at the same time, Ma’s policy 
thinking also continues to be based on the notion of free-market and CSEI induced economic 
upgrading while his administration has been responsive primarily to OEM/ODM managing 
business executives in its CSEI policy formation (L. Wang, 2011, p. 67).  
   
Coinciding with Taiwan’s industrial malaise and wanting labour environment, China’s rapid 
industrial upgrading has now also had the effect of drawing in many skilled and professional 
workers from Taiwan for long-term employment in China. This is so much the case that Taiwan 
is now faced with a severe brain drain crisis by which professionals in a wide variety of 
managerial and professional fields have been lured to China due to cultural-linguistic 
similarities between the two (M.-C. Tsai & Chang, 2010, pp. 639–640; C.-Y. Yang, 2012). The 
pull to China has been compounded particularly by changes in China’s labour market in which 
skilled and managerial staff have started to command significantly higher wages than in Taiwan. 
Because of relevant know how and a linguistic compatibility, many Chinese firms have also 
increasingly engaged in the practice of aggressive headhunting by which targeted individuals 
are offered salaries many times higher than their salary in Taiwan. China’s LCD sector, for 
instance, owes a significant portion of its success to Taiwan’s China-bound personnel.16 Such a 
brain drain crisis is not, however, surprising given Taiwan’s wanting labour conditions which 
spans the entirety of its private sector labour environment (Bulard, 2012).  
 
Paradoxically, China’s rapid economic upgrading has now led to an increased process of capital 
return from China which has posed further challenges toward Taiwan’s labour environment. The 
cause of the capital return is that China’s successful economic upgrading has led to pronounced 
down-stream labour wage increases and a much more rigidly enforced environmental protection 
regime, particularly toward non-Chinese firms. As such, a majority of firms that are likely to 
return to Taiwan do so because they are not competitive enough to remain in China.
17
 Rather 
than empowering Taiwan’s labour movement by increasing the leverage and bargaining power 
of labour, Ma’s administration has proposed instead an intensified OEM/ODM capital 
advancing policy of island-wide special economic zones in which migrant labour quotas are to 
be widened and in which wages can be de-leveraged from Taiwan’s minimum wage 
requirements. Although Ma’s wage deleveraging proposals have faced serious opposition and 
have not been implemented yet, his administration’s state-induced low-wage policy thinking has 
                                                     
16 Interviews with anonymous interviewees 3 and 4 in December 1 and December 9, 2012. 
17 Interview with anonymous interviewees 4 and 8 in December 9 and December 22, 2012
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been rightfully criticized by labour groups as fostering a national cost-down framework.
18
 The 
risk of capital return to impede economic upgrading has even been acknowledged by some 
business leaders such as Acer’s Stan Shih who agrees that this could damage Taiwan’s economy 
if returnees fail to create sufficient value (E. Huang, 2012).  
 
Because of the de-leveraged relationship between economic growth and the citizenry’s 
socio-economic welfare, Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise naturally worsened. For one, 
Taiwan’s real wage growth continued on its negative growth trajectory from an average decline 
of 3.4% between 2000 and 2012 and 3.5% between 2008 and 2012 (Taipei Times, 2014). 
Average wages for junior-college graduates, for instance, continued to average at 26,400, a 
marked contrast with the equivalent wage of 35,200 NTD in Hong Kong and 74000 NTD in 
South Korea (H. Shih, 2014). In the context of a continually growing GDP, the wealth gap 
between the rich and the poor has also continued to increase significantly. This is evident in 
2009 statistics on disposable income differences between the top and bottom 10 and 5% of 
income earners which measured at 28 times and almost 75 respectively, the latter of which only 
measured at 65 in 2008 (S. Huang, 2011). Ma’s capital advancing taxation policies have 
exacerbated such trends further. This is particularly so in terms of Ma’s reduction of the 
enterprise income tax and the inheritance tax from 25% to 17% and from 50 to 10% respectively 
(H.-Y. Chang, 2012). 
 
In addition to welfare declines, Taiwan’s deteriorating socio-economic malaise was also 
particularly prescient at the level of Taiwan’s labour environment. Taiwan’s average annual 
work hours, for instance, measure at 22,00, approximately 20% higher than Japanese and 
American equivalents (Sui, 2012). Long working hours are the norm in almost all of Taiwan’s 
economic sectors in which 63.9% of office workers, for instance, work an average of 10.4 hours 
daily while 21.4% are estimated to work an average of 11 hours or longer (China Post, 2011). 
The severity of Taiwan’s overwork culture is nowhere more apparent than in the number of 
overwork related deaths which measured at almost 50 in 2011 (Sui, 2012). Taiwan does have a 
legal work time limit which calls for a maximum of either 40 hours worked weekly or 84 hours 
every two weeks, but most employers do not follow such limits because of lax enforcement 
(China Post, 2011; Sui, 2012). Although excessive, Taiwan’s intensive labour regime has been 
perpetuated within a working culture in which individuals are averse to stand out within a 
strongly paternalistic, hierarchical and pyramidial work structure in large companies and SMEs 
alike (Bulard, 2012).   
 
                                                     
18 Interview with Hung Ching-hsu and Sun Yu-lian in December 24 and December 24, 2012 
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Because of Taiwan’s capital advancing social order and CSEI features, there is little question 
that CSEI failed to deliver on promised welfare improvements in Taiwan. As such, it was also 
increasingly clear that the Cross-Strait historical bloc’s legitimation of CSEI continued to fall 
short of its promised outcomes. This being so, the only remaining question is how Taiwan’s 
continually capital advancing social order could be legitimated. 
  
Section 7.3: A Strained Social Order Legitimation  
Since the onset of CSEI, it has coincided with a rising national identity debate which has 
diverted attention away from the class defined features within which CSEI occurs and in which 
Taiwan’s social order is defined. Although a Taiwan identity debate continued to underlie 
Taiwan’s politics, its intensity receded so that Ma’s administration came to face an increasingly 
more concerted opposition against his business friendly policies. This was largely an outcome 
of Ma’s economically based legitimation of ECFA which ensured that his administration stood 
to face enormous pressure if its promises failed to materialize and if Taiwan’s socio-economic 
malaise continued. Coupled with the DPP’s tactical reorientation toward a stronger issue 
emphasis, Taiwan’s citizenry became increasingly receptive again to an issues-based political 
articulation.  
 
7.3.1 Social Movement Widening  
Due to the combination of factors outlined above, Taiwan’s citizens also became more 
responsive again to more tangible economic and policy issues. For one, an increased sentiment 
prevailed that Taiwan’s labour conditions and quality of life left much to be desired. This was 
particularly evident in a large scale survey conducted in 2011which revealed that 77.4% of 
office workers held themselves to be leading ‘poor’ lives which were characterized by low 
income, long hours of work and a lack of sleep (China Post, 2011). Because of an increased 
public receptiveness to welfare issues, Ma was no longer able to side-line the labour and welfare 
issue entirely, especially toward the end of his first term in office when he faced increased 
re-election pressures. Ma’s administration, for instance, was instrumental in the passage of the 
Three Labour Laws (The labor Union Act, The Settlement of Labor Disputes Act and the 
Collective Agreement Act) which for the first time allowed the formation of inter-firm unions, 
guaranteed freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike (H.-H. Chen, 
2012, p. 23). On a purely institutional level, the passage of the Three Labor Laws is somewhat 
paradoxical, especially as to why institutional actors would support legal revisions which, on the 
surface, appeared to curtail the interests of Taiwan’s hegemonic LE capitalist class. A common 
assumption among labour organizers, however, is that this is likely because of the relatively 
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inconsequential nature of the laws in light of the weakness and co-opted nature of labour unions. 
Furthermore, the Three Labor Laws revision is also said to contain a capital advancing 
dimension because it was guided by the long-term aim of removing the state from a continued 
labour dispute mediating role.
19
  
 
The self-perception among labour organizers that Taiwan’s labour movement remains weak is 
not without substance and applies especially to labour unions. For one, labour unions continue 
to suffer from the intense factionalism and insularism highlighted in the previous chapter while 
a previously DPP co-opted TCTU also continued to chart an increasingly conservative path. 
This being so, the overall sentiment among labour organizers is that in organizational terms, the 
prospect for Taiwan’s labour unions remains bleak.20 As such, it is hardly surprising that in 
2011, 19 out of 20 workers on average continued to lack protection from effective labour unions 
(Y. Chiu, 2011, p. 73). But, although unions remained weak, Taiwan did see the development of 
increasingly effective national labour advocacy organizations which individual unions often 
aligned with and which succeeded at capturing media attention. This was so much the case that, 
at times, a distinct labour agenda significantly constrained the interests of Taiwan’s LE 
capitalist class.  
 
The most pronounced example of labour’s success at constraining the interests of the LE 
capitalist class relates to the IT sector furlough controversy. This refers to a spate of mandatory 
temporary unwaged work days announced across a number of IT firms in 2011 which was 
justified on the grounds of decreased global orders and a general economic slowdown. Although 
government issued statistics are more conservative, they, nevertheless, measured the total 
number of employees on furloughs at 12,487 in January, 2012 (C. Wang, 2012). The opportune 
timing and attention drawing nature of the IT sector was highly conducive toward advancing a 
labour agenda because it occurred while Ma faced a looming re-election and was under 
significant pressure to appear responsive. As such, progressive Labour groups organized 
forcefully to the furlough incident and forced Ma to respond, especially when the issue became 
increasingly controversial after it was known that many furlough implementing firms such as 
Everlight continued to be profitable. Faced with a growing public backlash, Ma eventually 
voiced his disagreement with the practice. After this, The CLA also announced its intention to 
investigate the matter by looking into individual cases in which unlawful furloughs may have 
occurred while also warning that the burden of proof would rest on employers (L. Lin, 2011). 
The reasoning for such a course of action has been speculated on, but the electorally driven 
nature of Ma’s response is difficult to deny. Regardless of the specificities of the furlough issue, 
                                                     
19 Interviews with Ke Yi-min and anonymous interviewee 16 in December 27 and December 25, 2012.. 
20 Interviews with Ke Yi-min, Lin Tzu-wen and Wu Yong-yi in December 27, December 25, 2012 and January 7, 2013. 
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it also denotes a much larger social shift by which Taiwan’s policy makers now faced a public 
which was increasingly receptive to material and economic issues on which a social movement 
agenda could more easily resonate.  
 
In addition to a less emotive Taiwan identity debate, the increased receptivity of the public 
toward labour issues was also the outcome of advances made by movement organizers toward 
widening a social movement agenda. In terms of Taiwan’s labour movement, for example, a 
much more multi-faceted narrative crystallized which highlights numerous inter-related issues 
such as Taiwan’s overwork-based labour environment, furloughs and corporate friendly taxation 
regime. Furthermore, there have also been attempts to forge a viable core social movement 
alliance, most crucial to which is a so-called red-green alliance between the labour and 
environmental movements. Thus far, bridging the gap between the two has been a challenging 
process and remains a work in progress. The Green Party and the Raging Citizens Act Now, for 
instance, have attempted to forge such an alliance, but they eventually parted paths due to 
irreconcilable differences between their organizational apparatuses and strategy.
21
 For now, 
organized labour remains the weaker of the two and red-green organizers such as Lai Wei-jie of 
the Green Citizens Alliance note that the weakness and internal contradictions of Taiwan’s 
labour movement necessitate that its aim must first be on self-strengthening.
22
 Regardless, the 
goal of forging a red-green alliance is commonly acknowledged by movement organizers as 
pressing and crucial to a widening of the social basis of social movements.  
 
In order to shape Taiwan’s social order parameters, an issues-widening remains crucial because 
it allows for the development of a more pronounced class agenda on which a prospective 
counter-historical bloc can be developed. Although this has not yet crystallized and although 
Taiwan’s social movements lack a strong social basis for mobilization, organizers have 
succeeded at least at reaching a much wider audience toward its concerns. A crucial factor for 
this has been discursive advances such as the development of the strategically apt catch-all 
anti-poverty narrative which has framed Taiwan’s widening wealth gap as an outcome of 
institutional injustices. Narratives such as this have not been framed on explicit class terms, but 
rather in terms of the social good and resonate much more strongly with Taiwan’s still 
left-weary citizenry due to long-term legacies of the KMT’s anti-Communist propaganda. In 
addition to actions such as hunger strikes to raise awareness on Taiwan’s wealth distribution, a 
number of progressive organizations such as the Anti-Poverty alliance have also been formed 
which have been successful at capturing media attention and shaping Taiwan’s political 
discourse (I.-C. Lee, 2011). Chien Hsih-chieh, a central force in Taiwan’s issue-widening and 
                                                     
21 Interviews with Ke Yi-min and Pan Han-shen in December 27, 2012 and January 4, 2013. 
22 Interview with Lai Wei-chieh in January 8, 2013. 
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head of the Anti-Poverty Alliance, notes that an issue-widening is important because it allows 
for the articulation of a positive vision of social transformation in Taiwan which is necessary to 
widen the more narrow focus of Taiwan’s labour movement.23  
 
On the question of issue widening, many labour organizers and union cadre express reservations, 
especially in terms of organization and mobilization capacity. Many organizers point to the 
proliferation of 2-3 man strong NGO type organizations which operate without a strong social 
base as a problem.
24
 This is also acknowledged by Chien who notes that a movement widening 
is necessary because of the mobilization weaknesses of unions in which labour actions no 
longer draw in the larger numbers they used to and with participants even of successful actions 
only tending to measure in the 100 or 1000s.
25
 This is a valid point and in the context of the 
continued weakness of organized labour, an issue widening is a strategic response which does 
not impede labour unions from expanding their membership while an issue-widening can also 
potentially draw in a wider array of participants. But, because this is also still very much a 
process in motion, Taiwan’s social movements have had a checkered legacy in which they have 
only enjoyed a slim number of high profile successes, the most noteworthy of which are the 
furlough controversy and the reversal of the Kuokoang petrochemical plant, both of which 
immediately preceded Ma’s 2012 re-election. This is not surprising, however, as Taiwan’s 
social movements are not yet organized on the basis of a viable counter historical bloc which 
can alter the class basis of Taiwan’s state. 
  
After Ma’s 2012 victory, his administration became much less responsive to social contestation 
while his administration continued to advance an unambiguous capital advancing policy 
framework. This was particularly evident in the case of a proposed stock market transaction tax 
to address Taiwan’s chronic budget deficits and rising national debt which was supported by 
many of Taiwan’s social movements. In response to pronounced business advocacy, the 
transaction tax was so severely watered down as to become largely void of substance and in 
response to which Ma’s finance minister, Christina Lu, resigned from her post in protest (Shih, 
Su, & Wang, 2012). A similar dynamic was demonstrated in the case of a CLA proposed 
monthly 200 NTD minimum wage increase which faced such firm opposition from capitalists 
that Huang Rushuan, the head of the CLA, was forced to cancel the policy and after which she 
also stepped down in protest. Despite organizing in full force, Taiwan’s labour movement and 
social movement allies did not succeed at winning this very slim wage increase. It was only in 
2013 that Taiwan’s monthly minimum wage was finally increased by 267 NTD to 19,047NTD 
                                                     
23 Interview with Chien Hsih-chieh in December 17, 2012. 
24 Interviews with Wu Yong-yi and anonymous interviewee 18 in January 7, 2013 and December 25, 2012. 
25 Interview with Chien Hsih-chieh in December 17, 2013. 
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in order to keep wages in line with inflation. But, the stipulation was also added that future 
monthly minimum wage increases required a 3% increase of gross domestic product for 2 
consecutive quarters or a decline of Taiwan’s unemployment below 4% for two months in a row 
(K. Lin, 2013).   
 
7.3.2 Social Movements and China 
A failure of Taiwan’s social movements to take the lead in the development of a counter 
historical bloc was also influenced by continued reverberations of a Taiwan identity component 
among its organizers. This is an especially important issue because it is also true that Taiwan’s 
social movements have made significant progress to overcome identity cleavages. Because of 
such developments, some scholars have argued that a ‘transcendence’ attitude has increasingly 
taken hold among campaigners who are successfully working to transcend divisive identity 
cleavages by streamlining a first instance material agenda (H.-H. Chen, 2012, p. 21). But, some 
degree of caution is warranted as a relative de-emphasizing of identity cleavages is still very 
much an ongoing process. In the case of Taiwan’s three main national labour advocacy 
organizations, for instance, the TLF and Labor Party continue to perceive identity cleavages as 
genuine issues while positioning themselves as Taiwan nationalist and Chinese nationalist 
respectively. It is only the Raged Citizens Act Now which posits that identity, although 
important, should be perceived of as a second degree issue which comes after the forging of a 
common cause on class.
26
  
  
The fact that an identity politics continues to guide the thinking of Taiwan’s social movements 
is especially observable in the case of the recent sunflower movement which protested against 
the Cross-Strait Service Pact signed between the SEF and ARATS in June 21, 2013. The service 
pact was a major extension of the ECFA agreement which will significantly liberalize trade in 
services between Taiwan and China and which opens 64 Taiwanese services sectors to Chinese 
investment and 80 Chinese service sectors to Taiwanese investment. In Taiwan, opened sectors 
include transportation, publishing, tourism, cosmetics, online gaming, Chinese medicine and 
funeral services. On the Chinese side, opened sectors include finance, retail electronics, 
e-commerce, construction, transportation and publishing. But, specific restrictions do remain on 
the degree of liberalization in both Taiwan and China. In Taiwan, for instance, Chinese capital 
faces continued ownership restrictions such as a 50% ratio in the publishing sector and 
employment restrictions in the beauty parlour and hair salon sector in which Chinese invested 
firms are only permitted to employ Taiwanese staff (Moh, 2013). 
 
                                                     
26 Interviews with Sun Yu-lian, Tang Shu and Ke yi-min in December 24, December 28 and December 27, 2012 
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From the onset, the Cross-Strait Service Pact was mired by controversy, even in terms of intra 
capitalist contradictions. This was so because of fears that an opening of Taiwan’s service sector 
would pose serious threats toward domestically oriented firms and numerous industry 
associations representing sectors such as beauty treatment and publishing, have raised concerns 
over this (China Post, 2014a). But at the same time, affected sectors are not ones in which 
capital consolidation is pronounced and which consequently have secured a more limited 
political influence. This is in stark contrast to the agreement’s beneficiary sectors such as the 
consolidated services, finance and industrial sectors which are dominated by LEs and which 
overwhelmingly support the Services Pact. Consolidated services and finance capitalists support 
the trade pact because they benefit in terms of market expansion opportunities in China while 
industrial capitalists supported the pact because a failure of its passage may undermine 
negotiations for a trade in goods agreement which is still to follow (C. Hsu, 2013; Taipei Times, 
2013). The intra-capital contradiction dynamic is best illustrated in the words of vice chairman 
of the Chinese National association of Industry and Commerce, Nelson Chang, who states that 
‘we should not abandon 90% of our local industries for fear of hurting the other 10%’ (China 
Post, 2014b). 
 
Complications quickly arose because the Service Pact had to be ratified in the Legislative Yuan 
in which it faced concerted opposition by the DPP. Although eventually cleared in committee, 
the passage of the Service Pact was plagued by controversy and eventually led to the 
development of Taiwan’s anti-Service Pact, Sunflower movement to occupy Taiwan’s 
legislature. Protestors took issue particularly with procedural shortfalls by which the KMT’s 
chair of the Service Pact reviewing committee cleared it for review on a technicality so that the 
agreement was to be voted in full by the legislature thereafter rather than on a clause-by-clause 
basis (China Post, 2014a). The Sunflower movement, although student led, drew support both 
from social movements and Taiwan nationalists. The student occupiers remained in the 
Legislative Yuan for a total of 20 days. In addition to a constant sit-in around the Legislative 
Yuan, numerous rallies were also planned which drew in impressive numbers, the largest of 
which was estimated at 500,000 strong. Due to the scale of the action, a well-managed media 
campaign and a wide reaching support network, the Sunflower movement secured a pronounced 
political leverage and could not be ignored easily. This was especially so because unlike the 
minimum wage or stock market transaction tax campaigns, the Sunflower movement was a 
bridgehead which connected socio-economic concerns with a nuanced Taiwan identity agenda 
(C. Tang & Pan, 2014). 
 
The occupiers had three central demands. Firstly, they demanded that Ma meet with them and 
apologize about the hasty passage of the Services Pact. Secondly, they demanded that Wang 
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Jin-pyng, the KMT’s legislative speaker and Ma’s chief political opponent within the KMT, 
meet with them. Finally, they also demanded that legislation should be passed which would 
institutionalize an item-by-item legislative oversight for the Services Pact and similar 
Cross-Strait agreements signed in the future. Wang eventually agreed to meet with the occupiers 
on the 6
th
 of April during which he promised that he would not mediate Cross-Party negotiations 
on the Service Pact before a supervisory law monitoring such agreements was passed (Wei, 
2014). Although Ma and the KMT party caucus refused to support Wang, they have had little 
choice but to concede for the time being, especially in the context of a looming 2014 year-end 
legislative election for which many KMT legislators acknowledge that it is difficult to ratify the 
agreement after the Sunflower movement (H.-C. Shih, 2014). For one, it does not help the KMT 
that an estimated 73.7% of public opinion supports a clause-by-clause review of the Service 
Pact. This, coupled with Ma’s 14.5% approval rating, has ensured that KMT legislators are 
seriously concerned about the electoral impacts of an abrupt passage of the services pact (C. 
Wang, 2014). 
 
As noted already, the Sunflower movement was composed a variety of interests and due to 
which a clear class agenda did not emerge explicitly. For one, economic nationalist concerns 
underlined the student movement which placed a strong emphasis on the likely damage that the 
Service Pact would pose to Taiwan’s predominantly micro-scaled service sector firms. One 
recurring example that opponents of the Service Pact highlighted was the damage that Chinese 
competition in hair and beauty salon sector will damage the prospects of Taiwanese firms in 
which an estimated 20,000 of the total 60,000 sectorial workforce are self-employed or unpaid 
family labour (Lai, 2014). Clearly, there was a class element in such concerns, but the 
movement never developed a coherent narrative around class issues and its agenda thus 
remained vague. This is even more evident when attention is turned to labour unions and 
organizations, many of which supported the student movement while many others instead 
condemned it (China Post, 2014c; C.-H. Lo, 2014). This is not surprising, however, as many of 
the movement’s concerns contained a Taiwan nationalist dimension which naturally did not 
bode well with China-friendly labour organizations such as the labour party or more pragmatic 
labour unions which were not against CSEI per se.  
 
Rather than focusing on the class-led nature of CSEI as an issue in itself, the Sunflower 
movement has instead developed a narrative on democratic accountability and 
self-determination which contains an implicit Taiwan nationalist agenda. But, rather than being 
framed around an explicit Taiwan nationalism, the Taiwan nationalist component of the student 
movement was expressed primarily in terms of institutional accountability. As such, protestors 
took issue especially with the KMT and the CCP’s unaccountable roles in the signing of the 
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Service Pact which is said to advance only the interests of a political and corporate elite while 
‘sacrific[ing] the rights and benefits of most of the public. The student movement’s Taiwan 
nationalist current can be seen in the words of the movement’s figurehead, Chen Weiting, who 
notes that ‘from this moment on no behind closed doors negotiation is allowed [and] no regime 
can be permitted to make brazen moves to sell out Taiwan.’ He concluded that ‘We Taiwanese, 
not anybody else, are the masters of the island.’ (A. Hsiao, 2014)  But, despite its lack of a 
clearly defined class basis, the Sunflower movement is reflective of an increasingly difficult to 
legitimate CSEI deepening in Taiwan while a previously overwhelming support for CSEI, has 
weakened and which, in turn, also poses increased challenges to the CCP’s long-term 
geo-strategic interests. This is especially so in the long-term trend by which a Taiwanese 
political self-perception has intensified. The only difference is that this self-perception is no 
longer articulated as visibly as before because it has become a given in Taiwan. This is because 
an astounding 69.7% of Taiwanese view China and Taiwan as two separate countries while only 
9.6% think that both sides belong to a ‘divided Republic of China’ (C. Wang, 2013). Due to a 
pragmatic inclination, however, the social consensus remains in Taiwan toward a continued 
Cross-Strait status quo (Bodeen & Evav, 2014). 
 
Regardless of its overlapping identity and economic concerns, the immediate political outcome 
of the Sunflower movement was the KMT’s unprecedented defeat in November 28 Mayoral 
elections. The KMT leadership made matters worse by under-estimating the influence of the 
Sunflower movement and Taiwan’s increasingly politicized youth. Instead, the KMT continued 
to champion its LE capital advancing domestic and CSEI policies while also nominating 
numerous candidates from powerful political families who secured enormous financial gains 
through CSEI and who quickly became focal points for the public’s anger. Furthermore, KMT 
candidates also relied heavily on captains of industry such as Foxconn’s Terry Guo to campaign 
for them which, for the first time, backfired instead (C.-H. Hsieh, 2014). Not only did KMT 
mayoral candidates lose by large margins in traditional DPP strongholds, but also in KMT 
strongholds such as Taichung and Taipei (Fang, Yang and Yang, 2014). Although this defeat was 
due to a number of factors, an important reason was the public’s discontent toward Ma’s 
perceived elitist, unresponsive and inefficient rule which was blamed for Taiwan’s worsening 
socio-economic climate. The defeat was considered as such a decisive blow to the KMT that Ma 
Ying-jiou was forced to step down as party chairman afterward (C.-H. Hsieh, 2014). 
 
On the flipside, the DPP secured an impressive victory for which it campaigned on both a more 
implicit Taiwan identity stance, but also focused more heavily on economic issues which 
resonated with an increased public discontent toward Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise. The 
current DPP chairman, Tsai Ying-wen, underscores this, for instance, by acknowledged that, by 
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and large, young people are discontent, less partisan and are now more concerned with tangible 
economic and policy issues (C.-Y. Huang, 2014). But, this does not mean the Sunflower 
movement has led to the formation of a viable counter historical bloc. This is because if the only 
outcome of the Sunflower movement is the political resurgence of the DDP, this will not likely 
impede the DPP from pursuing a similarly LE capital advancing policy course as it had in the 
past. For a different policy course, it would be necessary for the crystallization of an explicitly 
economically concerned and issues-based movement that can resist identity motivated 
co-optation and which can pressure both the DPP and KMT to moderate their policies toward a 
less LE capital advancing direction when in office.  
  
Because of varying long-term interests, underlying contradictions are also increasingly visible 
between the CCP and Taiwan’s LE capitalist class. This is because the CCP is now less likely to 
secure the necessary support for its political aims if Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise intensifies 
further. But, given Taiwan’s still OEM/ODM capital defined social order and CSEI features, it is 
unlikely that Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise will be reversed which, in turn, will likely lead 
to an increased social contestation in Taiwan, much of which will be channeled toward CSEI as 
in the case of the Sunflower movement. For now, the CCP’s response toward opponents of the 
service pact has been to place more emphasis on engagement with Taiwan’s key social 
demographics such as SME owners, middle and low income earners and the younger generation 
(J.-H. Wang, 2014). Zhang Zhijun, the new head of the TAO has even referred to the Sunflower 
Movement directly by stating that he would like to talk with its leaders during a planned visit to 
Taiwan about the Service Pact (J. Hung, 2014). For now, such statements are primarily 
symbolic, but are reflective of the CCP’s attempt to secure an increased CSEI legitimacy in 
Taiwan. At the same time, however, it is difficult to conceive that the CCP would willingly 
engage with a movement which does not yet possess a clearly defined social basis and tangible 
class agenda. 
 
It is only by securing a coherent class basis for a more defined counter-historical bloc that both 
the parameters of Taiwan’s social order and the CSEI trajectory can be altered. To date, an 
identity dimension continues to complicate this aim, particularly when it comes to the question 
of engaging with the CCP which, for better or worse, has secured a social order shaping 
capacity in Taiwan. Many of Taiwan’s labour and social movement organizers are reserved 
toward engaging with the CCP due to Taiwan nationalist inclinations or a fear of being labelled 
as pro-China.
27
 In terms of engagement, some labour organizers acknowledge that they had 
been invited by the CCP to visit China’s labour unions for all expenses paid for visits, but that 
                                                     
27 Interview with anonymous interviewee 16 in December 25, 2012 
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engagement has remained centred on wining and dining.
28
 Given that the CCP is a pragmatic 
actor which engages with and responds to social forces in terms of their strength, it is possible 
for social movements to communicate a distinct non-capitalist perspective to the CCP. Of 
Taiwan’s progressive labour groups, the China-friendly Labour Party has the most extensive 
history of engagement with CCP party organs and has, at times, attempted to communicate a 
labour perspective to the CCP.
29
 But, party organizers also acknowledge that Taiwan’s 
organized labour is not yet a powerful enough social force to warrant a response from the 
CCP.
30
 The need to communicate with the CCP is also acknowledged by more pragmatic 
organizers such as Lai Weijie and Wu Yong-yi who understand that it is a pressing task for 
Taiwan’s social movements to insert their voice into the CSEI process and who understand the 
CCP as a responsive actor to class-led social contestation in Taiwan.
31
 But for now, they are 
reflective of a minority position among social movement organizers most of whom are still 
sceptical to engage with the CCP.  
 
Although Taiwan’s social movements have not yet been able to articulate a distinct class-based 
agenda to the CCP, CSEI now faces an increased contestation in Taiwan due to a more nuanced 
identity politics and Taiwan’s difficult to ignore socio-economic malaise. Although the 
Cross-Strait historical bloc continues to hold for the time being, contradictions are increasingly 
evident within it too which are likely to challenge the CCP’s geo-strategic strategy in the 
foreseeable future.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined how the Cross-Strait historical bloc’s long-term policy parameter 
culminated in a full scale Cross-Strait détente and a deepened and institutionalized CSEI 
trajectory. Due to the CCP’s détente induced perception management imperatives, I placed 
particular attention on examining its practice of economic interest ceding to Taiwan which was 
institutionalized in the ECFA agreement. At the same time, I argued that this did not offset 
Taiwan’s worsening socio-economic malaise because its social order and CSEI trajectory both 
continued to advance the interest of the OEM/ODM LE capitalist class. But, Taiwan’s 
worsening socio-economic malaise, I argue, for the first time led to serious difficulties in the 
CSEI legitimation process. This was because of Taiwan’s more receptive discursive climate to 
socio-economic issues due largely to the receding intensity of the Taiwan identity debate and 
the failure of Ma’s rosy legitimation of a CSEI induced economic prosperity to materialize. On 
                                                     
28 Interview with Hang Shr-shian in December 27, 2012. 
29 Interview with Tang Shu in December 28, 2012.
 
30 Interview with Tang Shu and GaoWei-kai in December 28, 2012 and January 3, 2013. 
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Interviews with WuYong-yi and Gao Wei-kai in January7, 2013 and January3, 2013. 
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this basis, I examined Taiwan’s resurfacing social movement contestation and argued that 
movement organizers have made significant progress toward an agenda widening. But at the 
same time, I argued that social movements have not developed into a viable counter historical 
bloc because a conscious class basis has not yet developed therein. As such, I argued that 
Taiwan’s social movements have primarily succeeded to force Ma’s administration to respond 
when mobilizing against CSEI because this drew support both from social movements and 
Taiwan nationalists. Although failing to alter Taiwan’s social order parameters, I argued that the 
rise of an increased anti-CSEI contestation has placed the CCP under an increased pressure to 
respond or to risk losing popular support in Taiwan for a deepened CSEI. For the time being, 
however, I argued that the hegemony of the Cross-Strait historical bloc remains weakened, but 
secure.  
 
Although my analysis in this chapter has focused particularly on the discursive processes which 
enabled CSEI, I have also examined underlying strains within the Cross-Strait historical bloc. 
At a most general level, such strains can be observed in the CCP’s long-term policy imperative 
to secure a deepened support for CSEI, but which is challenged by Taiwan’s ongoing 
socio-economic malaise for which the LE capital advancing nature of CSEI is a causal factor. 
Previously, Taiwan’s national identity debate has been crucial to the legitimation of capital 
advancing policies and has allowed Taiwan’s LE capitalist class to engage in a very limited 
degree of interest ceding to secure its hegemony. But, as I have argued, important changes 
occurred during this time which have led to a weakening of the Cross-Strait historical bloc’s 
hegemony due to a receding intensity of the Taiwan identity debate. As such, it is not surprising 
that there was a dramatic increase in Taiwan’s social contestation during this time. But, my 
analysis also shows that a relatively more nuanced identity current does still continue to 
influence Taiwan’s social movement contestation. Because, Taiwan’s internationalization has 
been toward China, the regional nature of its class contradictions have led to an unavoidably 
regional dynamic of resistance processes and due to which it has been difficult for such 
resistance to be dis-entangled from identity contradictions. Regardless of the unsettled nature 
the CSEI trajectory, one thing is for sure and that is that a previous economistic narrative of a 
CSEI induced national prosperity is now much less convincing than it was before. This being so, 
a continually LE capital defined CSEI trajectory will likely be ever more difficult to legitimate 
in the time ahead without a more concerted interest ceding in Taiwan.  
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Conclusion 
My main aim in this thesis has been to account for the complicit and facilitating role of Taiwan’s 
state toward CSEI despite the challenges that it poses to Taiwan’s sovereignty and 
socio-economic welfare. My analysis has been guided by two central aims, the first of which 
was to problematize mainstream accounts of CSEI which are based on either realist or liberal 
predicates, or as is most often the case, a combination of both. As such, I challenged both the 
liberal predicate that a market-led CSEI is necessarily economically beneficial for a majority of 
Taiwan’s citizens and the realist predicate that Taiwan’s state is an autonomous and 
agency-bound actor which seeks to advance Taiwan’s collective interest through its CSEI 
policies. To overcome such static assumptions toward CSEI, my second aim was to apply a 
neo-Gramscian framework to demonstrate that CSEI can be better theorized in terms of social 
order and the class basis of Taiwan’s state. To do so, I theorized CSEI relations through a 
hegemonic Cross-Strait historical bloc forged between Taiwan’s LE capitalist class and the CCP. 
By positing Taiwan’s policy parameter as being defined by a Cross-Strait historical bloc, I also 
theorized the social basis of Taiwan’s state. More specifically, I historicized Taiwan’s social 
order from the KMT’s arrival in 1945 onward to explain how a previous political autonomy 
enjoyed by the KMT’s elite bureaucracy dissolved due to a prolonged changing social basis of 
Taiwan’s state. By theorizing CSEI in terms of Taiwan’s social order and the Cross-Strait 
historical bloc, I have demonstrated that CSEI cannot be understood without an explicit focus 
on the class basis of Taiwan’s state. Additionally, I have also demonstrated that the 
neo-Gramscian framework is highly effective at theorizing both CSEI and non-Northern 
regional social orders more generally.  
 
Research Questions and Thesis Findings 
The main research question that I addressed was why has Taiwan’s state facilitated a prolonged 
Cross-Strait economic integration process? In order to address this research question, I also 
address two related sub-questions. The first sub-question was how can CSEI be understood in 
terms of Taiwan’s social order and what was the CCP’s role in shaping it? The second 
sub-question was how can the limited resistance against CSEI be understood as an outcome of 
its successful legitimation? Finally, I have also addressed a number of much more specific 
sub-questions in each chapter which combined allow me to answer my research question and 
sub-questions definitively. Therefore, I will first go over my chapter questions and how I have 
addressed each before I return to answer my research question and sub-questions.  
 
In chapter 1, I examine how CSEI can be understood conceptually without relying on realist or 
liberal predicates? To do so, I first identify the limitations of the liberal and realist predicates on 
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which the CSEI literature is based and then develop an alternative set of conceptual parameters 
from which to proceed. Based on insights from the policy studies, economic nationalist and 
sociological literature, I argued that rather than leading to Taiwan’s collective welfare 
enhancement, that the class-led nature of CSEI has exacerbated Taiwan’s socio-economic 
malaise. I argued also, however, that it is necessary to account for Taiwan’s socio-economic 
malaise not only as an outcome of CSEI, but also the class basis of Taiwan’s capital defined 
social order more generally. To discern the class basis of Taiwan’s state, I engaged with the 
statist literature and argued that although Taiwan was a developmental-state between 1949 and 
1988, that the political autonomy which enabled it has to be explained with reference to the 
social basis of Taiwan’s state. Finally, I explain the progressive erosion and eventual dissolution 
of the elite bureaucracy’s autonomy as an outcome of a changing social basis of Taiwan’s state 
which culminated in the ascendance of a new alliance of class interests in which the LE 
capitalist class and the CCP were central.  
 
In chapter 2, I explore how a neo-Gramscian framework can be applied to theorize CSEI 
through the concept of regionally operating historical blocs? To do so, I first critiqued the global 
capitalism perspective held by many neo-Gramscians and argued that although a broad capitalist 
policy convergence is occurring, that this is so only in a general and abstract sense and that a 
regional order variation remains the norm. I base this on the Gramscian theory’s national point 
of departure by which transnational social orders emanate from and are legitimated at the 
national level. On this basis, I argued that national social orders are impinged on by both a 
transnational and regional historical blocs while the susceptibility to either is determined largely 
by the fractional nature of nationally hegemonic capitalist classes. As such, I argued that the 
sub-contracting features of Taiwan’s hegemonic LE capitalist class have led it to join a historical 
bloc with the ‘contender state’ managing CCP which has led to Taiwan’s pronounced 
internationalization to China. Additionally, I also developed a conceptual schema to theorize 
Taiwan’s social order transition from a previous passive revolution enabled statist to a 
Cross-Strait historical bloc defined liberal capitalist social order and I focus especially on the 
hegemonic narrative which enabled this transition.  
 
In chapter 3, I examined what was the social basis of Taiwan’s hard developmental-state 
between 1949 and 1978 for the elite bureaucracy’s pronounced political autonomy during this 
time? Securing its class interest from a control over the state, I argued that the elite 
bureaucracy’s political autonomy rested on a successful passive revolution which allowed it to 
secure a disciplinary rule while remaining unresponsive to interest articulation among Taiwan’s 
social forces. Pursuing a statist development path, I argued that the elite bureaucracy’s 
autonomy remained stable because it secured the necessary acquiescence from Taiwan’s major 
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classes, especially its growing labour, middle and capitalist classes. Although a majority of 
Taiwan’s classes had not yet developed a class consciousness, I also argued that the key 
exception was an increasingly influential LE capitalist class which was targeted for the most 
intensive transformismo. Although the LE capitalist class acquiesced to the elite bureaucracy’s 
leadership, the two did become relatively more closely aligned over this time. Until 1978, this 
did not yet significantly alter Taiwan’s statist social order features, but I argued that from the 
late 1960s onward, Taiwan’s social order can already be theorized in terms of a historical bloc 
forged between a dominant elite bureaucracy and a subservient LE capitalist class. 
 
In chapter 4, I examined how a prolonged changing social basis of Taiwan’s state led to a 
continued, but much weakened elite bureaucratic autonomy during Taiwan’s soft 
developmental-state era between 1978 and 1988? I identified two inter-related processes as 
having led to a weakened elite bureaucratic autonomy, namely an increasing contestation 
induced encroachment on previously off-limit political spaces and a weakened elite bureaucratic 
consensus due to its prolonged interest harmonization with Taiwan’s LE capitalist class. In 
policy terms, I argued that the elite bureaucracy became much more responsive to the short-term 
interest of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class while its industrial policy was also confined only to 
national priority targets. This was because the elite bureaucratic – LE capitalist historical bloc 
increasingly underpinned the stability of the statist order, especially in the context of an 
increased contestation among Taiwan’s labouring and middle classes. Although such 
contestation was previously manageable, I argued that the elite bureaucracy’s successful 
repression of a class politics led to a channelling of social contradictions toward a specifically 
regime challenging democratization movement. As such, a severely weakened elite bureaucratic 
autonomy still held only because of a continued LE capitalist acquiescence to the elite 
bureaucracy’s leadership and its elevation of a political transformismo to the elite bureaucratic 
level.  
 
In chapter 5, I explored how a prolonged changing social basis of Taiwan’s state led to the 
eventual dissolution of the elite bureaucracy’s political autonomy during Lee Teng-hui’s 
presidency and what the state’s social basis was afterward? Because CSEI now fully intensified, 
I also explored why the state allowed CSEI to proceed during this time? At a domestic level, I 
argued that a historical bloc came into shape in which the LE capitalist class was hegemonic and 
which dissolved the elite bureaucracy’s remaining political autonomy. The historical bloc’s 
hegemony, I argued, was enabled especially by the rise of an issues-diverting national identity 
politics which was a crucial component of Taiwan’s hegemonic narrative. This was especially so 
because it impeded the forming of a viable counter historical bloc while also enabling a wide 
acceptance of the economistic core of Taiwan’s hegemonic narrative. Although Lee’s policy was 
157 
 
unambiguously capital-advancing, I also examine the single exception to the rule, his failed 
attempt to curtail an intensifying CSEI. This, I argued, was due to the CCP’s successful forging 
of a Cross-Strait historical bloc with Taiwan’s LE capitalist class during this time which 
flaunted Lee’s unenforceable CSEI restrictions by progressively intensifying CSEI.  
 
In chapter 6, I examine why and how a Taiwan nationalist DPP pursued a CSEI liberalizing 
policy path, especially in the context of an intensified socio-economic malaise which became 
fully evident during this time? I argued that the DPP’s CSEI liberalization occurred in response 
to a conscious advance by the Cross-Strait historical bloc and was driven largely by the party’s 
aim of securing the support of Taiwan’s hegemonic LE capitalist class. As such, I argued that 
Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise was an outcome of resource allocation contradictions more 
generally and the specific sub-contracting nature of its industrial composition which led CSEI to 
occur in the context of a pronounced capital flight. Rather than a rise of social contestation, I 
argued that the DPP’s elevation of a divisive Taiwan nationalism to the center of Taiwan’s 
political discourse and its successful co-opting of Taiwan’s social movements sidelined an 
issues-based political discourse entirely. As such, the DDP was able to legitimate CSEI as a 
purely economic matter and as being necessary for Taiwan. I argued, however, that the 
long-term outcome of the DPP’s policy was that is strengthened the CCP’s capacity to discipline 
Taiwan’s LE capitalist class to wield its influence toward securing the KMT’s return to power in 
2008.  
 
In chapter 7, I examine how it was that a prolonged CSEI finally culminated in political détente 
and the most marked CSEI openings to date during Ma’s Ying-jeou’s presidency despite 
Taiwan’s continually worsening socio-economic malaise? Because of a much more intensified 
issues-based contestation process during this time, I also explore to what extent such 
contestation is reflective of a weakened CSEI legitimation and the possibility that a 
counter-historical bloc may be coming into existence? The increased social contestation, I 
argued, was an outcome of Ma’s CSEI legitimation in solely economic prosperity terms, the 
DPP’s post-defeat reorientation toward a more foregrounded issues-based agenda and, of course, 
a continued socio-economic malaise which was no longer overshadowed so strongly by an 
emotive national identity debate. But, although Taiwan’s social movements have been 
increasingly active, I argued that they have not yet coalesced into a counter historical bloc 
because a conscious class basis has not yet developed therein. This, I argued, is due largely to a 
continued identity dimension which has underpinned many of Taiwan’s most successful 
mobilizations to date. But, although the hegemony of Taiwan’s historical bloc continues to 
remain tenable, I argued that for the foreseeable future, Taiwan’s social dislocations are likely to 
continue spilling over into a specifically CSEI challenging direction. 
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Based on the answer to my chapter questions, I can now also straightforwardly answer my 
research question and its two sub-questions. Firstly, Taiwan’s state facilitated a prolonged CSEI 
because its policy was confined within the parameters which emanated from Taiwan’s 
Cross-Strait historical bloc. As for the question of Taiwan’s social order, an intensified CSEI 
occurred on the basis of the hegemonic stature of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class and through 
which the CCP also secured a strong social order shaping capacity in Taiwan toward advancing 
its interests. As for the question of legitimation and contestation, a limited social contestation 
can be explained in terms of the effectiveness of Taiwan’s hegemonic narrative. This was 
composed of a divisive Taiwan identity politics which enabled the wide acceptance of the 
hegemonic narrative’s economistic core which equated a capital-led CSEI with Taiwan’s 
collective prosperity. Although this hegemonic narrative has weakened during Ma’s presidency, 
I argue that it continues to hold.  
 
Theoretical implications:  
CSEI tends most often to factor as a matter of interest because of its perceived geopolitical 
importance for the Cross-Strait relationship which continues to be identified as a potential 
military flashpoint. Although this may have been the case before, as I have argued throughout 
this thesis, the CCP’s United Front strategy has been so successful at securing Taiwan’s 
internationalization toward China that the possibility of military action across the strait is 
virtually zero. Despite this being so, the existing literature has failed to accurately theorize the 
CSEI relationship due to the prevalence of an asocial and ahistorical analysis which is based on 
un-theorized liberal and realist predicates. Although it is true that some CSEI scholars have 
focused more specifically on class and have parted paths with liberal assumptions, a much more 
deeply entrenched realist predicate of an agency-bound state continues to influence their 
analysis (C.-W. Lin, 2004; T.-H. Lin, 2009). To overcome this, a more critical political economy 
type approach toward CSEI is absolutely necessary, but which to date, also remains lacking and 
under-developed. This is unfortunate not only because of the failure of existing approaches to 
elucidate the CSEI process, but also because CSEI is a particularly illuminating example of 
regional social order formation processes.  
 
As I have demonstrated, the major problem with a realist and liberal predicate based analysis is 
that such predicates are un-reflexively theorized as objective features of the international order. 
But, both predicates have failed to account for Taiwan’s state as subject to a fluid and 
perpetually transforming social order basis which has defined the policy parameters and class 
interests advanced by the state at any given time. As such, because I have identified the LE 
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capitalist class as hegemonic in Taiwan’s post-statist social order, I was able to account for 
Taiwan’s socio-economic malaise as a direct outcome of the LE capital advancing features of 
CSEI and its social order. With Taiwan’s deep economic dependence on China, I have not taken 
issue with CSEI itself, but rather the welfare impeding outcomes which result from its LE 
capital-defined nature. This is especially so because of the OEM/ODM features of Taiwan’s LE 
capitalist class which has ensured that CSEI was driven by a massive capital flight which has 
had a scarring effect on Taiwan’s social welfare and economic upgrading prospects. Although I 
have also theorized the CCP as a central class in the Cross-Strait historical bloc, this has not 
diluted the LE capital advancing features of CSEI. This was because of the CCP’s 
responsiveness to the economic interests of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class due to its reliance on it 
to intensify CSEI and to confine Taiwan’s state policy parameters. 
  
A Gramscian approach is not only illuminating because it can explain policy and social order 
features in terms of class basis, but also because it can account for the class agencies which 
shape and define social order parameters. As such, although my analysis was based on material 
processes such as class and social order, I have also examined the central role of ideational 
processes toward shaping legitimation and resistance processes. This is a particularly important 
question because a capital-defined social order and CSEI both continue to secure a high degree 
of popular support in Taiwan. But, as I have shown, this is not difficult to grasp when the effects 
of the class-diluting and issues-diverting Taiwan identity debate are accounted for. Due to the 
centrality of identity cleavages, rather than realizing and articulating on a set of separate class 
interests, Taiwan’s citizens instead tended to accept the economic core of the hegemonic 
narrative which de-politicizes economic policy and CSEI. Thus, it is clear that although class is 
central toward understanding Taiwan’s social order, ideational processes have been equally 
important by mediating the collective agency of major classes toward defining the social basis 
of Taiwan’s state. 
 
In order to account for CSEI, a longer-term historicization of Taiwan’s social order was also 
necessary. By relying on the Gramscian triangle which examines the class basis of social orders 
as affected by inter-determining production, institutional and ideational nodes, I have also been 
able to theorize Taiwan’s social order transformation process. More specifically, my analysis has 
shown that since 1949, Taiwan’s social order has underwent two major transformations from a 
passive revolution enabled developmental-state to a Cross-Strait historical bloc defined liberal 
capitalist order. On the basis of passive revolution, transformismo and the historical bloc, I was 
not only able to situate the social basis of the KMT elite bureaucracy’s political autonomy, but 
also the relative diluting thereof and its eventual dissolution altogether. My argument thus also 
suggests that the class basis of the developmental-state is a central factor for the transitory 
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nature of the statist social order. This is because a statist industrialization development path 
always propels class formation processes which eventually challenge a necessary elite 
bureaucratic autonomy. In Taiwan’s case, this occurred both in terms of an increasingly 
powerful capitalist class which eventually advanced to secure political power and an increased 
middle and labouring class contestation spurred forth by development induced social change.  
 
The Gramscian theory’s strong capacity to theorize social order variation and its concept of 
passive revolution has also been instrumental to my theorization of the CCP’s role within the 
Cross-Strait historical bloc. To do so, I have built on Kees van der Pijl’s (2012) conception of 
China as a passive revolution-enabled contender state to theorize a necessary outward effect on 
regional social order that such a contender state naturally poses. My analysis suggests that the 
CCP’s politically autonomous elite bureaucracy has shaped Taiwan’s social order according to a 
logic which can be conceptualized through the Gramscian concept of the historical bloc. 
Through the Cross-Strait historical bloc, for instance, I was able to demonstrate how the CCP 
has pursued its geo-strategic policy interests through a conscious interest harmonization with 
Taiwan’s LE capitalist class to secure its social order shaping capacity in Taiwan. But, because I 
theorize the CCP’s elite bureaucracy as a similarly distinct class to the KMT’s previously 
regime managing elite bureaucracy, I have also been able to account for the CCP’s geo-strategic 
policy in class terms without reverting to realist concepts of state agency.  
 
As I have demonstrated in my analysis, historicizing and accounting for the class basis of CSEI 
is something that the neo-Gramscian framework does not struggle with. But, my application of 
the framework also veers from popular global capitalist applications which tend to theorize a 
process of global capitalist social order convergence and anti-capitalist resistance against this. 
(Gill, 1995, 2002; Rupert, 2000, 2003) This is largely an outcome of a more static and 
monolithic understanding of capitalism which has led to a consciously and binary like 
theorizing. As such, social order formation processes in which an anti-capitalist element is not 
so clearly present and in which encroachment processes cannot be so easily linked to a diffuse 
global capitalist class tend to escape its focus. What my findings suggest, however, is that 
sacrificing the Gramscian theory’s strong explanatory capacity because of a consciously global 
anti-capitalist theorizing is a very unfortunate development. For one, it remains the case that the 
Gramscian framework can be applied both to account for a more general global capitalist 
convergence process, but also more regional social order formation processes. But even so, my 
analysis shows that theorizing global convergence process cannot be complete without also 
accounting for concomitant social order formation processes at the regional level. This is 
especially so because although all capitalist social orders have a stake at deepening and 
expanding capital accumulation, there also remain important intra-capital interest contradictions 
161 
 
too. 
 
When applying a Gramscian approach to examine capitalist social order formation and 
internationalization processes, my analysis suggests that the first question to ask is what the 
fractional nature of dominant or hegemonic capitalist classes is. It is only by doing so that the 
policy basis of individual states can be more correctly theorized in terms of the degree to which 
they are susceptive to regional historical blocs or a northern-emanating transnational historical 
bloc. Of course, it is unlikely that there will be many cases in which the degree of 
internationalization is so strongly pronounced as that of Taiwan, especially because of the 
CCP’s prolonged policy priority to secure Taiwan’s unification with China. In a majority of 
cases, it is likely that individual state-society complexes will be subject to a confluence of 
regionally and transnationally operating historical blocs and toward one of which they are likely 
to tilt more pronouncedly. But, regardless of the degree of correspondence, Taiwan’s 
internationalization toward China is reflective of a pronounced and continued regional feature of 
global order which cannot be ignored easily. This is especially so because despite proceeding on 
the basis of a capitalist economic integration process, Taiwan has internationalized toward 
China’s counter-hegemonic contender state, a fact which directly challenges the global capitalist 
convergence thesis.  
 
My analysis demonstrates also that it is problematic to conceive class contradictions in global 
terms. The reality of the matter is that class cleavages are much less clearly defined than is often 
assumed while they will also tend to manifest themselves in a much more distinctively regional 
fashion. Because of this, it is not always so easy to reduce an analysis of social forces solely to a 
capitalist vs. non capitalist schema when focusing on regional social orders. As Taiwan’s case 
demonstrates, the CCP clearly cannot fall under the capitalist class heading because of China’s 
counter-hegemonic contender state stature. But at a strategic level, the CCP has also operated 
through a pronounced capitalist logic by aligning itself with Taiwan’s LE capitalist class. One 
thing that is certain, however, is that because of the visibility of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class and 
the CCP, resistance processes have also been much more regionally focused and have not 
developed into a global anti-capitalist direction. This is to be expected, however, because it is 
the LE capitalist class and the CCP which have most visibly shaped Taiwan’s social order and 
which are also naturally most responsive to social contestation processes thereon. As such, the 
economistic core of the hegemonic narrative has also been aimed at linking Taiwan’s economic 
welfare directly with a deepened CSEI. Although this economistic narrative includes a 
normative assumption of the desirability of capitalist market relations, it is also designed to 
overcome specific reservations in Taiwan toward economic integration with China.  
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As my analysis also shows, in order to utilize the concept of class, it is crucial to explore its 
often entangled relationship with identity politics. As I noted in my analysis, a Taiwan identity 
politics has been central to its strong degree of popular support toward a capitalist defined CSEI 
process and social order. In Taiwan’s case, its historical experience and various extant identity 
contradictions have ensured that the China centred nature of the Cross-Strait historical bloc has 
exacerbated an identity politics toward which class contradictions have been channelled to. It is, 
however, true that a previously CSEI advancing Taiwan identity politics has nuanced somewhat 
of late while a relatively more foregrounded class dimension has also channelled contestation 
against an intensified CSEI. But, this has also been problematic because contestation has tended 
to focus on the destination of Taiwan’s capital flight, but not so much on Taiwan’s social order 
and class basis which are at the root of the capital flight in the first place. Because of an 
under-developed class agenda and a continued identity current within Taiwan’s anti-CSEI 
contestation, I have remained sceptical that a viable counter historical bloc may be coming into 
shape yet which can qualitatively alter Taiwan’s social order parameters. As such, my analysis 
again points to the importance of identity discourses and their role in social order legitimation at 
the regional level in order for a class analysis to gain a necessary degree of precision. Although 
a specifically global Gramscian theorizing is well developed, it is clear that what is needed now 
is for this to be accompanied by a much better developed regional analysis.  
 
Future Research  
Based on my analysis, there are at least three interesting directions which future research can 
take toward CSEI, the CCP’s international strategy and increasing regionalizing tendencies in 
the global order more generally.  
 
In terms of CSEI, now that the tenability of the Gramscian framework toward theorizing CSEI 
has been demonstrated, especially from the perspective of Taiwan, it will be illuminating to also 
examine CSEI from a more explicit CCP perspective. Although much more is known about the 
CCP’s United Front policies toward Taiwan’s LE capitalist class, it will be important also to 
explore the CCP’s United Front policy at a deeper level toward Taiwan’s non-capitalist classes. 
Throughout my analysis, I have taken especial note of the CCP’s pragmatic CSEI policy 
features of responding to Taiwan’s social forces on the basis of class influence. This policy logic, 
combined with Taiwan’s more pronounced anti-CSEI contestation and an increased CCP 
emphasis on perception management, suggests that it will be especially important to examine 
the CCP’s strategic thinking toward engagement with Taiwan’s social movements and labor 
groups. As I noted, such engagement has already occurred, but it also still remains limited and 
primarily at the level of symbolic interactionism. But provided Taiwan’s social movements 
gained further influence, it is not impossible that the CCP may opt to engage with them more 
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tangibly, especially toward the pragmatic aim of diluting the Taiwan nationalism among 
Taiwan’s social movements. To examine this would be interesting on its own terms, but could 
also allow for the CCP’s United Front long-term alliance with Taiwan’s LE capitalist class to be 
researched more critically. This is especially so because with the CCP’s dominant status, the 
question naturally remains whether or not an eroding support for CSEI may yet force the CCP’s 
hand toward shaping the CSEI process along a more socially conducive pathway. If this were a 
possibility, this may yet weaken the influence of Taiwan’s LE capitalist class toward shaping the 
CSEI process.  
 
The CCP’s CSEI policies are important also because they are likely to be reflective of the CCP’s 
international strategy more generally. As such, there are also many important questions which 
can be explored through a further application of a neo-Gramscian framework on this question. It 
is true that there is a level of specificity to the Cross-Strait historical bloc because it operates 
solely on Taiwan and toward the central aim of securing Taiwan’s eventual unification with 
China. But at the same time, China has also secure a strong presence and pronounced political 
influence along a qualitatively similar path in less powerful surrounding countries such as 
ASEAN states toward which alliance formation with dominant classes has also been central. 
This and similar CCP priority engagements are likely to be a very fruitful area for further 
research. Although I have focused on historical blocs according to a regional dimension, it is 
also possible that regionally centered historical blocs can secure a transnational reach. This is 
especially likely in the case of the CCP’s Africa policies which have come under particular 
attention of late because it has pursued a conscious logic of targeted alliance formation with 
regional elite classes whiles also attempting to secure a welcome presence through a central 
ideational dimension. To do so, the CCP has propagated a narrative which stresses a 
South-South solidarity and mutual aid type conception of global order which also directly 
challenges neoliberal development thinking. In addition to secure the CCP’s welcome presence, 
such policies are also reflective of a contender state policy logic by which the CCP has sought to 
challenge the global North’s dominance toward defining the norms of international economic 
relations. This has been so much the case that China’s policy has been referred to by some 
commentators as a characteristic ‘Beijing consensus’ policy framework (Halper. 2010; Ramo, 
2004). As such, a neo-Gramscian analysis is likely to be especially prescient toward theorizing 
such a dynamic through the theoretical lens of CCP-led historical blocs within given national or 
regional social orders.  
 
At a more general level, there is also significant scope to apply a regional historical bloc type 
framework to theorize non-Northern transnational relations, especially in the context of rising 
power states and their regionalizing effects. Because the Cross-Strait historical bloc has 
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emanated from a contender state, the question of how to account for regional historical blocs 
which are centered in liberal capitalist states such as India and Brazil has been beyond the scope 
of my analysis. Based on a regional Gramscian schema, however, it is not an unreasonable 
assumption that hegemonic capital factions based in rising power states will likely also forge 
regionally operating historical blocs to shape regional social orders. Because of fractional 
contradictions, it is likely that such historical blocs will also pursue interests which, at times, 
will clash with a Northern emanating historical bloc. As such, whether applied to examine the 
hegemonic core within regional historical blocs or the effects thereof on weaker states, further 
Gramscian research on such questions is much needed and will likely be extremely illuminating. 
In addition to theoretical and conceptual insights toward understanding the global order more 
generally, such research is especially crucial because of the highly topical nature in relation to 
the current multi-polar global moment.  
 
Because of the multi-polar features of the current global order, it is likely that a general interest 
in regional social order will grow stronger in the foreseeable future. To what extent such 
research will be guided by a Gramscian framework remains to be seen, but the level of 
correspondence in the case of CSEI to Gramscian insights adds credence to a multiple-historical 
blocs conception of global order. A multi-historical bloc defined feature of global order has been 
less observable previously largely because of a unipolar post-Cold War moment of Northern 
supremacy which culminated in the neoliberal Washington consensus and its corrosive effects 
on the global South. Of course, this is not to say that regional capitalists did not also ally with a 
transnational historical bloc during this time, but rather that such integration was not 
friction-free and without contradiction, especially because the neoliberal policy consensus 
advanced the interests of Northern capital. But, as China’s rise and an increased multi-polar 
global order demonstrate, this was a historically specific juncture which has now become 
significantly weakened. Naturally, social order and class contradictions remain, but the 
multitude of historical blocs which are in operation is likely to entail a much more diffuse and 
labyrinth like power distribution which a regionally-focused Gramscian framework remains 
well suited to theorize.  
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